Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16709/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act .

Between:

Danielle Sadler

Appellant

and

The Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR: Jan Dymond

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Danielle Sadler, Owner

For the Respondent: Sadia Ashraf, Representative

HEARD: By teleconference February 24, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Danielle Sadler, the appellant, appeals the 45-day impoundment of the appellant’s 2015 Ford Expedition motor vehicle, Ohio licence plate GHU3203, under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on January 25, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Jordan Jacob Marcus Lewis (“the driver”) was driving the vehicle while his licence was under suspension resulting from a prescribed criminal conviction.

2The appellant relies on sections 50.2(3)(c) and (d), namely that she exercised due diligence in determining that the driver’s licence of the driver was not suspended at the time of the motor vehicle was detained in order to be impounded, and that the impoundment of the vehicle will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension under s.50.2(3)(c) of the Act; and

ii. whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULTS

4I find that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship and order the respondent to release the vehicle. Given that finding, I do not need to decide the due diligence ground of appeal.

ANALYSIS

5The Registrar submitted evidence confirming the driver had never held a valid Ontario driver’s licence and had been subject to suspension since 2016. They further submitted a Notice to Registrar indicating that the driver had failed to produce a driver’s licence when the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded and that a breathalyzer test of the driver registered 80 mg or over. Accordingly, I find that the vehicle was lawfully impounded pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the Act.

6The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act may, pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.

7An owner may appeal only on the grounds set out in s. 50.2(3)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Act. The appellant appeals on grounds of s. 50.2(3)(c) that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver was not suspended at the time the motor vehicle was detained in order to be impounded and that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

The appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

8I find that the appellant has established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle and, on a balance of probabilities, that the impoundment has resulted in a financial and economic loss of an immediate, significant and lasting nature to the appellant because the impoundment caused the termination of her employment.

9Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria by which exceptional hardship is defined for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. Subsection 10(1) compels the Tribunal to first consider whether the owner has alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

10Subsection 10(4) of the Regulation places the burden on the owner to demonstrate there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, which includes considering and inquiring into every reasonable option such as using another vehicle and making arrangements to manage without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

11Only if the appellant demonstrates that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available to her may I consider the other factors and criteria in the Regulation that define the exceptional hardship test, for example, financial loss or loss of employment. Importantly, the Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

The appellant does not have alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

12I find that the appellant has demonstrated, on a balance of probabilities, that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available under s.10(4) of the Regulation.

13The appellant is an American resident who was visiting her boyfriend and family in Ontario at the time the vehicle was impounded on January 25, 2025. She testifies that she was scheduled to return to the U.S. the following day so that she could be at work on January 27, 2025. She testifies that, because of the impoundment, she has had to remain in Canada.

14The appellant testifies that, since the impoundment, she has been staying with the driver and the driver’s parents who have been providing her with meals, laundry access, etc. She has not required medical attention while in Ontario. She testifies that, without a vehicle, she is unable to return to the U.S. causing her exceptional hardship.

15The Registrar submits that the appellant has access to alternative transportation and that she has not looked into a car rental or bus as alternatives.

16The appellant testifies she considered but could not afford to return to the U.S. via other means of transportation. She testifies that airfare would cost a minimum of $400 while a bus ticket would be between $68 and $100. She testifies no one she knows has a passport that would enable them to come to Canada to assist her and that neither the driver nor the driver’s parents own a vehicle that she can borrow in order to return to the U.S. She states that she has exhausted her available financial resources; that she cannot afford to rent a vehicle or pay for airfare or bus ticket to return home, and that she is unable to borrow money from friends or family as they also have limited financial resources. She testifies that the father of her children has loaned her funds for the appeal but is not able to assist her further.

17I note that the appellant has been staying in Picton, Ontario where there is no direct transportation to the appellant’s hometown of Monclova, near Toledo, Ohio and therefore the appellant would have to find means to get to a major transportation hub such as Toronto in order to catch a flight or a bus. Even if the appellant had attempted to use alternative means of return, I find it is probable that she would not have arrived in time to meet her work commitment.

18I note that the appellant has been staying in Picton, Ontario where there is no direct transportation to the appellant’s hometown of Monclova outside Toledo, Ohio and, therefore, the appellant would have to find means to get to a major transportation hub such as Toronto in order to catch a flight or a bus. Even if the appellant had attempted to use alternative means of return, I find it is probable that she would not have arrived in time to meet her work commitment.

19Section 10(4) of the Regulations requires that every reasonable option be considered. While there are options available, I find that the costs and time required render them not reasonable in this case. I find, therefore, that the appellant has considered and inquired about alternatives and find that she has established that no reasonable alternatives are available that would have enabled her to return to work as scheduled thereby avoiding termination of her employment.

The appellant has established that the impoundment resulted in financial and economic loss, and loss of employment.

20Having found that the appellant has satisfied the requirement to demonstrate that no alternative transportation is available or that she can make arrangements to do without her vehicle, I may now consider whether the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship. In analysing whether the appellant meets the exceptional hardship test under s.10(2) and 10(3) of the Regulation, I have considered it from the perspective of the appellant’s need to return to the U.S. in order to maintain her employment.

21I find it is probable that, had it not been for the impoundment of her vehicle, the appellant would have been able to return to the U.S. as planned and would likely have retained her employment.

22The appellant testifies that, prior to the impoundment, she was working part-time and was paid an hourly rate of $21/hour for 30 hours/week. She further testifies that she was terminated by her employer because she was unable to return to the U.S. as planned.

23She submits that the loss of her employment has caused an immediate economic loss leaving her without funds to support herself and her children - a loss that will continue to mount until she is able to find a new job.

24The respondent submits that the appellant has access to alternative transportation that she can use for her daily transportation needs. The respondent argues that the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is an inconvenience and that the appellant had other means of transportation available to her to return to the U.S. but has not looked into renting a vehicle or using other means of transportation such as a bus or airflight to return to the U.S. and requests that the Tribunal confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.

25I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant has established that her loss of employment is a direct result of the impoundment of her motor vehicle and that the loss is immediate, significant and lasting. Clearly, the loss was immediate as it resulted in a complete loss of income from that source upon her termination. The loss is significant because she has lost her only source of income and means to support her children and is lasting because the income it represents cannot be replaced. Additionally, as a visitor, she is unable to work in Ontario. Without her vehicle, she is unable to return to the U.S. to find work.

26For the reasons stated above, I find that the appellant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3) of the Act.

27As I have found that the appellant has met her onus to establish exceptional hardship, I do not need to consider whether the appellant exercised due diligence under 50.2(3)(c) of the Act.

Conclusion

28I find that the appellant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

ORDER

29Pursuant to s.50.2(5) of the Act, I direct the Registrar to release the impounded vehicle.