Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16688/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Between:

Danny Grimard

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Danny Grimard, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Sadia Ashraf, Representative

HEARD: February 14, 2025

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Danny Grimard, appeals under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”) from the 45-day impoundment of a 2010 Honda motor vehicle. At the time it was detained in order to be impounded, M.M. was driving the vehicle while her licence was suspended as a result of a Criminal Code conviction.

2The appellant’s motor vehicle was detained in order to be impounded on January 24, 2025. The 45-day impoundment period ends on March 10, 2025.

3The appellant is appealing on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

4The issue in dispute is:

i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

5I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. The impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

6The respondent presented uncontradicted evidence which establishes that:

i. the appellant is the registered owner of the impounded vehicle, a 2010 Honda motor vehicle (the “vehicle”);

ii. on January 24, 2025, the police discovered the vehicle being driven by M.M. (the “driver”); and

iii. the licence of the driver was under suspension for a Criminal Code conviction at the time the police detained the vehicle for impoundment.

Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship

7The burden is on the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as it is defined in the Act and regulations. I find the appellant has not met his burden.

8Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

9Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

10If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will fail.

11If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then subsection 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to subsection 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses.

12The Tribunal is not permitted to consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

13I find the appellant has alternative means of transportation available to him. The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, he and his spouse have been using a 2011 Grand Caravan motor vehicle and a 2015 Toyota Corolla motor vehicle. He testified that the Grand Caravan vehicle is his spouse’s primary vehicle, and he normally drives the 2015 Toyota Corolla. He testified that his family has been able to use these two alternative vehicles to meet their transportation needs. He testified that, since the impoundment, he and his family have not missed any medical appointments and they have been able to obtain groceries and medications as needed.

14The appellant further testified that he has access to taxi services in his town.

15The appellant testified that, in fact, on January 18, 2025, he had sold the vehicle on Facebook Marketplace and he was surprised to learn that the vehicle was still registered in the name of his spouse and himself, and not the new owner. He has not been in contact with the new owner since he sold the vehicle, and he does not know the driver. He states that he did not realize he needed to complete additional steps to transfer ownership of the vehicle, and acknowledges that the proper steps were not taken. He testified that the financial cost of the impoundment fees is a hardship as he is the single income provider for his family.

16In any case, the focus of this appeal is on the grounds of exceptional hardship. I find the evidence before the Tribunal establishes that there are alternative means of transportation available to the appellant. Since the impoundment, the appellant has used two alternative vehicles, a Dodge Caravan and a Toyota Corolla, to complete his essential tasks and maintain his household. Since the impoundment, both he and his spouse continue to drive their primary vehicles.

17Under the circumstances, I find the appellant has not proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available and the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.

ORDER

18Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.