Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18032/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Yingcong Zhou

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Bruce Stanton

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Yingcong Zhou

Kam Hung Stephen Wai, Paralegal

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference

Tuesday, December 16, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Yingcong Zhou, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of his motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on November 23, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that his licence, at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded, was not then under suspension, and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that his licence, at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded, was not then under suspension; and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that his licence, at the time the motor vehicle was detained in order to be impounded, was not then under suspension

6I am not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that his licence, at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded, was not then under suspension.

7In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

8Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant establish that he took reasonable actions to determine that he was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that he is properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

9The appellant testified that he did not know his licence was suspended at the time his vehicle was detained for impoundment.

10The appellant’s documentary evidence reveals that on November 5, 2025, the appellant was convicted of Dangerous Operation under s. 320.13(1) under the Criminal Code and was sentenced to 12 months’ probation pursuant to a Probation Order (“PO”) issued by the Court that day. I take notice that a conviction under s. 320.13 of the Criminal Code carries, upon a first conviction, pursuant to s. 41(1)(b) and (f) of the Act, a one-year suspension of driving privileges.

11The PO listed seven conditions the appellant was required to uphold during the 12 months including, “… not to operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content over 0 mg of alcohol/100 ml of blood”.

12The appellant testified that he believed that he could drive as long as he had no alcohol in his system. He testified that, on the day of the Court hearing, neither the presiding judge nor counsel nor any of the court staff conveyed any information to suggest that his driving privileges were suspended.

13The appellant testified that he plead guilty to the Dangerous Operation offence and agreed to the terms of the PO. On cross-examination, the appellant testified that he had counsel representation on the day of the Court hearing and that he understood the terms of the PO.

14The appellant testified that he learned of the licence suspension on November 25, 2025, two days after his vehicle was impounded, when he picked up mail from a nearby Canada Post outlet. He testified, and referred to documents to illustrate, that Canada Post left a Delivery Notice at his residence on November 20, 2025, informing him that a mail item would be available to pick up at a nearby Canada Post outlet by 1:00 p.m. the next business day.

15The appellant testified that he did not go to the Canada Post outlet until November 25, 2025, at which point he learned of the licence suspension by way of a Notice sent to him from the Ontario Ministry of Transportation (“MTO”). He testified that the Notice was dated November 14, 2025, had been sent on November 18, 2025, and the suspension was effective starting November 5, 2025 for 12 months.

16The appellant submits that the PO left him with the impression that he could continue driving because the condition prohibited him from driving only when there was alcohol in his system. He submits that, had he received the Notice from the MTO prior to the date of the impoundment, he would not have been driving the vehicle that day and the vehicle would not have been impounded.

17The appellant submits that no one advised him of the licence suspension and the PO made reference only to “no alcohol”, so he assumed his licence remained valid. He seeks an order for the release of the vehicle on the ground that he exercised due diligence in determining that his licence was not suspended at the time the vehicle was detained for impoundment.

18The respondent submits that the appellant was represented by counsel and plead guilty to the Dangerous Operation conviction so, despite his oral evidence to the contrary, he ought to have known that the conviction carried an immediate suspension of his driving privileges.

19Leila Pereira testified on behalf of the respondent that she served many years in a previous role at Service Ontario where she attended hearings at 438 University Avenue (Toronto) on behalf of the MTO and garnered firsthand knowledge of how proceedings similar to the appellant’s were conducted. She testified that when an accused person receives a conviction on this type of offence, it is common practice for the judge and/or clerks or staff of the Court to explain all of the consequences of the conviction, including its impact on driving privileges. She testified that if the proceeding is in-person, the driver must forfeit their driver’s licence card to the Court that day. If it is a virtual Court proceeding, the driver is required to turn their driver’s licence card over to a Service Ontario outlet as soon as possible after the date of the conviction and they are to immediately stop driving.

20I find the appellant has not met his onus to prove he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that his licence, at the time of the impoundment, was not then under suspension. He did not demonstrate that he took reasonable care and undertook the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

21The circumstances, in this case, involve the fact that, 18 days prior to the impoundment, the appellant had appeared in Court and plead guilty to Dangerous Operation, a conviction that led to a sentence of 12 months’ probation and, according to the Act, resulted in a one-year licence suspension.

22The appellant claims he became aware of the licence suspension only after he picked up his registered mail on November 25, 2025, but I am not convinced that he is being truthful on this point because he was evasive in answering any inquiry of what he knew (about the consequences of a conviction) prior to or on the Court date. When asked what, prior to the Court hearing, he expected the consequences of a conviction would be, the appellant testified that he only knew the conditions set out in the PO. I find it difficult to believe that an accused, who was represented by counsel, would plead guilty to a Criminal Code offence and not know the conviction would result in a suspension of driving privileges.

23Ignorance of the law is generally not a defence. While it may have been open to the appellant to argue that he relied on legal advice instead of looking into the legal implications himself, the appellant gave no indication that his counsel for the court hearing was ineffective or incompetent, and did not appear at any time to be arguing or providing evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. Considering he was represented in the Court on November 5, 2025, I find it more likely than not that the appellant was aware that a conviction would result in a licence suspension.

24Because Ms. Pereira did not attend, and therefore had no direct knowledge of, the appellant’s court appearance on November 5, 2025, I give little weight to her testimony that it is common for the Court in these circumstances to explain post-conviction steps including informing the convicted person that they must turn over their licence (if they are attending virtually) at a Service Ontario office and stop driving.

25More compelling than the likelihood that the appellant knew of the driving suspension as early as November 5, 2025, however, is the apparent absence of any steps or actions the appellant took to ascertain whether his licence was valid. His burden in this hearing was to demonstrate the actions that a person in similar circumstances would have taken to confirm they had driving privileges, yet the appellant provided no indication that he took any steps following the November 5, 2025 conviction to see if his driving privileges continued.

26Even if one were to grant the possibility that the appellant was unaware that his licence was suspended upon the conviction date, I find that a person in these circumstances, having just been convicted of a serious Criminal Code driving offence and sentenced to 12 months’ probation, would have undertaken at least some steps or actions to understand how and in what way the conviction affected their driving privileges. This appellant provided no evidence of any steps or inquiries of the sort.

27As noted above, the threshold to meet in this ground is to show that one took reasonable actions to determine that they were properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In this case, the appellant’s belief in the validity of his licence seems to have rested on an impression he took from a condition listed in the PO. It seems he made no further inquiries to confirm or verify that belief and assumed he could continue driving despite his criminal conviction.

28I find the appellant’s attempt to rely on the delivery date of the MTO Notice of suspension and the wording of a condition in the PO falls short of the legal threshold in s. 50.2(3)(c) because he did not demonstrate that he took actions of any kind to determine the status of his licence. I assign little weight to the date of the delivery of the MTO Notice because the licence suspension had already occurred by operation of the Act under subsections 41(1)(b) and (f).

29Accordingly, I find that the appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that his licence at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

30I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

31The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

32If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

33If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

34The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

35The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

36I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

37The appellant testified that, although he is currently without a driver’s licence, he lives with his mother and, if the impounded vehicle was released, she could drive the vehicle to help him get to work and for his other transportation needs. He testified that, since the impounded vehicle is their only vehicle, his mother needs it for her employment as well.

38Since the impoundment, both the appellant and his mother have been using public transit services to get to and from work. The appellant testified that the ride to his workplace using public transit can sometimes take up to 1.5 hours and this has caused him to arrive late to work on occasion, a situation that could affect his ongoing employment. He testified that being late will jeopardize his employment and this puts the family household income at risk as they need both incomes to meet financial obligations such as mortgage payments, insurance, and utility expenses. The appellant gave no indication that either he or his mother missed any days of work since the vehicle was impounded.

39The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, he and his mother have walked or used public transit to get to retail locations for groceries, household supplies, pharmaceuticals, and medical appointments.

40The appellant testified that he owns a second vehicle, but it is currently on loan to his uncle and is not available as an alternative.

41The appellant testified that he needs the impounded vehicle to help visit his grandfather in hospital. Under cross-examination, the appellant testified that the hospital his grandfather is currently residing in, is approximately 1.5 blocks from his home and is within walking distance. He did not reveal whether he had walked, used public transit or other means of transportation for visits to his grandfather.

42The appellant testified that he has considered using taxi and/or Uber services but these alternatives are unaffordable.

43I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. He has access to public transit for employment, acquiring household needs and attending appointments. He can also access some retail services within a reasonable walking distance from his home. I recognize that using public transit and walking can be inconvenient and requires additional time; however, as noted above, inconvenience is not a ground on which the Tribunal can order an impounded vehicle to be released.

44Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusions

45I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that his licence, at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded, was not then under suspension; and

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

46The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.