Ravinder Singh v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 142401

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17764/HTA

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act and from a decision of the Minister of Transportation to change the class of a driver’s licence under s. 32(5)(b) of the Act.

Between:

Ravinder Singh

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Raymond Ramdayal

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Ravinder Singh Gurinder Pal Multani, Paralegal

For the Respondent:

Sidra Saeed, Articling Student

HEARD: November 25, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Ravinder Singh (the “Appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Respondent”) to suspend his Class A driver’s licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) and from a decision of the Minister of Transportation (the “Minister”) to change the class of a driver’s licence under s. 32(5)(b) of the Act.

2By way of a letter to the Appellant dated September 2, 2025, the Respondent suspended the Appellant’s driver’s licence, pursuant to subsection 47(1) of the Act for a period of 90 days from September 4, 2025.

3Further, by letter to the Appellant dated October 10, 2025, the Ministry of Transportation (“MTO”) advised that the suspension of his driver’s would end October 14, 2025, and that his driver’s licence would be downgraded to a Class G(Z) also on October 14, 2025.

4The burden of proof lies with the Respondent to prove on a balance of probabilities that the Appellant received his driver’s licence fraudulently and that has resulted in the public’s safety being placed at undue risk. To arrive at a finding, I must determine whether the Respondent has established sufficient reason for suspending a driver’s licence for the purposes of s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

5It is the Appellant’s position that the suspension of his Class A(Z) driver’s licence is still in issue as the suspension, although ended, will continue to appear on his driving record unless the suspension is set aside by the Tribunal. This prejudices the Appellant’s employment opportunities in the future.

6Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Respondent.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Confidentiality Request

7At the commencement of the hearing, the Respondent requested, pursuant to Rule 13 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (the “Rules”), an order to limit public access to Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) letters pages 6, 9 and 10 of its submissions. The Respondent submits that those pages contain a letter which pertains to an OPP investigation that is still in progress, and some of the information in that letter could adversely affect others mentioned in those pages, and that the release of the information on those pages could compromise the ongoing investigation.

8The Tribunals are generally open to the public, in accordance with the open court principle: see Toronto Star v. AG Ontario, 2018 ONSC 2586. The Tribunal’s records are presumptively open to the public, according to the Tribunal Adjudicative Records Act, 2019. Tribunals may make exceptions to the openness of hearings for privacy interests.

9The Supreme Court of Canada in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 (“Sherman Estate”) outlines a three-part test. All three prerequisites must be met in order to properly impose a discretionary limit on openness:

1. court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;

2. the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and,

3. as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

10The person seeking a confidentiality order of any type has the onus of displacing the general rule of openness. Upholding the presumption of openness generally involves a recognition that neither individual sensibilities nor mere personal discomfort associated with participating in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings are likely to justify a restriction on the open court principle.

11The Respondent states that they are concerned that the disclosure of the full OPP letter may negatively impact their ongoing investigation and those who are referenced in the letter who are not part of this proceeding. The Respondent is not requesting the omission of the entire letter; only pages 6, 9 and 10.

12The Appellant had no objection to this request.

13For the reasons that follow, I find that the Respondent has established a basis for excluding pages 6, 9 and 10 of their written submission. To address the first prong, privacy can constitute an important public interest within the meaning of Sherman Estate, I am satisfied that the Respondent has established that the major investigation by the OPP is very much ongoing and making available information in the middle of that investigation may prejudice others who are indirectly impacted by the decision.

14I also find that the matter involves public security and may compromise the OPP’s investigation going forward.

15I also find that the party seeking to limit the open court principle has demonstrated the likelihood of risk to parties outside this appeal may cause possible disadvantage.

16The second prong of the test is that the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent this risk. In this case, there is no form of confidentiality order lesser than sealing pages 6, 9 and 10 of the Respondent’s submissions that would appropriately balance the open courts principle with the important public interest of public security.

17The third prong of the Sherman Estate test involves proportionality and whether the order outweighs its negative effects. I find that the request is reduced to include the least possible information to be held confidential (pgs. 6, 9 and 10 of the OPP letter). The Respondent is not requesting that the entire letter be omitted from the public record. Making this small adjustment does not change the public’s understanding that this appeal is part of a large investigation, the OPP’s investigation is ongoing, and those decisions will be made available as they normally are on or other Tribunal decision repository.

18I find that the Respondent has satisfied all prongs of the Sherman Estate test, For the reasons set out above, the motion is granted. I order that pages 6, 9 and 10 be excluded from the public record.

Amendment to the Notice of Appeal

19The Appellant submits that pursuant to the letter from MTO, dated October 10, 2025, he requests to also appeal the downgrade of his licence from a Class A(Z) to a Class G(Z). The Appellant submits that the same facts and evidence that pertain to the suspension also pertain to the downgrade. He further submits that further delays in re-obtaining his Class A(Z) licence is prejudicial to him in that it would increase the financial harm that he is experiencing.

20The Minister submits that they are not prepared to proceed with an appeal of the downgrade. They further submit that they rely on s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Regulation to establish sufficient reason to downgrade the Appellant’s licence. The Appellant submits that the use of this section of the Regulation in this circumstance is a misrepresentation of the law. He submits that s. 32(5)(b)(i) is the proper subsection as it more appropriately fits the facts of the case.

21The Tribunal does not have the authority to correct the statutory reference relied upon by the Minister. Also, the Tribunal cannot choose which section the Minister relies on to carry out its regulatory action and cannot impose the ground of s. 32(5)(b)(i) in the place of s. 32(5)(b)(ii). The Statutory Powers Procedure Act, RSO 1990, c S.22 (“SPPA”) provides the Tribunal with no such authority to impose on a party the grounds on which it relies.

22Given the above, I find that a decision made pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) is not one which is appealable under s. 50(1) of the Act and is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine. The appeal of the downgrade of the Appellant’s driver’s licence is dismissed.

ISSUES

23The issue in this appeal is whether the Respondent has established sufficient reason to suspend the Appellant’s licence pursuant to s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

RESULT

24The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the Appellant’s appeal with respect to the Respondent’s decision to downgrade the Appellant’s licence pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act.

25However, I do find that the suspension prejudices the Appellant’s employment opportunities in the future. This is because the suspension, although lifted, will continue to appear on his driving record unless the suspension is set aside by the Tribunal.

26Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I set aside the Respondent’s decision to suspend the Appellant’s A(Z) driver’s licence.

27The Appellant’s appeal with respect to downgrading his licence is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

Suspension of the Appellant’s Class A driver’s licence

28The Respondent alleges that there is reason to believe that the Appellant’s Class A licence was obtained as a result of dishonesty during their Class A testing and/or training processes and that the Appellant’s failure to abide by the regulatory framework that protects road safety in Ontario has undermined the confidence of the Ministry of Transportation in the Appellant’s ability and intention to drive safely.

29The Respondent has the authority under s. 47(1)(b) and (g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason not referred to in clauses 47(1)(d), 47(1)(e) or 47(1)(f) of the Act. The basis for the Respondent’s decision to suspend the Appellant’s driver’s licence is grounded in the findings of the Ontario Provincial Police Serious Fraud Office. The Appellant is part of a large number of individuals flagged during an extensive investigation of the improper issuance of drivers’ licences. Section 12.1(1) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that an applicant for a Class A driver’s licence may not take the road test for a Class A driver’s licence until he or she has successfully completed an entry-level training course for Class A drivers approved by the Ministry of Transportation. In this case, the allegation is that the Appellant benefited from circumventing this process and obtained his licence illegally.

30One of the fundamental purposes of the Act is to ensure the public’s safety on highways. See British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC) at para 26-28; Mitanidis v Ontario (Transportation), 2024 ONSC 5879; Adam Giffen v. Ontario (Minister of Transportation), 2013 ONSC 7461 at para. 33.

31The Appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. He relies on the grounds that there was no dishonesty on his part, the suspension is improper, he is experiencing financial and family hardship, and he is willing to comply with any additional requirements which would allow him to retain his A(Z) licence. Overall, the Appellant denies that he obtained his Class A driver’s licence by misrepresenting the nature or extent of the training he received prior to taking his licensing test and denies that the Respondent has established that he is unlikely to drive a commercial vehicle safely on highways.

32In his testimony, the Appellant explained that he came to Canada in April 2018. He obtained his Class G(Z) licence at the end of 2018. He started working as a truck driver in 2023 after obtaining his Class A(Z) licence. He described having completed 108 hours of training including learning how to drive, inspection procedures, air brakes, backing up, and highway safety. He testified that he would drive 4-5 hours per day for 25-30 days. He has never been involved in any accidents or received any tickets.

33The Appellant testified that he booked his road test with the driving school because the truck was free and he felt confident leaving it in their hands to book the road test. He states he never received a telephone call or text from the driving examiner. He also did not give permission to the examiner to take his picture. He denies ever paying anyone for the licensing or exam.

34The Appellant asked that his personal family situation be taken into account. He is the father to a newborn baby born in September 2025. He is the only member of his family currently working and his financial situation is strained. The recent events have resulted in his insurance being increased. Unfortunately, alternative work such as working as an Uber or taxi driver is not available to him because the suspension now appears on his driving abstract.

35The Respondent submitted that the Appellant’s driver’s licence was suspended for safety concerns. This was triggered by an OPP investigation involving potential bribery related to the examination process for Class A commercial driver’s licences. They further submit that the OPP had reasonable grounds to believe that the Appellant fraudulently obtained his Class A driver’s licence through a scheme in which the commercial driving examiners accepted payment in exchange for a favourable road test outcome.

36The Respondent acknowledges that the Appellant may or may not have been aware of this scheme. However, it does not change the fact that the licence was issued through a fraudulent scheme between the driving school and driving examiners.

37While I accept that the OPP came to the conclusion that they have reasonable grounds to believe the Appellant fraudulently obtained his Class A(Z) licence, I find the evidence connecting the Appellant to the scheme is sparse and unconvincing. The Appellant’s testified that he did not play any role in the scheme being alleged. He stated that he placed his trust in the company and, being unfamiliar with the process, assumed that they were acting in his best interest. I also placed weight on the Appellant’s testimony as it relates to his financial situation and family circumstances. With the suspension appearing on the Appellant’s driver’s record, it precludes him from being hired for other occupations which involve driving a G licence (e.g., food delivery, Uber or other ride sharing services.

38The burden lies with the Respondent to prove on a balance of probabilities that the Appellant’s driver’s licence was obtained as a result of fraud or bribery resulting in public safety. The Respondent’s evidence falls short of meeting that burden. I was not pointed or directed to evidence of the Appellant’s actions and the alleged bribery. Nor was I pointed or directed to evidence to dispute his testimony regarding his ability to safely drive without incurring tickets or accidents while he was driving. Furthermore, the Respondent decided to reinstate his Class G(Z) driver’s licence prior to the end of the suspension period indicating they believe a suspension to be unnecessary as a downgrade better addresses the safety concern.

39I therefore find that the grounds for the suspension of the Appellant’s Class A driver’s licence are not met, and I set aside the suspension.

CONCLUSION

40I find that the Respondent has not satisfied its burden to establish the Appellant’s Class A driver’s licence obtained as a result of dishonesty during the Class A testing and/or training processes.

41I further find that the Respondent has not satisfied its burden to establish sufficient reason to suspend the Appellant’s licence and I set aside the Respondent decision to suspend the Appellant’s driver’s licence.

ORDER

42For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I set aside the Respondent’s decision to suspend the Appellant’s driver’s licence.

43The Appellant’s appeal with respect to the downgrading of his licence is dismissed.