RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: E. Louise Logan, Vice-Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 24-000692/AABS
Case Name: Dorothy Allwood v. Primmum Insurance Company
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant: Darya Katkouskaya, Counsel
For the Respondent: Peter Durant, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On October 2, 2025, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated September 11, 2025 (“decision”).
2In the decision, the Tribunal determined that the applicant is entitled to income replacement benefits (IRBs) from December 31, 2022 to May 18, 2023, the treatment plans in dispute, and interest. It also determined that the respondent is not liable to pay an award.
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The applicant is seeking reconsideration pursuant to Rule 18.2(b). She submits that the Tribunal erred in its determination of the duration of her entitlement to IRBs. The respondent submits the applicant’s request for reconsideration should be dismissed.
5The applicant is seeking a finding that she is entitled to IRBs from December 31, 2022 to present and ongoing.
RESULT
6The applicant’s request for reconsideration is denied.
ANALYSIS
7The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
8The applicant submits that the Tribunal erred by:
a. Determining the duration of IRB entitlement based on her intended retirement date of May 13, 2023, rather than statutory disability criteria;
b. Treating a “mere intention” to retire as disqualifying her from entitlement to an IRB. The analysis must be based on the statutory disability test under section 6 and the duration of entitlement under section 9 of the Schedule;
c. Treating her retirement plans as fixed or binding, despite no evidentiary basis for such a finding other than her testimony;
d. Stating that her submissions addressed entitlement to the IRB for the period of December 31, 2022 to May 18, 2023, when her former counsel’s opening submissions argued for 208 weeks of entitlement;
e. Relying on the “mistaken closing submissions” of her former counsel rather than on the statutory provisions and evidence of her ongoing impairments; and
f. Failing to apply the consumer protection purpose of the Schedule, which requires a broad and remedial interpretation of entitlement.
9The respondent submits that the Tribunal did not err in fact or law and applied the correct legal test in section 5(1) of the Schedule. It argues that the Tribunal did not indicate that retirement intention was part of the test for entitlement to IRB, and in fact, found the applicant had met the legal test.
10The respondent also submits that it is not an error of law to rely on the submissions of counsel. Reconsideration is not an avenue for advancing new arguments that a party could, but did not, make at the initial hearing. Even if the Tribunal erred, which the respondent submits it did not, it argues that IRB entitlement still stops at 104 weeks post-accident, as there was no evidence put on the record for entitlement beyond 104 weeks.
11The respondent further submits that the Tribunal did not make any errors of fact in not considering the applicant’s opening submissions, not properly weighing evidence of the applicant’s ongoing disability, or relying on the applicant’s testimony as a basis for a finding that she planned to retire on May 18, 2023.
12On reply, the applicant points to the test in section 6 of the Schedule and submits that, while the disability test changes after the first 104 weeks of disability, neither entitlement nor the period of the benefit is contingent on her planned retirement date. She argues that the Tribunal erred in law when it relied on her intended retirement date to limit entitlement to IRB, and in declining to exercise its jurisdiction and failing to apply the test in section 6 of the Schedule. She submits that if the Tribunal had applied the correct legal test, she would have been entitled to IRBs until at least January 18, 2024, two years post-accident.
13This request for reconsideration centres on the closing submissions made by the applicant’s former counsel at the hearing. Specifically, the submissions about the applicant’s claimed period of entitlement to IRB. In closing submissions, applicant’s former counsel argued that the applicant should receive IRBs for “the exact time period that we are asking for in terms of income replacement benefits is 19 weeks and 6 days”, stating that:
…regarding income replacement benefits, we believe that the applicant should receive an income replacement benefit for the period of December 31, 2022, to May 18, 2023, which she testified to be the date that she had planned to retire, going back to even before the motor vehicle accident. She provided reasoning, and we believe that our position is supported by her testimony, the testimony of her family doctor, with whom she discussed this, and by medical documentation, and by case law on the test for entitlement to IRB pre-104 or in the first 104 weeks so the exact time period that we are asking for in terms of income replacement benefits is 19 weeks and six days. [emphasis added]
14I find that these submissions are unambiguous and specific with respect to the claimed period of IRB entitlement. The Tribunal found that the applicant is entitled to precisely what was argued by her own counsel. In determining the applicant’s IRB entitlement, the Tribunal cited her own testimony with respect to her planned retirement date. It also relied on the submission of counsel that she was seeking entitlement from December 31, 2022 to May 18, 2023. While the applicant is now seeking a further period of entitlement, this does not change the fact that the applicant’s former counsel referred to a very specific period of time in closing remarks at the hearing. In my view, it is not an error to rely on the applicant’s testimony and the submissions of her counsel to ground a determination of entitlement.
15In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the submission that the applicant’s former counsel argued for a longer period of entitlement in his opening remarks. However, as noted above, at the close of the hearing, following the presentation of medical evidence and the applicant’s own testimony, counsel made very specific submissions with respect to the claimed period of entitlement. The Tribunal did not err in referring to this closing submission in its decision.
16I have also considered the applicant’s argument that the Tribunal erred by relying on her testimony about her planned retirement and applied the wrong legal test. I find, however, that the applicant has not shown how it was an error to rely on the applicant’s sworn testimony for a finding of fact. I also find that the Tribunal cited and applied the correct test in section 5 of the Schedule to the claimed period of IRB entitlement. The post-104 week test in section 6 does not apply to the claimed period of December 31, 2022 to May 18, 2023.
17Finally, I have considered the argument that the Tribunal failed to apply the consumer protection purpose of the Schedule, which requires a broad and remedial interpretation of entitlement. I agree with the applicant that the consumer protection purpose of the Schedule should inform the Tribunal’s interpretation of the relevant provisions. I find, however, that the applicant does not indicate in her reconsideration submissions how the Tribunal’s decision did not account for this important principle. As noted above, the closing remarks of the applicant’s former counsel were unambiguous, and the Tribunal granted all of what was claimed by the applicant at that time.
18I find, for the reasons set out above, that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
19The applicant’s request for reconsideration is denied.
E. Louise Logan
Vice-Chair
Released: December 31, 2025