Peter Landry v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 135591

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17958/MED

An appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Peter Landry Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Dr. Isla McPherson, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Peter Landry, Appellant For the Respondent: Ian Soorkam, Agent

Held by teleconference: December 10, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Peter Landry (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”) to suspend his Class AZ and G licences under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) after the Registrar received a Mental Health Assessment form stating that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Registrar may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely a mental health condition, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend his licences under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. He agrees that he has a mental health condition but denies that his mental health condition interferes with his ability to drive safely.

5Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

6The Open Court Principle was reviewed at the outset of the hearing.

ISSUES

7The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

8To resolve that issue, I will address the following questions:

i. Does the appellant suffer from a mental health condition?

ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

9The Registrar bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the answer to each of the above questions is “yes.”

PRELIMINARY MATTER

10During the hearing it was evident that one of the appellant’s written submissions that he intended to rely on had been sent to the Registrar and not the Tribunal. The Registrar had forwarded the submission to the Tribunal prior to the hearing, but it was not included in the hearing documentation provided. Upon consent of both parties, a brief recess was taken, and the documentation was forwarded and reviewed before continuing with the hearing.

RESULT

11Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely and I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licences.

ANALYSIS

Does the appellant suffer from a mental health condition?

12The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely a mental health condition.

13As a commercial driver, the appellant has been followed with cyclical requests for medical information for over a decade. The Registrar’s submissions included the entire driver medical file which consistently documented the presence of a mental health condition by various physicians since 2008.

14The Registrar sent a letter to the appellant dated August 10, 2025, requesting completion of an updated Mental Health Assessment form, as part of the monitoring system in place for the appellant’s mental health condition.

15The appellant’s family physician, Dr. B, completed this form on October 30, 2025. Dr. B reported that the appellant has major depressive disorder that is stable with ongoing symptoms, the condition has remained stable/unchanged less than three months, and that the appellant exhibits impaired cognition, attention or judgement.

16In response to receiving this form, the Registrar suspended the appellant’s AZ and G class drivers’ licences and requested confirmation of a three month period of mental and emotional stability, confirmation of adherence with the recommended treatment regimen and/or insight in to the condition, confirmation the condition had been successfully treated or resolved, confirmation of improvement in the condition, and confirmation of improvement in judgement, attention and cognition.

17The appellant does not dispute that he has a mental health condition and submitted the past 10 years of mental health assessments that had been requested by the Registrar. The appellant argued that his mental health condition is treated, symptoms are resolved, and he has been stable for more than three months.

18The appellant testified that these historical mental health assessments indicate that his mental health was stable and managed well with prescribed medications in the past. He testified that due to several physical illnesses that resulted in admissions to hospital over the past 3-4 years, he had taken extended time off work which resulted in financial debts. As a result, he could not afford the medication for his mental health condition, which led to a hospital admission in July 2025. Since that time, he has resumed his medication and is doing well.

19Under cross-examination, the appellant testified that he was diagnosed with major depressive disorder in 2003 and experienced a depressive episode with psychotic features in 2009 which resulted in an admission to hospital.

20The medical evidence in this case is clear and the diagnosis is not under dispute. Based on the information available, I find that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a mental health condition.

Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

21I find that the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

22The Registrar’s position is supported by the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [2025 Update] (the “CCMTA Standards”).

23The Registrar relies on the CCMTA Standards Chapter 14 which documents that psychiatric disorders can result in either a persistent or episodic impairment of the functions necessary for driving and highlights that a driver’s level of insight is a critical consideration when assessing the risk of an episodic impairment of functional ability due to a psychiatric disorder.

24The Registrar relies on Standard 14.6.1. This Standard indicates a driver is eligible for a licence if the condition is stable, the driver has sufficient insight to stop driving if the condition becomes acute, the functional abilities necessary for driving are not impaired, and a treating physician supports a return to driving.

25The Registrar stated that the appellant had not been able to confirm a period of mental and emotional stability, and their decision to suspend the appellant’s licence and request a period of stability was prudent and in keeping with road user safety.

26Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but are not bound by them.

27The appellant argued that his mental health condition does not interfere with his ability to drive a commercial or private vehicle. The appellant argued that Dr. B did not have all the necessary documents to make a proper judgement when he filled out the Mental Health Assessment form as he did not have the psychiatric assessments by Dr. M. The appellant relied on five psychiatric assessments by Dr. M dated from July – November 2025. He highlighted text from the July 14, 2025, assessment documenting that his cognition was grossly intact, auditory hallucinations had significantly improved, insight was largely intact and judgment adequate. He noted in another appointment in July as well as assessments in September and October all documented his insight and judgement were “fair”. He argued these assessments confirm three months of stability. The appellant relied on submitted emails documenting communication he had sent between Dr. B and Dr. M’s office to ensure Dr. M’s assessments were being sent to Dr. B.

28The appellant testified he has worked as a driver with vulnerable populations for twenty years, and his employers knew of his hospitalization and approved of his continuing to work. He testified he has continued to work as a driver following his hospital admission and submitted pay stubs to confirm his payment during this time.

29Under cross-examination the appellant testified he drives a full-size coach bus with seating for 56 passengers as well as smaller buses with 33 and 24 passengers. He drives an accessible bus that can fit up to 4 wheelchairs and 2 ambulatory passengers. He spends 35-45 hours driving per week.

30The appellant testified under cross-examination that after being off his psychiatric medications for almost a year prior to his July 2025 hospitalization, he reached out to his family for support when he experienced abnormal thoughts, and his family advised him to go to the Emergency Department. The appellant testified he followed their direction and was admitted to hospital and assessed by a psychiatrist. After being admitted for three days he was granted a pass to leave the hospital for the day but expected to return in the evening. He testified however that he did not return to the hospital as was instructed to at the end of the day. He indicated he felt unsafe at the hospital, and instead stayed with family members. He testified that after returning to taking his medications, he felt almost back to himself after four or five days. He testified he has an arrangement with his family for financial support if needed to continue to afford his medications. The appellant argued that Dr. B did not check affirmatively to the question of whether he requires a functional driving assessment which he believes supports his position.

31The appellant was asked about Dr. M’s consultation note of September 24, 2025, that describes he hit a deer with his car and hit a pole while driving a bus, and that the appellant had concerns about his attention. Dr. M’s note also acknowledges the appellant was concerned he was drinking too much at times. The appellant testified as to the nature of the accidents, including a deer running across the road as he crested a hill and trying to get close to the hospital entrance in the bus he was driving when hitting the pole. He testified that Dr. M increased one of his psychiatric medications, sertraline, at that appointment to address the concerns with attention, and he describes a good response to the increase in medication. He testified he had increased his drinking from one beer every other week to five times per week recently but only after work and never while driving.

32The appellant was asked regarding Dr. M’s latest consultation of November 12, 2025, which indicates that she will connect with Dr. B to discuss the decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence and notify the appellant as soon as possible. The appellant testified he had not heard back from Dr. M but had an upcoming appointment shortly after the hearing date.

33I acknowledge the appellant’s depression with psychotic features was treated and that he testified to feeling almost back to himself within four to five days of resuming treatment at the beginning of July, which is when he suggests a three-month period of stability begins. However, I note Dr. M documented he still suffered from hallucinations and delusions in mid-July, and the consultation of October 22 describes that residual auditory hallucinations described at the previous appointment had disappeared, with the previous appointment being September 24. Further, concerns were raised during the September appointment due to difficulty with attention that was temporally linked to two car accidents and resulted in Dr. M increasing one of his psychiatric medications. Lastly, Dr. B answered affirmatively to the question of whether the appellant exhibits impaired cognition, attention, or judgment on October 30, 2025.

34I acknowledge that psychotic episodes due to psychiatric illness may be the most urgent psychiatric situation regarding fitness to drive and an acute psychotic episode is incompatible with safe driving. Insight is an important consideration when considering safety to drive. Insight means that a driver is aware of their medical condition, understands how the condition may impair their functional ability to drive and has the judgment and willingness to comply with a suggested treatment regimen. I am concerned about the appellant’s history of not following his prescribed treatment regimen. While I understand that the appellant stopped taking his psychiatric medication due to financial constraints, I am concerned that he did not tell his physician(s), despite having almost a year to do so, particularly when he has previous history of hospital admission due to major depressive disorder with psychotic features and was also familiar with the reporting requirements in order to maintain his commercial licence. Further, the appellant did not follow medical advice when he failed to return to the hospital after being given a day pass during his admission to hospital in early July 2025.

35I am also concerned that Dr. B has indicated the appellant has impairment attention, judgment or cognition. The appellant’s position is that he does not have an impairment of his attention, judgement or cognition. However, by the appellant’s testimony and Dr. M’s note, there were concerns about his attention in September that contributed to two car accidents.

36I have heard the appellant state that his position is supported because Dr. B has indicated he does not require a functional driving assessment. While a functional driving assessment is an important tool to address driving safety, it is not often used to assess conditions that are improving. Importantly though, not requiring a functional driving assessment, does not indicate that there are no concerns regarding the ability to drive safely.

37Lastly, I acknowledge that there is no medical opinion provided that supports the appellant’s return to driving. Dr. M has indicated she will talk to Dr. B about the appellant’s licence suspension, but that was four weeks prior to the hearing date, and there was no updated communication provided to the appellant.

38Although this Tribunal is not bound by the CCMTA Standards, they can be considered when making the decision for the reason that these Standards are the result of a lengthy and intensive process to provide medical standards based on the best evidence available and with a focus on functional ability to drive rather than exclusively on medical diagnoses.

39Given that experiencing symptoms of psychosis is incompatible with safe driving, the appellant has stopped taking his medications in the past without notifying his healthcare provider, that Dr. B has indicated there is ongoing symptoms and impairment in cognition, attention or judgement, and Dr. M has not provided any follow up communication to suggest the appellant is safe to return to driving despite the appellant’s prompting, I find this insufficient to set aside the suspension. I am persuaded in this case to accept and apply the CCMTA guidance and note that the conditions for reinstatement have not been met.

40As such, for the reasons cited, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

Conclusion

41I find that the Registrar has discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely a mental health condition, and that condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

ORDER

42For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.