Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17691/HTA

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the "Act"), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act and a from a decision of the Minister of Transportation to downgrade a licence pursuant to Section 32(5) of the Act.

Between:

Tajinder Singh

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles and Minister of Transportation

Respondent

Reasons for Decision

VICE-CHAIR: Colin Osterberg

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: G Multani, Paralegal

For the Respondent: J Vu, Counsel

HEARD: By Teleconference November 5, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Tajinder Singh (the "appellant") appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles ("Registrar") to suspend their licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the "Act") and the decision of the Minister of Transportation ("Minister") to downgrade their Class A driver's licence under s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act.

2The Registrar alleges in its letter to the appellant dated September 2, 2025 that there is reason to believe that the appellant's Class A licence was obtained as a result of dishonesty during their Class A testing and/or training processes and that the appellant's failure to abide by the regulatory framework that protects road safety in Ontario has undermined the confidence of the Ministry of Transportation ("MTO") in the appellant's ability and intention to drive safely.

3The Minister and the Registrar, in their letter to the appellant dated October 10, 2025, advise him that the suspension period had changed and that it would end on October 14, 2025, and that on that date the appellant's licence would be downgraded to Class G(Z).

4At the hearing, the Registrar alleged that the appellant's Class A licence was obtained as a result of dishonesty during the Class A testing process and that the Registrar's ability to determine that the appellant's was able to drive a commercial vehicle safely was therefore compromised. The Registrar clarified that the suspension of the appellant's Class A Licence was pursuant to s. 47(1)(g) of the Act. The Minister clarified that the downgrade of the appellant's licence was pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act.

5The Respondent denied that he was involved in any dishonesty related to the testing process and says that his ability to drive a commercial vehicle safely is supported by the fact that he successfully completed the required training prior to testing and that his driving record since obtaining his Class A licence has been clear.

6At the conclusion of the hearing, I provided the parties with my decision and reasons orally and later issued a written decision. The appellant has requested written reasons for the decision and those reasons are as follows.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Confidentiality Order

7At the commencement of the hearing, the Registrar requested that three pages, pages 6, 9, and 10, included in its submissions be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public. Those pages consisted of two letters sent to the Ministry of Transportation ("MTO") by the Ontario Provincial Police ("OPP") with details of an investigation that was ongoing. The Registrar advised that it had been asked by the OPP to keep the letters confidential and to only disclose them for the purposes of the hearing before the Tribunal. The Registrar argued that it was in the public interest to maintain confidentiality with respect to the letters because they relate to an investigation which was ongoing; the disclosure of the letters might compromise the investigation; the letters contain names of persons who are the subject of the ongoing investigation and who may be prejudiced should the letters be open to the public.

8The appellant had no objection to the issuance of a confidentiality order as requested by the Registrar.

9The Tribunal's adjudicative records are generally open to the public, in accordance with the open court principle and s. 2(1) of the Tribunal Adjudicative Records Act, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sch. 60 ("TARA"). However, s. 2(2) of TARA provides that the Tribunal may order that all or part of an adjudicative record be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public if the Tribunal determines that matters contained in the record are of such a nature that the public interest or the interest of a person served by avoiding disclosure outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that the record be available to the public.

10Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, held that the following requirements must be met before placing limits on the open court principle:

i. court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest

ii. the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and

iii. as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effect.

11I am satisfied that the release of the documents in question to the public poses a serious risk to the important public interest being the conduct of an ongoing criminal investigation and that a confidentiality order is necessary to prevent this serious risk. I find that the relief requested is proportional to the negative impact of the order on court openness.

12I therefore ordered that Pages 6, 9, and 10 of the Respondent's Submissions filed at the hearing shall be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public.

Jurisdiction

13At the request of the appellant, I ordered that the appeal be amended to include the issue of the downgrade of the appellant's licence which the Minister advised was done pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act.

14The Minister took the position that the downgrade of the appellant's licence from Class A to Class G is not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate.

15Given that the specific section of the Act that the Minister is relying on was only made known to the appellant at the hearing, in the context of a request by the appellant to amend its appeal to include the issue of the downgrade, I gave the appellant several opportunities to adjourn that part of the hearing to another date so that he could prepare to argue whether or not the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal with respect to that section. Despite being provided with these opportunities, the appellant asked that we proceed with the appeal of the downgrade.

16I gave both parties one-half hour to prepare their positions with respect to the downgrade and specifically the issue of the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

17The Minister advised that it was taking the position that because the appellant's licence was downgraded pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The Minister argues that there is no regulation made under s. 32(14)(n) of the Act which creates a right to appeal a decision made by the Minister under s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, the Minister argues that there is no right of appeal of its decision to downgrade the appellant's licence under s. 50(1) of the Act.

18The appellant argued the Minister's position has shifted in terms of the sections of the Act it is relying on and that the Tribunal has added the downgrade in other decisions and did not dispute jurisdiction. The appellant says that the Minister has been unfair and arbitrary and that it would be unfair to leave the Appellant with effectively no remedy, particularly where a licence to pursue the appellant's occupation is in issue and where significant procedural fairness is required.

19The appellant says that the downgrade arises out of the same facts and effectively flows from the suspension and that, since the Tribunal has jurisdiction with respect to the suspension it has jurisdiction over the downgrade.

20The right to appeal a Minister's decision made under s. 32(5) of the Act is set out in s. 50(1) of the Act which provides that every person aggrieved by a decision of the Minister made under s. 32(5) for which there is a right of appeal pursuant to a regulation made under s. 32(14)(n) may appeal the decision to the Tribunal.

21Ontario Regulation 340/94 ("Regulation") prescribes the kinds of decisions which may be appealed to the Tribunal and s. 25.1 of the Regulation states that a decision made by the Minister under s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Act is a decision a person may appeal under s. 50 of the Act. There is no similar provision in the Regulation which specifically says that a decision made by the Minister pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) may be appealed under s. 50 of the Act.

22There is no regulation made under s. 32(14)(n) of the Act which creates a right to appeal a decision made by the Minister under s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, there is no right of appeal of its decision to downgrade the appellant's licence under s. 50(1) of the Act.

23I find that a decision made pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) is not one which is appealable under s. 50(1) of the Act and is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine.

24I find The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the appellant's appeal with respect to the Minister's decision to downgrade the appellant's licence pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act.

ISSUES

25The issue in this appeal is whether the Registrar has established sufficient reason to suspend the appellant's licence pursuant to s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

RESULT

26Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish sufficient reason to suspend the appellant's licence and I confirm the Registrar's decision to suspend the appellant's driver's licence.

ANALYSIS

27The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(b) and (g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver's licence for any sufficient reason not referred to in clauses 47(1)(d), 47(1)(e) or 47(1)(f) of the Act.

28One of the fundamental purposes of the Act as describe in s. 31, is to ensure the public's safety on highways. See British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC) at para 26-28; Mitanidis v Ontario (Transportation), 2024 ONSC 5879; Adam Giffen v. Ontario (Minister of Transportation), 2013 ONSC 7461 at para. 33.

29Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

30The evidence presented at the hearing establishes the appellant's Class A driver's licence was obtained as a result of dishonesty during the Class A testing and/or training processes. In particular, I am satisfied that the testing process was tainted by a payment made by someone to the appellant's examiner in exchange for a favourable test result.

31Registrar alleges that it received information from the Ontario Provincial Police ("OPP") that the appellant's licence was obtained as a result of a fraud committed during the licence testing process and in particular that the MTO received information from the OPP that the examiner who conducted the testing of the appellant had received payment in exchange for a favourable road test. The Registrar does not allege that the appellant participated in this transaction or that he knew anything about it. But the Registrar does allege that the testing process is one of the primary methods by which the Registrar can be satisfied that the appellant will drive a motor vehicle safely and that the appellant's testing process cannot provide that assurance because of the impugned transaction.

32The evidence comes from two OPP letters to the Registrar:

i. A letter dated August 19, 2025, states that the OPP has reasonable grounds to believe that approximately 250 individuals may have fraudulently obtained their Class A commercial driver's licence including the appellant;

ii. A letter dated October 3, 2025; states that the OPP was investigating a bribery scheme in which certain commercial driver examiners were accepting cash payments in exchange for providing passing results to applicants during their commercial driver's licence road examinations. The letter states that after an extensive examination the OPP has reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant fraudulently obtained their Class A licence in that way. Evidence is described, including that the appellant's driver's licence was sent to a complicit driver's examiner which was the method of communication used by the participants in the bribery scheme to facilitate the sharing of applicant information in order to ensure the applicants that were to benefit from the bribery scheme were examined by complicit examiners and that a complicit examiner did the appellant's road test.

33The appellant says that there is no evidence that the appellant was involved in the improper transaction. The appellant argued that at this point there is no final conclusion of the investigation and no allegation against the appellant. He argues that the Registrar's conclusions that the appellant was involved in the bribery scheme amounts to speculation and that the appellant is being penalized for something that the Registrar is currently unable to prove.

34The appellant presented evidence that he has driven commercial vehicles for three years since obtaining his Class A licence and has never had any driving infractions. He argues that he has satisfied all of the MTO's requirements to obtain a Class A licence. The appellant also argues that the driving test is in the full control of the MTO and the appellant should not be penalized for the MTO's failure to conduct the driving test properly.

35The evidence presented in the letters from the OPP satisfy me that the road test undertaken by the appellant was tainted by a bribery scheme and was inadequate to provide satisfactory evidence of the appellant's ability to drive a commercial vehicle safely. The facts set out by the OPP in their letters was uncontradicted by any other evidence at the hearing and sets out that the driver examiner who was taking bribes for providing favourable test results was sent the appellant's driver's licence and was the appellant's examiner for the road test. This was the system used by the persons complicit in the bribery scheme and there was no other explanation offered for this having occurred involving the appellant.

36I am not required to find that the appellant participated in this transaction or that he knew anything about it, but I accept that the testing process is one of the primary methods by which the Registrar can be satisfied that the appellant will drive a motor vehicle safely and that the appellant's testing process cannot provide that assurance because of the impugned transaction.

37The fact that training was completed and that there is no allegation of unsafe driving after the licence was obtained does not make up for the fact that no satisfactory testing was done. In my view testing is an important part of ensuring that drivers are safe and is the only part of the process that is in the objective control of the MTO.

38With respect to the appellant's position that there is no evidence that the appellant was involved in the improper transaction, in my view that is not the issue. The issue is whether the public safety on the highway has been adequately assured and I find that it has not been where the testing process is inadequate.

39With respect to the appellant's submission that proper testing is the responsibility of the MTO and not that of the appellant and the appellant should not be penalized for the failings of the MTO in conducting that training, again that is not the issue. The purpose of the Act is to ensure the safety of the public on the highway. Whether the inadequacy of the testing is due to the actions of the MTO or the appellant or some other third party, the issue is that the testing was not adequate, and the public safety not properly assured.

40In my view, an inadequate road test, which the Registrar is unable to rely on in order to carry out its mandate to ensure the safety of the public on the highway, is sufficient reason to suspend a licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act. I find that the road test which the appellant underwent in order to obtain his Class A licence was inadequate and that the Registrar is unable to rely on it to ensure that he is able to drive a commercial vehicle safely on the highway.

Conclusion

41I find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish sufficient reason to suspend the appellant's licence pursuant to s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

ORDER

42For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I confirm the Registrar's decision to suspend the appellant's driver's licence.