Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 25-004696/AABS
In the matter of an Application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.
Between:
Lorissa Brown
Applicant
and
North Blenheim Mutual Insurance Company
Respondent
PRELIMINARY ISSUE HEARING DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR:
Brian Norris
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant:
Gjergji (George) Laloshi, Counsel
For the Respondent:
Catherine H. Zingg, Counsel
Heard:
By Way of Written Submissions
OVERVIEW
1Lorissa Brown (“the Applicant”), was involved in an incident on February 28, 2023 and sought benefits from North Blenheim Mutual Insurance Company (“the Respondent”) pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (“the Schedule”).
2The Respondent denied the Applicant’s claim for benefits because it concluded that she was not involved in an automobile accident. The Applicant applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal - Automobile Accident Benefits Service (“the Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE IN DISPUTE
3The preliminary issue to be decided is:
i. Was the Applicant involved in an accident as defined in section 3(1) of the Schedule?
RESULT
4The Applicant was involved in an accident as defined in section 3(1) of the Schedule.
ANALYSIS
Background
5The Applicant was the passenger of a vehicle and was involved in what is typically called a “road rage” incident.
6The Applicant was the passenger of a vehicle driven by her boyfriend. Another driver (“Hammoud”) was driving behind them and became upset that they were driving at the posted speed limit. Hammoud then crossed the center line and drove beside the vehicle the Applicant was in and gestured his middle finger at the Applicant and her boyfriend. Shortly thereafter, the Applicant’s boyfriend pulled into a parking lot, and Hammoud followed them into the lot.
7Once in the parking lot, the Applicant and her boyfriend exited their vehicle and approached Hammoud in his vehicle and, at one point, the Applicant punched Hammoud’s vehicle. Hammoud then reversed his vehicle and proceeded to exit the parking lot however, the Applicant and her boyfriend followed on foot. Hammoud then put his vehicle in drive and proceeded to exit the parking lot, striking the Applicant with the front portion of the vehicle, causing an injury to her right leg, ankle, and foot. The Applicant’s boyfriend was also struck by Hammoud’s vehicle while attempting to stop Hammoud from fleeing the scene of the incident.
8Hammoud was criminally convicted of dangerous driving, causing bodily harm, and uttering threats.
9At issue is whether the incident meets the definition of an “accident”, including whether Hammoud’s criminal actions are an intervening act.
Was the incident an “accident”?
10I find that the Applicant was involved in an “accident” as defined by section 3(1) of the Schedule.
11Section 3(1) of the Schedule defines “accident” as “an incident in which the use or operation of an automobile directly causes an impairment”. The onus is on the Applicant to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that his injuries were caused by the use or operation of an automobile.
12Section 118 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8 (“Insurance Act”), which applies to automobile policies, expressly provides that contravention of any criminal or other law does not automatically render a claim unenforceable.
13As outlined in Economical Mutual Insurance Company v. Caughy, 2016 ONCA 226, an analysis of whether an accident occurred involves a two-part test to determine whether an incident is an “accident” as follows:
The purpose test: Did the incident arise out of the use or operation of an automobile? and,
The causation test: Did the use or operation of an automobile directly cause the impairment?
14The purpose test is a determination of whether the incident resulted from “the ordinary and well-known activities to which automobiles are put.”
15The causation test then requires the adjudicator to determine if these “ordinary and well-known activities” were the direct cause of the Applicant’s impairments by focusing on the following considerations:
The “but for” consideration;
The intervening act consideration, which may serve to break the chain of causation where some other intervening events cannot be said to be part of the ordinary course of use or operation of the vehicle; and,
When faced with a number of possible causes, the “dominant feature” consideration focuses on whether the ordinary and well-known activity is what most directly caused the injury.
The Purpose Test
16I find that the incident meets the requirements of the purpose test.
17The purpose test is not whether the use of operation of the vehicle was done properly, prudently, or lawfully, it asks whether the vehicle was in ordinary use or operation. The purpose test is designed to be a filter to ensure that benefits are not provided for an incident in which a vehicle is involved but not being used in a manner that would be covered by the insurance at all.
18I find that Hammoud’s actions, including harassing and endangering other motorists, meets the purpose test in this case. Here, Hammoud was using and operating a vehicle when the incident occurred and used the vehicle as an instrument to strike the Applicant and her boyfriend. The fact that his actions intimidated and harassed, or that they led to a criminal conviction of dangerous driving, causing bodily harm, does not upset the fact that he was behind the wheel, operating the vehicle, as he drove it out of the parking lot, striking the Applicant and her boyfriend in the process.
19The use and operation of the vehicle is confirmed by the criminal conviction of Hammoud. The sentencing transcript confirms that Hammoud pled guilty to dangerous operation of a vehicle causing bodily harm and uttering threats. I find that one can only be found guilty of dangerous operation of a vehicle if they were operating a vehicle at the time of the offense. Moreso, a finding that Hammoud was not using or operating the vehicle would be contrary to the criminal court’s findings of fact.
20Accordingly, I find that the purpose test is met.
The Causation Test
21I find that the Applicant would not have sustained her injuries but for the accident, that there is no intervening act that upsets the chain of causation in this scenario, and there is no other dominant feature of this incident such that it would not meet the definition of an accident.
22The Respondent submits that the dominant feature of the incident is the criminal actions and intent of Hammoud, using his vehicle as a weapon. The Respondent submits that using a vehicle as a weapon breaks the chain of causation as it is the dominant feature of the incident. The Applicant disagrees and submits that coverage cannot be denied due to criminal activity and submits that the mechanism of the vehicular impact was the force that injured her leg, ankle, and foot.
23I find that the Applicant’s case is most analogous with L.L.B. and Intact Insurance Company of Canada, 2020, 95904 (ON LAT) (“LLB”). The parties directed me to several tribunal decisions to support their respective cases and I find that LLB is the most applicable. In LLB, a driver of a vehicle assaulted a person when the driver opened the door of the car with the intention of striking the person with the door. After striking the person with the door, the driver exited the vehicle and punched the person several times, causing further injury. The Tribunal found that the incident in which the driver struck the person with the door met the definition of an accident, and that the subsequent assault was a new incident. I find that the Applicant’s situation is akin to the initial incident in LLB. In LLB, the Tribunal concluded that the vehicle was used as an instrument of the physical injuries sustained, constituting an accident. I see no reason why the same should not apply here – Hammoud used the vehicle as an instrument to strike the Applicant while departing the parking lot.
24I find that the Applicant’s right leg, ankle and foot injuries occurred but for the accident. I acknowledge that it was on the record in the sentencing transcript that CCTV captured the Applicant kicking Hammoud’s vehicle at one point during the confrontation and that it could question the causality of the Applicant’s injuries. However, the sentencing transcript confirms that Hammoud accepted that the Applicant’s injuries were as a result of his driving, and the Court accepted this as a fact. To me, this ends any speculation as to whether the Applicant’s leg, ankle, and foot injuries occurred but for the accident.
25I conclude that no event occurred that would disrupt the chain of causation. There is no evidence before me to suggest that the Applicant sustained an injury after Hammoud struck her with his vehicle. If the Applicant was injured as a result of kicking the vehicle, which I do not believe occurred here, that injury occurred before she was struck by Hammoud’s vehicle and would not constitute an intervening act.
26I further find that Hammoud striking the Applicant with his vehicle is the dominant feature of the incident and the cause of the Applicant’s injuries. As outlined in section 118 of the Insurance Act, contravention of any criminal or other law does not automatically render a claim unenforceable. Here the Applicant is the victim of Hammoud’s dangerous driving. She was struck by a vehicle operated by Hammoud. The fact that Hammoud was convicted of a crime for the offense does not disentitle the Applicant from claiming entitlement to benefits provided under the Schedule
27Having found that the incident meets the purpose test and the causation test, it follows that the Applicant was involved in an “accident” as defined in section 3(1) of the Schedule.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
28The Applicant was involved in an “accident” as defined in section 3(1) of the Schedule.
29The application may proceed to a hearing on the substantive issues.
Released: December 9, 2025
___________________________
Brian Norris
Adjudicator