Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17662/HTA
In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.
Between:
Surjit Singh
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR:
Caley Howard
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Gurinder Multani, Paralegal
For the Respondent:
Alexander Qanbery, Articling Student
Heard by Teleconference: November 3, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Surjit Singh (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”) to suspend their licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).
2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(b) and (g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason not referred to in clauses 47(1)(d), 47(1)(e) or 47(1)(f) of the Act.
3One of the fundamental purposes of the Act is to ensure the public’s safety on highways. See British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC) at para 26-28; Mitanidis v Ontario (Transportation), 2024 ONSC 5879; Adam Giffen v. Ontario (Minister of Transportation), 2013 ONSC 7461 at para. 33.
4I find that ensuring the public’s safety on highways is a significant factor in determining whether the Registrar has established “sufficient reason” for suspending a driver’s licence for the purposes of s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.
5The Registrar takes the position that the appellant obtained their Class A driver’s as a result of the dishonesty of third parties involved in the training and/or testing process, that this compromised the appellant’s Class A driver’s test such that the Registrar is unable to verify whether the appellant is likely to drive a motor vehicle safely, and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend their licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.
6The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. The appellant denies that he obtained his licence as a result of dishonesty during the training and/or testing process.
7Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Order limiting public access to records
8The respondent sought an order under Rule 13.1 limiting public access to the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) letters contained in the respondent’s submissions at pages 6, 9 and 10, as they deal with an investigation still in progress and their disclosure may adversely affect the investigation and the people referred to in the letter.
9The appellant consented to the order. The Tribunal’s adjudicative records are generally open to the public, in accordance with the open court principle and s. 2(1) of the Tribunal Adjudicative Records Act, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sch. 60 (“TARA”). However, s. 2(2) of TARA provides that the Tribunal may order that all or part of an adjudicative record be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public if the Tribunal determines that matters contained in the record are of such a nature that the public interest or the interest of a person served by avoiding disclosure outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that the record be available to the public.
10The Supreme Court of Canada in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 (“Sherman Estate”), held that the following requirements must be met before placing limits on the open court principle:
i. court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest
ii. the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and
iii. as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effect.
11I find that the correspondence from the OPP at pages 6, 9 and 10 of the Registrar’s submissions contain information regarding an ongoing OPP investigation. As a result, I find that they should be excluded from the public record on the basis that they involve matters of public security and to preserve the integrity of an ongoing investigation. I find that this meets the test in Sherman Estate because disclosure of the pages in question poses a serious risk an important public interest, no alternative measures will prevent the risk to the ongoing OPP investigation and the benefits of preserving the integrity of the investigation outweigh the limits placed on the open court principal.
12I order that the entirety of pages 6, 9 and 10 of the Registrar’s submissions will not be disclosed to the public, pursuant to s. 2(2)(a) of TARA.
Motion to exclude pages 6, 9 and 10 from the respondent’s submissions
13The appellant asked the Tribunal to exclude pages 6, 9 and 10 of the respondent’s submissions from the evidence on the basis that the investigations referred to are still ongoing, the appellant is being prejudiced and they letters are from unnamed officers.
14The respondent submits that the letters are reliable on their face, they are written by named OPP officers, who signed the letters, and the letters were disclosed to the appellant.
15I declined to grant the appellant’s motion to exclude the documents because the appellant did not persuade me that there was any reason to exclude these letters. Section 15(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act allows me to admit documentary evidence (whether sworn/under affirmation, or not) into the proceeding as long as such evidence is “relevant to the subject-matter of the proceeding,” subject to my discretion to exclude them because they are overly repetitious, while s. 15(2) precludes admitting evidence that is inadmissible by reason of privilege or another statutory exclusion. Neither privilege nor statutory exclusion has been asserted, nor is it obvious to me that any privilege attaches to the letters. I agree that the letters are reliable on their face and are from named OPP officers. I find that the ongoing nature of the investigation does not make the letters less reliable or inadmissible, but it may be a factor in whether I find the respondent meets the burden of proof.
Motion to amend the appeal
16After the parties were done leading evidence and the respondent had made its submissions, but before the appellant made his closing submissions, the appellant sought to amend the appeal to address the downgrade of the appellant’s licence in addition to the suspension. The appellant submitted that the late request was due to new facts coming to light during his testimony.
17The respondent submitted that it was not prepared to argue about the downgrade, that it was not appropriate to amend the appeal after the respondent had finished presenting its case, and that the representative of the Registrar did not have instructions to appear on behalf of the Minister to argue about the downgrade of the appellant’s licence to a G licence.
18I was not persuaded that any facts came out during the appellant’s testimony that the appellant was unaware of before the hearing. We discussed the issues in dispute at the beginning and the appellant did not raise his request at that time. I found that it was not fair to amend the appeal after the respondent had led its evidence and made its submissions.
Reliance on Tribunal decisions
19The appellant referred me to various Tribunal decisions made under the Act throughout his submissions, but did not provide me with copies of any written reasons and/or decision. He asked to be allowed to email some decisions to the Tribunal during the hearing.
20The Registrar objected to adjourning the hearing or delaying the delivery of my reasons in order to allow the appellant to submit the caselaw on which he sought to rely. The Registrar argued that the Tribunal would give minimal weight to written decisions that did not include written reasons in any event.
21I refused to grant the appellant’s request to submit written decisions as they would not be helpful. The Tribunal is not bound by other Tribunal decisions in any event, but written decisions without written reasons would be no help at all. In my view, agreeing to the appellant’s request would have necessitated a delay or adjournment in order to give the Registrar time to review the cases and respond. Such a delay would not benefit the appellant.
ISSUES
22The issue in this appeal is whether the Registrar has established sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s licence pursuant to s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.
23To resolve that issue, I will address the following questions:
i. Was the appellant’s Class A driver’s licence obtained as a result of the dishonesty of third parties during the Class A testing and/or training processes?
ii. If so, did this compromise the appellant’s Class A driver’s test such that the Registrar is unable to verify whether the appellant is likely to drive a motor vehicle safely?
iii. If so, is this a sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s licence pursuant to s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.
RESULT
24Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has not satisfied its burden to establish sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s licence and I set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
ANALYSIS
Has the Registrar established the appellant’s Class A driver’s licence was obtained as a result of the dishonesty of third parties during the Class A testing and/or training processes?
25The evidence presented at the hearing does not establish the appellant’s Class A driver’s licence was obtained as a result of the dishonesty of third parties during the Class A testing and/or training processes.
26The Registrar relies on the two OPP letters which state that the OPP, following an investigation, has reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant fraudulently obtained his Class A licence. The evidence referred to in the letter is a chat communication dated September 24, 2022 from one DE4 examiner to another DE4 examiner, who completed the appellant’s examination on September 24, 2022. The chat communication included an image of a confirmation of the road test booking for Mr. Singh. The OPP letter at page 9 alleges that the DE4 examiner who completed the appellant’s examination was involved in the bribery scheme that is the subject of the investigation.
27The appellant testified that he did not participate in any bribery scheme, that he took the mandatory training and passed it, paid the required fees for training and testing, and passed his driver’s test on the first attempt. The appellant submits that less weight should be given to the OPP letters as they are not sworn testimony. I was directed to no evidence that the appellant requested the Registrar to produce the OPP officers for cross-examination at the hearing, so I did not reduce the weight given to the letter for this reason. In any event, s. 15(1) of the SPPA allows me to consider evidence, whether sworn/under affirmation or not.
28The OPP letter refers to a “reasonable grounds for belief” that the appellant’s licence was obtained through the fraudulent scheme. However, as the Registrar relies on s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend the appellant’s licence, I find the standard that the Registrar is required to meet is a balance of probabilities, which requires the Registrar to prove that it is more likely than not that the appellant’s licence was obtained as a result of dishonesty. Therefore, I find that the OPP letter, on its face, suggests that the evidence collected by the OPP meets a lower standard than the Registrar is required to meet for this hearing. In any event, I view the language expressed in the OPP’s letter as their position and not binding on me in my adjudicative role.
29I find that the remaining details in the OPP letter at page 9 do not persuade me that it is more likely than not that the appellant’s licence was obtained as a result of the dishonesty of third parties. It is not clear to me from reading the letter who is alleged to have paid a bribe in exchange for Mr. Singh’s passing grade. I put little weight on the chat message between the two examiners because it seems to be speculation on the part of the OPP that the purpose of the chat message was to ensure the applicant was examined by a complicit examiner. The letter itself does not explain how the OPP came to that conclusion, nor was I referred to any additional evidence to support the OPP’s conclusion with respect to the purpose of the chat message.
30In the circumstances, I find that the Registrar has not satisfied its burden to establish the appellant’s Class A driver’s licence was obtained as a result of the dishonesty of third parties during the Class A testing and/or training processes.
Conclusion
31I find that the Registrar has not satisfied its burden to establish sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s licence and I set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
ORDER
32For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s Class A driver’s licence is set aside.
Released: December 9, 2025
__________________________
Caley Howard
Adjudicator

