Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17934/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Kamaljeet Singh

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Dagmara Szczudlo

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Kamaljeet Singh, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent for the Respondent

Interpreter:

Nasir Baphir (Punjabi language)

HEARD:

November 14, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Kamaljeet Singh, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Thursday, October 30, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Harlive Singh Grewal (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while their driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits them from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant is a joint owner of the impounded vehicle with D.B. Renovation & Construction Inc.

3The appellant appeals on the grounds that that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

4The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to ss. 50.2(3)(b.1) and 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension or subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1); and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

5For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Role of interpreter

6During the hearing, the Punjabi language interpreter was reminded that his role at the hearing is to translate and not to act as a witness.

7The appellant required the assistance of an interpreter for the hearing and engaged the services of a friend who was fluent in English and Punjabi. Mr. Nasir Baphir, the interpreter, also had firsthand knowledge of events related to the impoundment because he picked up the appellant from the Police station on October 30, 2025.

8The respondent submitted that Mr. Baphir was giving an impression of directing the appellant’s testimony, and offered his own perspectives (in English) on what occurred after the vehicle was detained.

9I reminded Mr. Baphir that his role at the hearing is to act as an interpreter and to translate what is stated by all participants faithfully without offering his own experiences regarding the event. The respondent agreed to continue working with Mr. Baphir as an interpreter once these expectations were clarified.

Appeal grounds

10The appellant selected two grounds of appeal in his Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) dated November 3, 2025: that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

11The respondent testified that the vehicle was impounded because the driver, Harlive Singh Grewal, was driving while his driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device, not because he was driving with a suspended licence.

12On the basis of this information, I also considered the appellant’s appeal on the ground whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1).

ANALYSIS

13For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1)

14I am not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1).

15In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

16Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant must establish that they took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

17The appellant testified that he hired the driver to work for his company 5-6 days before the incident and at the time of hire, did his due diligence in determining that the driver’s licence of the driver was not under suspension. He testified that he saw the licence and believed the driver’s assurance that he was ok to drive.

18Continuing his testimony, the appellant added that he was a passenger in the vehicle on the day that it was detained and that the Police officer involved, told the driver that the reason for the impoundment was that his licence is suspended. Neither the appellant nor the driver spoke English, and Google Translate was used to communicate with the Police. Based on the ‘Driver Status by Date’ report from the Ministry of Transportation, I find that, on October 30, 2025, the driver of the vehicle was licenced and there was a mandatory ignition interlock status condition on his licence. As a result, something was ‘lost in translation’ and it is unlikely that the Police officers conveyed that the driver’s licence was suspended to the driver and/or the appellant because this information would have been available to officers during the traffic stop.

19The only evidence presented by the appellant in relation to this ground was testimony that he looked at the licence and asked the driver if he is licenced but took no other steps to verify. As noted above, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken, and I find that the appellant did not meet their onus of proof for this ground.

20The respondent presented evidence which establishes that the driver’s licence was subject to an ignition interlock condition, which was present since July 30, 2025. Based on the Extended Driver Record Search and the Driver Status by Date records, I conclude that at the time of the incident, the driver did hold a valid driver’s licence, albeit with a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device.

21The respondent submits that the appellant did not call Service Ontario, use the Ministry of Transportation website, nor request a Driver’s Abstract to check whether there are any conditions on the driver’s licence. Instead, the appellant relied on the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed.

22I find the evidence presented by the respondent to be persuasive, and do not find it reasonable to believe that the driver was not aware of the interlock condition on his licence, particularly since the licence was reinstated with the condition several months before the incident.

23I considered the testimony of both parties and find that the appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that he took all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances. I would expect a business owner to verify information provided by a new hire, particularly one with access to company vehicles which represent a significant investment and business liability.

24I find that the appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1).

25Since the appellant has not established that he satisfies this ground of appeal, I must now consider whether the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

26I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

27The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

28If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

29If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

30The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

31The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

32I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

33The appellant submits that the impoundment will result in exceptional financial hardship and testified that he uses the 2022 Dodge Ram pickup truck for his construction and renovation business, including transportation of employees and tools to job sites. The appellant testified that activity for D.B. Renovation & Construction Inc. is paused because he does not have a vehicle to travel to job sites and his tools were in the impounded truck/trailer. Although the business is not generating any revenue, his expenses continue, and he is concerned about finances.

34Continuing his testimony, the appellant stated that at the time of the vehicle detainment, his company had 3-4 active jobs (in Brampton, in Orangeville, and in Clinton), however, one of the jobs in Brampton was cancelled by the customer due to the impoundment. At present, there are two active jobs which are being postponed until the release of the truck (Clinton and Orangeville).

35The appellant provided an address in Amaranth, Ontario (a rural township) in correspondence with the Tribunal. The same address also appears on the Ministry of Transportation records for the appellant and D.B. Renovation & Construction Inc. He stated that he lives with his wife and children and testified that he is able to take care of his and his family needs during the impoundment by using Uber and assistance from family and friends. His children have been able to attend school using a school bus and assistance from neighbours. The appellant’s wife is ill, however, she has been able to attend her appointments because the appellant borrowed a car from a friend to drive her.

36The appellant testified that a second vehicle, a 2007 Ford van, owned solely by D.B. Renovation & Construction Inc. is currently under repair and is not available as an alternative to the impounded truck. Initially, the appellant stated that the van had a lot of rust and he could not get a safety inspection done. Under cross-examination, he admitted that the van has been fit for the road since 2023 and the required repairs are body-shop related and are delayed because of panels which have been ordered almost a month ago “give or take”.

37The respondent submits that alternative forms of transportation are available and have been used by the appellant during the impoundment to meet his personal needs. The respondent argues that financial and economic loss cannot be considered and requests that the Tribunal confirms the decision of the respondent.

38I considered the testimony of both parties and find that the appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no alternative to the impounded car. I find that to date, the appellant has been able to access alternatives to meet his personal and family needs and a second vehicle is available to D.B. Renovation & Construction Inc. if its repairs are prioritized.

39The legislation does not permit me to consider financial or economic loss as factors unless there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, which is not the case.

40I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

41Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusions

42I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension or subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1); and

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

43The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.