Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17982/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Cheryl Sterling

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Avril A. Farlam

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Cheryl Sterling, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Stephen Grootenboer, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Thursday, November 27, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Cheryl Sterling, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s 2024 Dodge Ram, (the “vehicle”) was impounded on Thursday, November 6, 2025. At the time of the impoundment the appellant’s son Tyler James Bennett (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE

3The appellant’s Notice of Appeal indicates that her sole ground of appeal is exceptional hardship. At the beginning of her testimony, the appellant testified that the driver took the vehicle without her knowledge at a time when she was not at home.

4The appellant testified that she would like to add an additional ground of appeal, specifically that the vehicle was stolen at the time it was impounded.

5The Register did not object to the appellant raising this additional ground of appeal in this hearing.

6As a result, I allowed an oral amendment to the appellant’s Notice of Appeal to add this additional ground of appeal.

ISSUES

7The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

8For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

9For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that it satisfies one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was not stolen

10I am not satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

11In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

12In other words, in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

13The appellant testified that she drove another vehicle that she owns to go out of town to visit family from July, 2025 until November 19, 2025. The appellant said that she left the keys to the vehicle in her purse in the closet of her bedroom and that her son took the keys to the vehicle without her knowledge.

14The appellant testified that when she got the papers in the mail about the impoundment, she called the police to ask about getting her vehicle out of impoundment.

15In cross-examination the appellant confirmed that the driver lives with her, that she left the vehicle parked at their home when she left town, and that when she spoke to the police following the impoundment, she did not report the vehicle as stolen.

16I find the appellant’s testimony that the vehicle was stolen not persuasive or credible given that she left the vehicle at the home where she lives with the driver, did not take the keys with her or safeguard the keys by locking them away, taking them with her, or making them otherwise inaccessible to the driver.

17Further, the appellant put forward no evidence that the driver intended to deprive the appellant of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily. The appellant testified that the driver was on his way home from a friend’s house to the home she shares with the driver when the vehicle was impounded.

18I find that the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

19I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

20The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

21If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

22If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

23The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

24The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

25I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

26The appellant admitted that she has been driving her other vehicle.

27Records filed by the Registrar show that the appellant owns several other vehicles. Although the appellant testified that she has never owned the 1998 Ford shown on the Registrar’s records, she did not deny owning the 2018 Volkswagen or the 2013 Cata. Further, the appellant admitted in her testimony that during the impoundment period she has been driving one of the two vehicles she owns in addition to the impounded vehicle. These other two vehicles are alternatives available to the appellant during the impoundment period.

28I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

29Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

30For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusion(s)

31I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded;

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

32The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.