Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16932/LLCA

In the matter of an appeal from a Notice of Proposal to suspend a licence under the Liquor Licence and Control Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 15, Sched 22.

Between:

Midway Café Ltd., operating as Midway Invader

Appellant

and

Registrar under the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario Act, 2019

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATORS:

Michael Beauchesne, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Peter Chmiel, Counsel

For the Respondent:

Aviva Harari, Counsel

HEARD: October 20-24, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Midway Café Ltd., operating as Midway Invader (the “appellant”) is the holder of a liquor licence issued pursuant to the Liquor Licence and Control Act 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 15, Sched. 22 (the “Act”). The appellant appeals a Notice of Proposal to suspend the liquor licence (“NOP”) for 60 days, issued by the Registrar, Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario Act, 2019 (the “Registrar”) on March 21, 2025.

2The appellant conducts business as a “gentleman’s club” at 6809 Invader Crescent in Mississauga, Ontario ("the premises"). Mr. John Sit ("Mr. Sit”) is the director and officer of the appellant.

3For context, the central issue of this case concerns the intoxication of Mr. Okeeno Correia (the “deceased”), who, in the early morning hours of May 10, 2023, was a patron at the licensed premises operated by the appellant. The allegation is that the deceased was served—within a half-hour period—10 ounces of liquor provided by Ms. Mackenzie County, who was employed as a server by the appellant. According to police, when the deceased left the licensed premises, he proceeded to drive at a high rate of speed the wrong way on a 400-series highway and died upon colliding head-on with a transport truck.

ISSUES

4The issues in dispute, as noted in the case conference report and order (“CCRO”) for this matter—and as confirmed by the parties at the hearing—is whether, per section 13(1)(b) of the Act, the appellant has contravened this Act, the regulations, the standards and requirements established by the Registrar under section 24, or a condition of the licence.

5In its NOP, the respondent sets out the grounds for the liquor licence suspension as follows:

1. Contrary to section 32 of the Act, liquor was permitted to be sold or supplied to a person who was or appeared to be intoxicated;

2. Contrary to section 43(1) of regulation 746/21 under the Act, the appellant permitted intoxication to occur on the licensed premises or in adjacent areas under the exclusive control of the appellant;

3. Contrary to interim standard 4.1 per section 26 of the Act, persons involved in the sale and service of alcohol did not hold a valid certificate demonstrating the successful completion of a training course approved by the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (the “Board”);

4. Contrary to section 31(1) of regulation 746/21 under the Act, the licensee failed to ensure that liquor is sold and served only between the following hours:

(a) 9 a.m. on any day except for December 31 and 2 a.m. on the following day.

(b) 9 a.m. on December 31 and 3 a.m. on January 1.

6The respondent bears the onus to prove the breaches of the Act, regulations, standards and requirements, and licence conditions it alleges on a balance of probabilities.

RESULT

7The respondent has met it onus on all grounds. The Registrar is directed to carry out the NOP to suspend the appellant’s liquor licence for 60 days.

ANALYSIS

Contrary to [section 32](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2019-c-15-sch-22/latest/so-2019-c-15-sch-22.html#sec32_smooth) of the [Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2019-c-15-sch-22/latest/so-2019-c-15-sch-22.html), was liquor permitted to be sold or supplied to a person who was or appeared to be intoxicated? And contrary to section 43(1) of regulation 746/21 under the Act, did the appellant permit intoxication to occur on the licensed premises or in adjacent areas under the exclusive control of the appellant?

8I find the respondent has shown that the appellant permitted alcohol to be sold and supplied to a person who was intoxicated, and that the appellant permitted that intoxication to occur on the licensed premises.

9Section 32 of the Act says that no person shall sell or supply liquor or permit liquor to be sold or supplied to any person who is or appears to be intoxicated. Section 43(1) of regulation 746/21 13(1) under the Act, which addresses unlawful behaviour and nuisance, says the licensee shall not permit intoxication, unlawful gambling, or disorderly conduct to occur on the licensed premises or in adjacent areas under the exclusive control of the licensee.

10To prove its case, the respondent must either show the deceased was intoxicated, or appeared to be intoxicated, when sold liquor by the appellant, or that the appellant permitted the deceased to become intoxicated on the licensed premises or in adjacent areas under the exclusive control of the licensee.

11The respondent submits that on May 10, 2023, the appellant served the deceased five “double shots” of alcohol totalling 10 ounces within a period of approximately 27 minutes. The respondent contends the patron was intoxicated when he was served, and that he was permitted to remain on the licensed premises and consume the alcohol. The respondent principally relies on the evidence of Mr. Richard Anderson (Executive Director of Smart Serve Ontario), Ontario Provincial Police Constable Edmund Yeboah (“Officer Yeboah”), AGCO Inspector Harley Theakston, and Ms. Delaney Armstrong-Price (forensic scientist—toxicology) to support its position.

12The appellant argues that the deceased did not become—and was not permitted to become—intoxicated at the licensed premises. The appellant says the respondent produced no witnesses who directly observed the deceased’s consumption or level of intoxication on May 10, 2023, and that the video footage of the licensed premises in evidence does not support the respondent’s assertions. The appellant relies on the evidence of Ms. Mackenzie County (server) to demonstrate that the deceased consumed drinks that were not intended for him, and further, that the deceased did not appear to be intoxicated the night she served him alcohol at the licensed premises.

The deceased was intoxicated when the appellant sold and supplied alcohol to him

13While I find the respondent failed to establish that the deceased appeared to be intoxicated by the alcohol supplied by the appellant, I am satisfied that the toxicology evidence establishes he was, in fact, intoxicated at the time the appellant permitted alcohol to be sold to him.

Observable signs of intoxication are sparse

14The evidence relied upon by the respondent to show the deceased appeared to be intoxicated by the alcohol sold to him by the appellant is not persuasive.

15Ms. Armstrong-Price, who appeared as an expert toxicology witness, described intoxication as “outward signs resulting from consumption [of alcohol].” She described these signs as slurred speech, walking difficulties, loss of balance and fine motor skills, confusion, and reduced consciousness. During his testimony, Mr. Anderson recounted similar signs of intoxication taught as part of the Smart Serve course, which included “unsteady on feet.” I find some of these signs are consistent with the on-premises observations of Mr. Da Silva as documented by Inspector Theakston in February 2024. The interview notes indicate that Mr. Da Silva voiced concerns about the deceased’s speech (i.e.” the way he was talking was not like him, words were slow … slurring when talking”) and walking “sideways” in the parking lot of the licensed premises at the end of their visit. While the lack of corroborating testimony from Mr. Da Silva at the hearing diminished the persuasiveness of this evidence, I accept that the deceased exhibited obvious unsteadiness on his feet approximately five minutes after he exited the licensed premises. The video evidence depicts the deceased lurching towards his own car in the parking lot after allegedly refusing a ride from Mr. Da Silva to the casino. This walking difficulty was pointed out by Inspector Theakston at the hearing. During direct examination, Ms. County agreed the deceased appeared to be “staggering” at this late point of the video.

16However, I placed less weight on this evidence as an observable sign of intoxication resulting from alcohol served by the appellant because I do not rule out cocaine as a factor that may have contributed to the deceased’s walking difficulties as seen in the video. The coroner’s report establishes that the appellant’s blood samples contained .20 milligrams of cocaine per litre of blood. And I find the respondent failed to establish that the deceased ingested this drug at some point after leaving Mr. Da Silva’s vehicle. During cross-examination, Ms. Armstrong-Price testified that there was no way of establishing when the deceased ingested the cocaine, although her opinion was that it was likely a matter of hours before death. This puts the deceased’s cocaine use within the entire duration of his attendance at the licensed premises, and I note that the activities of the deceased for this period were not always captured on video. Ms. Armstrong-Price also explained that cocaine is a stimulant that causes motor restlessness and impairment. As such, I attributed less weight to the appellant’s walking difficulties as evidence of intoxication arising from his alcohol consumption at the licensed premises.

17Similarly, the remaining evidence pertaining to observable signs of intoxication does not assist in establishing the appearance of intoxication arising from alcohol consumption at the licensed premises.

18I place little weight on Inspector Theakston’s testimony about the deceased’s intoxication, as well as the observations he documented in his video review report of June 13, 2023. This is because Inspector Theakston’s observations strike me as arbitrary, in that I am not satisfied they are supported by the evidence or show that intoxication was the most likely explanation for what the video depicted. For example, I disagree that the deceased stumbles from missing or “floating” over a step immediately upon exit from the licensed premises. In my view, the deceased maintained his balance when stepping off the sidewalk to the parking lot. I do not see evidence of swaying while the deceased subsequently walks through the parking lot towards his vehicle upon exiting the licensed premises. While I agree the video shows embracing and handshaking inside the licensed premises as the deceased and his friends prepare to depart, I find Inspector Theakston did not establish this amounted to anything other than typical gestures of goodwill exchanged between friends that I observed multiple times throughout the duration of the video. I was not persuaded that any bumping of the table could be specifically attributed to the deceased, nor that it was a sign of intoxication. This is because the table appeared unsteady to me from the time the first drinks were served, when both parties agreed the deceased did not yet appear to be intoxicated.

19I find the lack of observable signs of intoxication inside the licensed premises supports the evidence of Ms. County. She testified that the deceased showed no physical signs of intoxication, seemed coherent, and was gambling on his phone for the most part. This is consistent with her statement as documented by Officer Yeboah on May 26, 2023. When Ms. County was asked if the deceased appeared impaired or inebriated, Officer Yeboah recorded her response as: “When he came in and leaving. He was very coherent, wasn’t rowdy, very respectful, he was just on his phone gambling the whole time.” Officer Yeboah also noted that Ms. County recalled the deceased was “on point,” in that his eyes were not bloodshot; he was not stumbling, and his words were not slurred.

The BAC results are consistent with intoxication

20While I find the deceased’s observable signs of intoxication are sparse, I am persuaded that the toxicological evidence establishes on a balance of probabilities that he was, in fact, intoxicated.

21Section 32 of the Act incorporates two prohibitive concepts. One is against service to someone who is, in fact, intoxicated. The other prohibition applies to someone who appears to be intoxicated. As such, the respondent need only prove one of these two grounds to meet its onus under section 32.

22In my view, the central issue as it pertains to the toxicology results is what the deceased’s BAC was projected to be by the time he left the licensed premises, and whether that BAC level is consistent with intoxication. The toxicological documents presented at the hearing include the Toxicology Coroners Case Analytical Summary (the “coroner’s report”), dated August 15, 2023; and the Toxicology Letter of Opinion (the “opinion letter”), dated July 25, 2025.

23The coroner’s report establishes that the deceased’s post-mortem blood-alcohol content (“BAC”) was 251 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood (“.251”). I accept this was the deceased’s BAC at the time of the accident because the analysis did not detect putrefaction, which, as I understand it from Ms. Armstrong-Price’s testimony, is a post-mortem increase in BAC owing to microbiological processes. While Ms. Armstrong-Price was unsure when the blood samples used for testing were taken, I note that the coroner’s report indicates receiving four samples of the deceased’s blood on May 12, 2023, which establishes that the samples were taken within 48 hours of the accident. In any event, the appellant did not contest the reliability of these BAC results based on when the samples were taken—or tested for that matter.

24Ms. Armstrong-Price relied on the analysis in the coroner’s report to calculate that the projected BAC of the deceased by the time he left the licensed premises was in the range of .224 to .232. This calculation—which was based on only four two-ounce servings of alcohol because Ms. Armstrong-Price was unsure as to whether the deceased had fully consumed the fifth drink—appears in Ms. Armstrong-Price’s opinion letter, and she confirmed this projection in her testimony. In my view, Ms. Armstrong-Price acknowledged that a BAC in this range constitutes intoxication by testifying that she would expect driving ability to be impaired at this level. Given the deceased’s cocaine use, I do not afford added weight to Ms. Armstrong Price’s opinion based on the deceased’s involvement in a car accident after driving from the licensed premises. However, I nevertheless find it compelling that Ms. Armstrong Price, as an expert in the field of toxicology, connects the deceased’s BAC range and impairment. This is persuasive evidence that supports intoxication arsing from alcohol consumed at the licensed premises.

25During cross-examination, the appellant asked Ms. Armstrong-Price to perform her own calculation of the deceased’s BAC at the time of the accident that instead relied on the 10 ounces of alcohol the deceased consumed at the licensed premises between 1:28 a.m. and 1:56 a.m. on May 10, 2023. Ms. Armstrong-Price testified that the appellant’s BAC range under this scenario was projected at .141 to .157, as opposed to the finding of .251 based on blood samples in the coroner’s report.

26The appellant’s closing submissions argue that this discrepancy in the deceased’s BAC at the time of the accident suggests he did not become intoxicated from the alcohol he consumed at the licensed premises, but rather because he consumed more alcohol after he left at 2:18 a.m. and up until the accident 47 minutes later at 3:05 a.m.

27I reject this argument. I was not pointed to evidence that persuaded me the deceased’s BAC at the time of the accident was due, in part, to alcohol consumed after leaving the licensed premises. For example, the parties did not point to any aspect of the video evidence that showed the deceased consuming alcohol in the parking lot. I was not directed to statements made by Mr. Da Silva that indicated the deceased had consumed alcohol in the parking lot at any point prior to leaving the licensed premises. In contrast, Officer Yeboah, who was present at the scene of the accident, testified that there was no evidence of alcohol in the deceased’s vehicle. And the parties did not point to evidence at the hearing that showed the appellant left his vehicle at any point up to the accident after driving away from the licensed premises, including when he reportedly “ditched” his car and exited back on to the road prior to the fatal collision. When I consider these factors on a balance of probabilities, I find the appellant’s submissions fall short as mere speculation. In my view, it is more likely than not that the deceased’s projected BAC resulted from alcohol he was served and consumed at the licensed premises.

28I prefer the time-of-departure BAC projection that Ms. Armstrong-Price calculated from the results of the coroner’s report because it is based on an analysis of the alcohol content in the deceased’s own blood. While I recognize the time-of-accident BAC range estimated by Ms. Armstrong-Price during the hearing differs from the calculation in the coroner’s report, it remains that Ms. Armstrong-Price did not calculate a corresponding projection of the deceased’s BAC by the time he left the establishment using the .141 to .157 range. In my view, this hinders the ability of this range to inform the deceased’s BAC at the time he left the premises.

29Further, Ms. Armstrong-Price’s redirected testimony acknowledged her own projection of the deceased’s BAC at the time of the accident was uncertain, in that the range could be higher if she included alcohol consumed by the deceased prior to his first drink at the licensed premises. I accept as fact that the deceased had indeed earlier consumed alcohol at a different establishment (i.e., the “Crooked Cue”). This is made out in the evidence of Inspector Theakston and Officer Yeboah.

30During his testimony, Inspector Theakston confirmed the information he obtained from a visit to the Crooked Cue with Officer Yeboah, which is documented in his inspection report of June 2, 2023. He testified that the Crooked Cue’s owner told him the deceased had consumed two “Moscow Mule” beverages at this location. I find this information is consistent with notes of two separate interviews with Mr. Da Silva—one at which Officer Yeboah was present in June 2023, and the other conducted by Inspector Theakston in February 2024. The pool table rental records and drink receipts—when considered in concert with the interview notes of Mr. Da Silva—corroborate the arrival and departure times of the deceased and his mates as approximately 11:00 p.m. on May 9, 2023, and 12:30 a.m. on May 10, 2023, respectively. Inspector Theakston’s testimony also referred to the bar receipt associated with the deceased’s purchases, which show two “Dutch Mules” were served.

31I afford little significance to the owner’s subsequent e-mail to Inspector Theakston on June 5, 2023, which confirmed the drinks served to the deceased were actually one “Don Julio” and one “Moscow Mule” based on the server’s recollection. This is because the bar receipt does indeed include a “Don Julio,” which still supports the respondent’s position that the deceased consumed two alcoholic drinks at the Crooked Cue. I therefore accept, on a balance of probabilities, that the deceased had already consumed two ounces of alcohol at the Crooked Cue prior to attending the licensed premises approximately an hour later. In my view, this evidence diminishes the persuasiveness of Ms. Armstrong-Price’s own calculation of the deceased’s BAC at the time of the accident and lends more weight to the BAC projection based on the deceased’s own blood samples.

32Taken in totality, I conclude this evidence demonstrates on a balance of probabilities, that contrary to section 32 of the Act, liquor was permitted to be sold or supplied to a person who was intoxicated. I am persuaded that this is established by the appellant’s projected BAC by the time he left the licensed premises—as calculated by Mr. Armstrong-Price from the coroner’s report data—as well as her corresponding opinion that she would expect a BAC in this range to cause impairment. As such, I am satisfied that the respondent has established this ground to support its proposal to suspend the appellant’s liquor licence for 60 days.

The appellant permitted the deceased to become intoxicated on the licensed premises.

33I find the appellant permitted the deceased’s intoxication to occur on the licensed premises.

34The bar-view video of the licensed premises interior shows the deceased being served and consuming five drinks between 1:29 a.m. and 2:13 a.m., which is a period of 44 minutes. I accept that the video establishes all these drinks were served by Ms. County and I find this evidence—in concert with the bar receipts for these purchases—supports the respondent’s position that each of these drinks were “doubles” (i.e., each contained two ounces of alcohol). During the hearing, Inspector Theakston referenced the bartender making two measured pours from a bottle into each of the five glasses that were then placed on the table where the deceased was sitting. Inspector Theakston also pointed to the corresponding bar receipts for four of these drinks—each dated May 10, 2023 and showing a purchase of Jameson whiskey in increments of two ounces. The fifth drink consumed by the deceased was not found in the point-of-sale (“POS) system and therefore had no receipt.

35I did not place much weight on Ms. County’s account of her service to the deceased, the thrust of which being that she served only two drinks to the deceased and did not knowingly permit the deceased to be supplied the three other drinks he consumed. For context, the table-view video shows the party of four were seated at two separate round tables that were placed side-by-side. The deceased sat across from Mr. Da Silva, but not at the same table. I find from the video evidence that Ms. County placed each of the five drinks consumed by the deceased on the deceased’s table.

36Ms. County testified that she served the deceased’s first and third drink with intention. While I accept the video evidence corroborates Ms. County’s recollection of intentionally serving these two specific drinks to the deceased, I find the balance of her testimony is unsupported.

37Ms. County testified that the second drink consumed by the deceased was a double Jameson ordered by and intended for the person wearing a ball cap who was sitting next to Mr. Da Silva and opposite the deceased. However, at the time of this service, I find the video clearly shows the “intended” recipient of the second drink already had a drink in his hand. I find that Ms. County’s testimony is also diminished by Mr. Da Silva’s actions just prior to the service, which include gesturing with one finger to Ms. County and then pointing towards the deceased while touching his finger on the deceased’s table. In my view, this is consistent with Mr. Da Silva ordering the second drink for the deceased, which is corroborated when the deceased, in turn, acknowledges Ms. County as she places a drink on his table next to the deceased’s right hand within two minutes of consuming his first drink. Ms. County returns to the tables several minutes later and remains there for approximately 10 minutes, during which time the deceased twice handles and sips from the second drink. He later finishes this drink while sharing in a toast with Ms. County. Based on this evidence, I find on a balance of probabilities that the second drink was intentionally served to the deceased and that Ms. County was well aware he consumed it, having earlier cleared the empty glass from his first service prior to serving the second drink.

38Ms. County’s testimony concerning the fourth drink merits little weight. She said that Mr. Da Silva had ordered it for himself, and that she had placed it in front of Mr. Da Silva accordingly. In contrast, the video shows that after consuming his third drink, the deceased places his empty glass in front of Mr. Da Silva and points at it while occupied on his phone. Mr. Da Silva, in turn, begins scanning the room and proceeds to again gesture with one finger to Ms. County. A little over a minute after the deceased finished his third drink, Ms. County provides service to the deceased by reaching directly across Mr. Da Silva’s table to place the fourth drink squarely on the deceased’s table beside the deceased’s right hand. The deceased immediately claims this drink and consumes it in whole before placing the empty glass on Mr. Da Silva’s table. I further discounted Ms. County’s testimony that the fourth drink was intended for Mr. Da Silva because the video shows that both Mr. Da Silva and the person seated opposite the deceased had been served a fresh drink just 30 seconds before Ms. County provided the deceased’s fourth drink. I find this evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that Ms. County intended to serve the deceased his fourth drink.

39Ms. County recalled that the fifth and final drink was placed on the deceased’s table, but between Mr. Da Silva and the person sitting next to him. She did not remember who ordered this drink or who it was intended for. I afford less weight to this testimony because the video evidence shows the deceased interacting with Ms. County and gesturing towards the bar just before Ms. County leaves the table to retrieve a drink at the bar and immediately return to the table with it. Ms. County then places the drink on the deceased’s table beside the deceased’s right hand. I am satisfied this evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that Ms. County intentionally served the deceased’s fifth drink.

40In my view, Ms. County—who claims to have completed Smart-Serve training and produced a digital copy of her certification—ought to have foreseen that serving the appellant 10 ounces of liquor in under an hour would result in intoxication. Using the Smart Serve guidelines chart referenced by Mr. Anderson, the deceased should have been permitted to consume no more than two standard drinks (i.e., three ounces) per hour. Ms. County acknowledged during cross-examination that the service she provided to the deceased and his mates contravened the appellant’s own policy of serving each patron only one ounce of liquor per hour. She also offered her opinion that serving two doubles back-to-back is “too much” despite the video evidence establishing that approximately three minutes elapsed between serving the deceased drinks one and two; four minutes between drinks three and four; and just under five minutes between drinks four and five.

41Taken in totality, I conclude this evidence demonstrates on a balance of probabilities, that contrary to section 43(1) of regulation 746/21 under the Act, the appellant permitted intoxication to occur on the licensed premises or in adjacent areas under the exclusive control of the appellant. I am persuaded that this is established by Ms. County’s intentional service of five drinks to the deceased, which consisted of 10 ounces in alcohol in under an hour. As such, I am satisfied that the respondent has established this ground to support its proposal to suspend the appellant’s liquor licence for 60 days.

Contrary to interim standard 4.1, established pursuant to [section 24](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2019-c-15-sch-22/latest/so-2019-c-15-sch-22.html#sec24_smooth) of the [Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2019-c-15-sch-22/latest/so-2019-c-15-sch-22.html), did persons involved in the sale and service of alcohol not hold a valid certificate demonstrating the successful completion of a training course approved by the Board?

42I find the respondent has shown that the appellant failed to comply with its requirement to meet the training standards set out in interim standard 4.1.

43The respondent’s NOP articulates this ground as follows:

“Contrary to Interim Standard 4.1, pursuant to Liquor Licence and Control Act, section 26, [emphasis added] persons involved in the sale and service of alcohol did not hold a valid certificate demonstrating the successful completion of a training course approved by the Board”.

44I note that section 26 of the Act is about hearings and not standards. During the hearing, the parties did not dispute the applicability of section 26 of the Act to this matter. I find that both parties knew this ground, as set out in the NOP, pertained to interim standard 4.1 of the Registrar’s Interim Standards and Requirements for Liquor (the “ISR”). Section 24 of the Act is the applicable section that allows the Registrar to establish standards. As neither of the parties disputed the validity the standard itself, I find that the reference to section 26 in the NOP was an error by the respondent that has no effect on this hearing, and I will therefore consider this ground as intending to refer to section 24 of the Act.

45Section 24(1) of the Act enables the respondent to establish standards and requirements respecting certain matters relating to the conduct of licensees or permit holders or to the operation of licensed or permitted premises. One of those matters includes training relating to the responsible sale, wholesale, supply and delivery of liquor under a licence or permit and to the responsible consumption of liquor authorized under a licence or permit. Section 24(6) requires every licensee and permit holder to comply with the standards and requirements established under subsection (1).

46Interim standard 4.1 of the Registrar’s Interim Standards and Requirements for Liquor (the “ISR”) pertains to the completion of training and requires all licensees to ensure every person involved in the sale, service, sampling or delivery of liquor—or in taking orders for the sale of liquor—holds a valid certificate demonstrating the successful completion of a training course approved by the Board.

47The respondent submits that as of May 10, 2023, two employees of the licensee, namely Mr. Hai Van (bartender) and Ms. County, had not successfully completed the required Board-approved training course offered by Smart Serve.

48While the appellant concedes this ground is made out insofar that Mr. Van did not complete his training or hold a valid certificate until May 20, 2023, the appellant maintains that Ms. County had successfully completed the Smart Serve course prior to May 10, 2023, and was in possession of a valid certificate at that time.

49The parties do not dispute that Mr. Van had not completed his Smart Serve certification prior to May 10, 2023, and that he therefore did not possess a valid certificate at that time. The video evidence shows he was performing bartending duties on May 10, 2023, and that he supplied the drinks that were consumed by the deceased and his mates. Taken in totality, I conclude this evidence demonstrates on a balance of probabilities, that contrary to interim standard 4.1, established pursuant to section 24 of the Act, a person involved in the sale and service of alcohol did not hold a valid certificate demonstrating the successful completion of a training course approved by the Board. I am therefore satisfied that the respondent has established this ground to support its proposal to suspend the appellant’s liquor licence for 60 days.

50Given the operability of this finding, I find it unnecessary to consider the merits of Ms. County’s training certification.

Contrary to section 31(1) of regulation 746/21 under the [Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2019-c-15-sch-22/latest/so-2019-c-15-sch-22.html), did the licensee fail to ensure that liquor is sold and served only between specified hours?

51I find the respondent has shown that the appellant failed to comply with its requirement to abide by the hours of sale and service specified at section 31(1) of regulation 746/21 under the Act.

52Section 31(1) of regulation 746/21 under the Act says the licensee shall ensure that liquor is sold and served only between 9 a.m. on any day except December 31, and 2 a.m. on the following day.

53The respondent submits that Ms. County served alcohol to patrons after 2 a.m. on February 2, 2025.

54The appellant concedes that this ground is made out. The appellant does not dispute that Ms. County served alcohol to a patron after 2 a.m. on this date. During her testimony, Ms. County acknowledged serving alcohol as claimed by the respondent.

55Given the parties do not dispute that Ms. County served alcohol in contravention of section 31(1) of regulation 746/21 under the Act, I am satisfied that the respondent has established this ground to support its proposal to suspend the appellant’s liquor licence for 60 days.

ORDER

56Pursuant to subsections (4) and (5) of section 26 of the Act, the Tribunal may direct the Registrar not to carry out the proposal or may direct the Registrar to carry out the proposal, in whole or in part, and with any changes that the Tribunal considers appropriate. After a hearing, the Tribunal may impose any condition on a licence or permit that the Tribunal considers proper to give effect to the purposes of this Act.

57For the reasons set out above, I find the respondent has established that pursuant to section 13(1)(b) of the Act, the appellant has contravened the Act, the regulations, the standards and requirements established by the Registrar under section 24, or a condition of the licence. As such, pursuant to section 26(4) of the Act I direct the Registrar to carry out its proposal to suspend the appellant’s liquor licence for 60 days.