Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17933/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Kristen Storie

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Bernard Trottier

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Kristen Storie, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Ian Sookram, Agent

Heard by teleconference: November 21, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Kristen Storie (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on October 22, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Scott Maurice (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) of the Regulation states that to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) of the Regulation from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

i. will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

ii. will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13In her Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) and oral testimony, the appellant stated that she lives in Britt, in the Parry Sound District. Britt is a community of fewer than 300 people, about 80 km north of the Town of Parry Sound and 95 km south of the City of Greater Sudbury. The appellant works as an operator at the Magnetawan First Nation water treatment plant, which is about 25 km from where she lives. The appellant lives in a mobile home that uses solar power and a gasoline generator for electricity, and propane for heating and cooking.

14The appellant testified that she lives with the driver and that she had lent the vehicle to a neighbour on the day of the impoundment. Later that day, the driver and the neighbour were stopped on the highway when the driver was driving the vehicle.

15The appellant submits that she requires her vehicle to get to work and to take care of day-to-day essentials such as groceries, water, medications, gasoline, propane, laundry and medical appointments. She submits that the driver does not own a vehicle of his own, and that she does not have access to another vehicle from a family member. She submits that there is no public transit or taxis in Britt, and that renting a vehicle is not a financially viable alternative to the impounded vehicle.

16The appellant testified that she has had to rely on rides from friends, co-workers and people at the band office to get to and from work since the day of the impoundment. She testified that she has been able to borrow a van that belongs to the water treatment plant occasionally, and that she owns a quadricycle off-highway vehicle that she has been able to use to get propane in Britt.

17The appellant testified that she has not always been able to get a ride to the Magnetawan water treatment plant, and that she has had to use paid time off when that has occurred. She testified that she is one of only two operators at the water treatment plant. In her NOA, the appellant submits that her role is critical to the health and safety of the community of the Magnetawan First Nation.

18She testified, also, that she was required to reschedule one non-emergency medical appointment in Parry Sound until after the impoundment period.

19The respondent submits that the vehicle was impounded because, on the day of the impoundment, the driver’s licence of the driver was suspended indefinitely for multiple Criminal Code of Canada convictions for impaired driving. Under s. 50.2 of the Act, the vehicle was impounded for 45 days.

20The respondent submits that the appellant has had access to alternate transportation to get to work and for day-to-day essentials. The respondent acknowledges that the water treatment plant is an essential service, but that between rides from friends and use of the treatment plan’s van, she has been able to fulfill her duties at the plant. For these reasons, the respondent argues that the impoundment should be confirmed.

21I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. I find that, although the appellant lives in a remote community, she has managed to obtain rides to and from work and/or borrow the treatment plant’s van on occasion. The appellant did not direct me to any evidence that the water treatment plant’s operations were compromised by her not having a vehicle and by taking time paid time off occasionally.

22I find that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle for day-to-day essentials such as groceries, water, medications and fuel. Not having the impounded vehicle is inconvenient, which I cannot consider as a ground to release the vehicle under the Regulation.

23Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion

24I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

25The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.