Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17944/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under section 55.1(1)2 of the Act.

Between:

Madison Ainsworth

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Michael Beauchesne

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Madison Ainsworth, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Stephen Grootenboer, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Friday, November 21, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Madison Ainsworth (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Friday, October 24, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Mathew Domingue (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued by the Registrar (the “respondent”) for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUE

3The issue in dispute is, pursuant to section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the respondent to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act, the appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that she satisfies one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in section 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by section 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, section 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant testified that she needs her vehicle to get to work as well as to take her child to school and weekend hockey. However, during cross-examination, the appellant confirmed that she has used alternate means (i.e., a rental vehicle funded by a family member) of getting to work since her vehicle was impounded. While the appellant explained that this rental vehicle would be returned on November 26, 2025, she confirmed that she has received rides to work from a co-worker in the past, and that this co-worker had indicated she could likely take the appellant to work on a “here-and-there” basis during the remainder of the impoundment period. I did not place much weight on the applicant’s testimony that it was “tough” to find one person to commit to providing a ride every day because the Act does not permit me to consider the inconvenience of different arrangements with multiple people to obtain alternate transportation.

14I further find there remains alternate means of getting to work that are unexplored and therefore have not been shown to be unavailable to the appellant. For example, at the end of the hearing, the applicant clarified that she lives in the central downtown area of her urban community but has not explored the availability of taxis or Uber. The applicant also agreed during cross-examination that she could likely obtain “chits” (i.e. vouchers) from her Ontario Works case worker to pay for taxis and Uber transportation, but had not yet investigated this either.

15During the hearing, the applicant acknowledged that her child was eligible for busing to-and-from school and confirmed this child would use this alternative transportation once the rental vehicle was returned. She also shared that a certain family member may be able to take her child to hockey for the two weekends remaining in the impoundment period after November 26, 2025, despite this family member not being available to take the appellant to-and-from work on weekdays owing to full-time employment. The appellant testified that amenities, such as medical facilities and grocery stores, were located “fairly” close to her residence, and that she receives help with groceries from the same family member who paid for her rental vehicle and may be available for hockey transportation on weekends.

16Taken in totality, I find this evidence establishes that the appellant has not shown, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Since the appellant has not met her onus to show there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, I am persuaded that exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation. I therefore need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

ORDER

17The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.