Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16701/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Erika Dika-Cambly

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Avril A. Farlam

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Erika Dika-Cambly, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Monday, November 17, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Erika Dika-Cambly, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Thursday, January 30, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Jerimiah Hole (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle without a valid driver’s licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant testified that she requires the vehicle in order to obtain groceries and other supplies for her children, her two pets and herself, to take her young children to medical appointments and other programs to assist in their development, and to allow her to help her elderly grandmother. The appellant testified that lack of access to her vehicle during the impoundment period has caused exceptional hardship for her and her children because she did not have access to her vehicle for these activities. The appellant wrote in the attachment to her Notice of Appeal that she has no alternative transportation.

14The appellant testified that the impoundment of her vehicle took place January 30, 2025 and ended March 16, 2025. The vehicle was returned to the appellant at the end of the impoundment period as she was able to borrow the funds from family to pay the impoundment fees. The appellant testified that she was able to borrow money from family during the impoundment period to hire taxis for transportation to obtain groceries and pharmacy items for herself and her children.

15The appellant also testified that her grandmother provided her with rides “once or twice”. In addition, the driver with whom she resides, has walked to the store sometimes to obtain needed items for the appellant and the children.

16The appellant testified that there is also bus service available to her and the children but she prefers not to use the bus because she finds this inconvenient as one of her young children has trouble sitting still and the appellant fears she would run around on the bus which she views as unsafe for the child and others.

17The appellant testified that one of her children missed a doctor’s appointment during the impoundment period but this was later re-scheduled and has taken place. The appellant also testified that one of her children could not attend a program designed to aid in the child’s development during the impoundment period but that arrangements were made for the child to attend the program later in the year.

18Although the appellant spoke of the inconvenience of taking the bus, this is not a factor which the Tribunal can take into consideration.

19Although the appellant testified that she thought that the development of one of her children has been delayed, she brought forward no medical evidence to support this.

20Because the appellant has public bus transit available to her which she has chosen not to use, and because the appellant and her children have taken taxis, received rides from family, and supplies have been provided by the driver through other means such as walking to the store, I find that these constitute alternatives to the impounded vehicle. As a result, I am unable to consider the appellant’s submissions related to financial or economic loss. The appellant’s preference to drive her own vehicle as opposed to taking the bus is a matter of convenience which I am not permitted to consider in determining whether there is exceptional hardship.

21Because the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle as set out above, I find the appellant has not established the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation.

22I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

23Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion

24I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

25The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.