Meeza Omar v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 119980

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Before: Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17548/MVIA

Case Name: Meeza Omar v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Written Submissions by:

For the Appellant: Meeza Omar, Appellant

For the Respondent: Ian Sookram, Agent

OVERVIEW

1The appellant filed a request for reconsideration form and supporting submissions on October 6, 2025 in respect of the Licence Appeal Tribunal’s (“Tribunal”) decision released on September 15, 2025 (“decision”).

2Following a teleconference hearing on September 9, 2025, the Tribunal confirmed the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.

3Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 states that, for the Tribunal to consider whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment, the appellant must first establish that “no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available”. As such, the adjudicator made a key finding in the decision at paragraph 19:

I considered the testimony of both parties and find that the appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no alternative to the impounded car. The respondent submitted that the appellant has access to public transportation, and this is confirmed by the appellant’s own testimony that she uses public transit in Toronto to meet her daily needs and continues to visit her mom using transit. This shows that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle which is currently being utilized. I find that the appellant’s mom also has access to public transportation because her daughter uses public transit to visit her. Although not preferred, the appellant’s mom may use public transit that is adapted for individuals with special needs/disabilities as an alternative to the impounded vehicle for attending her medical appointments. As a result, I find that Toronto public transit is a cost-effective alternative in addition to taxis and ride share applications for transporting the appellant’s mom to her medical appointments.

4Since she found there was an alternative to the impounded vehicle, namely, Toronto’s public transit system, taxis, and ride share applications, the adjudicator went on to conclude at paragraph 22 that: “… I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship”.

5The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:

a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;

b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or

c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

6The appellant is relying on Rule 18.2(a) and Rule 18.2(b) to support her request for reconsideration. The appellant is asking the Tribunal to either refund or reduce the impoundment fee “in light of the significant personal and financial hardship involved.”

7The respondent is asking for the request for reconsideration to be dismissed.

RESULT

8The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

9I find the appellant has not established any grounds for reconsideration, pursuant to either Rule 18.2(a) or Rule 18.2(b).

10The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor—in this case, the appellant—must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.

11The appellant presents two main arguments in support of her request.

12First, the appellant argues that, since she was not represented by counsel at the hearing, she was unaware of the evidence she needed to present. As such, the appellant submits that “the Tribunal should have provided clearer guidance to a self-represented party on what documentation could be helpful.” The appellant claims this lack of guidance amounts to a breach of procedural fairness, pursuant to Rule 18.2(a).

13Though I sympathize with the difficulty expressed by the appellant in attempting to navigate the Tribunal’s processes without legal representation, she has not pointed to any specific instances during the hearing when she was unclear on how she was to proceed with presenting her case. Rather, the decision shows that the adjudicator considered documentary evidence and testimony from the appellant, along with the arguments she put forward in support of her case, e.g., the hardship her mother is experiencing because of the impoundment. Procedural fairness is based on the protection of a party’s right to be heard, and I find she has not shown how the adjudicator breached this right.

14Further, regardless of whether a party has legal representation or not, they are expected to present their case in a manner that allows them to meet their evidentiary burden. It is not the role of the adjudicator to inform parties, even those without legal representation, that they should present a certain piece of evidence. This kind of guidance would amount to the adjudicator entering the fray between the parties, which would not align with the Tribunal’s role as an impartial decision-maker.

15Turning to her arguments about Rule 18.2(b), the appellant claims the Tribunal “appears to have overlooked or underestimated the extent of the hardship caused by the impoundment and the $4,096 fee.” According to her reconsideration submissions, the impounded vehicle was necessary to meet both her caregiving duties and activities of daily living. As such, the Tribunal should have been more attuned to the financial strain caused by the impoundment.

16As noted above, the reconsideration process is not a venue for re-weighing evidence that was considered at first instance. To trigger Rule 18.2(b), a party must not only show that the Tribunal committed a specific error of fact or law, but they must also show that, if the error had not taken place, the outcome of the decision would likely have been different.

17In reviewing the decision, I am satisfied that the adjudicator weighed the financial hardship that the impoundment fee has caused, as well as the difficulties that the appellant has experienced in trying to manage both her and her mother’s needs without the impounded vehicle. For instance, at paragraph 20, the adjudicator considered the appellant’s arguments about the financial strain caused by the impoundment fee, as well as the inconvenience of her longer commutes due to public transit. It is open to the appellant to disagree with these findings, but disagreement alone will not trigger Rule 18.2(b).

18Additionally, the appellant highlighted records from her mother’s physiotherapy appointments, and she stated that she is “prepared to provide any further documentation the Tribunal may request”.

19I note that the adjudicator referenced a record from the mother’s physiotherapy clinic at paragraph 16 of the decision. The appellant has not explained how the adjudicator’s review of this evidence was incorrect in fact or law.

20Further, while the appellant claims that she is ready to provide any records at the request of the Tribunal, the appellant has the onus to demonstrate that her reconsideration request meets the standard under Rule 18.2. It is not the Tribunal’s role to indicate what records may be of assistance to help a party meet this onus.

21Taken together, I find the appellant has not established any grounds for reconsideration pursuant to either Rule 18.2(a) or Rule 18.2(b).

CONCLUSION & ORDER

22The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

Craig Mazerolle

Vice-Chair