Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17543/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

1000480863 Ontario Inc. o/a Spray Foam Kings

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Dagmara Szczudlo

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Hans Jain, Corporate Director

For the Respondent:

Steve Grootenboer, Agent

HEARD By Teleconference September 9, 2025

OVERVIEW

11000480863 Ontario Inc. o/a Spray Foam Kings (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Tuesday, August 19, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Oleksandr Shevchuk (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2Douglas Quan submitted a Declaration of Representative form to the Tribunal acknowledging that he is an unlicensed representative covered by an exemption allowed by the LSUC as a private investigator and an authorized representative for 1000480863 Ontario Inc. Mr. Quan testified as to the events leading up to and after the vehicle impoundment during the hearing (as a witness) and did not actually act as a legal representative for the appellant in the proceeding. Hans Jain, a director of the company, attended the hearing on behalf of 1000480863 Ontario Inc. but did not testify.

3The appellant appeals on the grounds that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded, and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

4The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

5For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

6For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was not stolen

7I am not satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

8In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

9In other words, in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

10Mr. Quan testified on behalf of the appellant. Mr. Quan’s testimony is based on his experience as a private investigator for Spray Foam Kings, familiarity with company operations, and his presence on site at the warehouse on the day that the van was impounded.

11Mr. Quan testified that the driver was employed as a warehouse manager at Spray Foam Kings and, on the day the vehicle was impounded, the driver took it without authorization from his employer. He further testified that Spray Foam Kings offers insulation services in the Greater Toronto area and employs approximately 10 employees and several sub-contractors. The impounded 2020 Ford Transit cargo van was used to transport chemicals and supplies to job sites.

12Mr. Quan testified that the driver’s duties did not require him to operate the vehicle and were limited to a warehouse-based role where he managed inventory (including tools, equipment, and materials), performed electrical repairs, and arranged staff and deliveries. He also testified that the driver washed vehicles that were returned from job sites but was not authorized to drive. He testified that company vehicles were operated by other employees and keys to those vehicles were stored in a locked filing cabinet when the vehicles return to the site.

13Continuing his testimony, Mr. Quan stated that no one at the warehouse was aware that the driver was absent nor that the vehicle was taken until the following day when the driver’s family notified management that the driver was in a hospital. The Ford Transit van was discovered to be missing during a safety audit the next day, and Mr. Quan was retained to investigate and assist in asset recovery. His investigation revealed that the driver took the car from Spray Foam Kings on August 19, 2025 and drove himself to a methadone clinic. At some point after the visit, he was pulled over and the van was detained for impoundment since the driver had a suspended licence.

14Mr. Quan also testified that the driver had a complex medical history, was struggling with alcohol addiction for some time, and was estranged from his family. As a gesture of good will, the company permitted the driver to live on the premises at the warehouse and believed that the driver’s family was going to transport him to an addiction rehabilitation center on the day of the impoundment. Mr. Quan testified that the driver’s struggles with alcohol were well known at the warehouse and that his colleagues would drive him to a methadone clinic for treatment on previous occasions.

15Further, Mr. Quan testified that all vehicle access had been taken from the driver, including his personal access to two vehicles, his own and one registered to his uncle. Mr. Quan’s testimony did not include details of who took away access to the driver’s cars, specifically whether it was his employer or his family. The vehicles were stored at the warehouse and Mr. Quan provided photos of two plated Audi vehicles covered in dust in support of his testimony. Mr. Quan also testified that it is unclear how the driver obtained keys to the impounded vehicle, but he speculated that the likely cause is another driver who left keys out after returning the van.

16Mr. Quan testified that once the van was located at the impound lot, the appellant filed a report with the York Regional Police that the vehicle was taken without consent (YRP #2025-281068). Mr. Quan testified that the report was filed on August 22, 2025; however, a copy of the report was not available/entered as an exhibit to confirm its content.

17Mr. Quan testified that the driver’s regular work hours were 7:30 am to 3:30 pm but he often worked late. According to the Notice to Registrar, the van was detained for impoundment at 15:19 which is during the driver’s regular work hours. I find that it is more likely than not that the driver had access to company vehicles in the course of his duties, particularly when washing equipment and company vehicles at the warehouse.

18The respondent submitted that the driver’s struggle with alcohol was known to his employer. On the day in question, the driver used the impounded van to drive himself to a methadone clinic and there is no evidence that he meant to deprive the company either permanently or temporarily by not returning it after this visit. The respondent further submitted that the appellant did not serve evidence of the driver’s role at the company, nor that he was advised not to operate any company vehicles, particularly since he had access to them at the warehouse. The respondent argues that the request for impoundment be confirmed by the Tribunal.

19The issue to be determined is whether the vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained, which in part requires that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent. The appellant argues that the vehicle was stolen because the driver did not have the owner’s consent to drive (that the driver “took the vehicle without authorization from his employer”). The appellant has the onus to persuade me that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent. The only evidence put forward to support this argument was Mr. Quan’s testimony and photos of two Audi cars. Mr. Quan provided testimony that the driver was an employee of the appellant, that the driver’s duties did not require him to operate vehicles, and that all vehicle access had been taken from the driver. If established, these facts may have supported a finding that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent.

20I am not persuaded by Mr. Quan’s testimony and assign it little weight since he is not in a managerial capacity at Spray Foam Kings and is not the driver’s employer. Mr. Quan did not claim to have been present when the driver’s employer advised the driver that he is not permitted to drive company cars. Mr. Quan’s testimony is hearsay at best, and he did not explain the sources of the information he relayed at the hearing.

21While s. 15(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act permits me to consider hearsay evidence as long as it is “relevant to the subject-matter of the proceeding,” I am alive to the dangers of putting weight on hearsay evidence, namely that hearsay is inherently unreliable because the witness (Mr. Quan) gave evidence about what other individuals from Spray Foam Kings told the driver. Notably, Mr. Jain chose not to testify at the hearing and was not subject to cross-examination. Further, no additional evidence was provided to corroborate Mr. Quan’s testimony, except for photographs of vehicles, which were not persuasive in relation to the issues of authorization/consent to drive. As a result, I assign Mr. Quan’s testimony on these crucial issues little weight. Based on the limited evidence at my disposal, I cannot find that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent.

22On a balance of probabilities, the appellant has not met their onus to prove that the van was stolen when detained for impoundment.

23I find that the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

24I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

25The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

26If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

27If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

28The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

29The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

30I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

31Mr. Quan testified that the 2020 Ford Transit cargo van is used to transport 50-gallon drums of chemicals and supplies to job sites. He stated that the chemicals are corrosive and require temperature control. During the period of impoundment, Spray Foam Kings is re-directing a larger van in lieu of the impounded cargo van, however, this causes disruptions to projects and inefficiencies for the company. Mr. Quan testified that renting a similar cube van is not feasible because of the nature of chemicals that need to be transported and the risk of them causing damage to the rental. Finally, Mr. Quan stated that other vehicles owned by the company are leased and cross over to other businesses under the Atria Developments Inc. umbrella and are not always available to Spray Foam Kings.

32The respondent submits that the appellant’s business continues to operate without the impounded vehicle and four remaining vehicles registered to the business are being used to complete jobs. The appellant did not present evidence of loss of income because of the impoundment and although the temporary loss may be inconvenient, I find that the appellant has access to viable alternatives, particularly the larger van currently being utilized until the impounded van is released.

33I considered the testimony of both parties and find that the appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no alternative to the impounded van. Although Mr. Quan appears to be knowledgeable regarding Spray Foam Kings, he is a private investigator, and I did not hear testimony from an individual with managerial responsibilities at the company. Mr. Jain chose not to testify. I repeat my earlier reasons about the dangers of hearsay evidence and apply them here, as I have similar concerns about the reliability of this evidence as I did with the evidence in the “stolen” ground of appeal that I discussed above. Even if I were to accept Mr. Quan’s testimony, I find that the business continues to operate using alternative arrangements. I also give more weight to the respondent’s evidence that the company has access to additional vehicles as outlined in the Registered Identification Number (“RIN”) summary. The RIN lists four additional plated vehicles registered to the appellant’s numbered company, three of which are plated Fords of unspecified model.

34I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

35Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusions

36I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

37The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Released: October 7, 2025

__________________________

Dagmara Szczudlo

Adjudicator