Crowley v. Security National Insurance Company, 2025 CanLII 119967

Citation: Crowley v. Security National Insurance Company, 2025 ONLAT 24-013482/AABS

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 24-013482/AABS

In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.

Between:

Angela Crowley

Applicant

and

Security National Insurance Company

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATORS:

Rebecca Hines

Steve Gilchrist

APPEARANCES:

For the Applicant:

Rasha M El-Tawil, Counsel

James Virtue, Counsel

For the Respondent:

Nawaz Tahir, Counsel

Heard by Videoconference:

September 4, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Angela Crowley, the applicant, was involved in an incident on June 26, 2020 in the course of which she sustained injuries. She sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”). The applicant was denied benefits by the respondent, Security National insurance Company, and applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal - Automobile Accident Benefits Service (the “Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute. The onus is on the applicant to prove the merits of their claim.

ISSUES

2The following issues are in dispute:

1. Was the applicant involved in an “accident” as defined in section 3(1) of the Schedule?

2. If the collision does not meet the definition of an “accident”, is the respondent estopped from denying accident benefits to the applicant?

RESULT

3After considering the submissions of both parties as well as all the evidence, we find that the applicant was involved in an “accident” as defined by the Schedule.

BACKGROUND

4The applicant was the driver of an all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) which collided with a tree on private property. It is undisputed that the incident took place on the owner of the ATV’s property.

5On the date of the incident, the applicant and one of the family members occupying the property, travelled approximately 2.28 kilometres from the barn in which the ATVs were stored to a pond at the far end of the property. The route that they followed involved travelling along and across municipal road 7^th^ Line EHS which falls within the jurisdiction of the Township of Mono. After visiting the pond, the two ATVs were in transit, back to the barn, at the time the incident occurred.

6As a result of the accident, the applicant was rendered unconscious and suffered significant injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, concussion, numerous facial bone fractures, depression and PTSD. On April 24, 2024, after the applicant was subjected to two assessments, the insurance company deemed her to be catastrophically impaired. The respondent terminated the applicant’s entitlement to accident benefits two years after the accident and two months after it deemed her to be catastrophically impaired on the basis that the applicant was not involved in an accident. At the time of the hearing, the applicant continued to require medical treatments for her injuries.

RELEVANT LAW

7Section 3 of the Schedule defines an “accident” as an “incident in which the use or operation of an automobile directly causes an impairment or directly causes damage to any prescription eyewear, denture, hearing aid, prosthesis or other medical or dental device.”

8“Automobile” is not defined in the Schedule but s. 224(1) of the Insurance Act defines an “automobile” as (a) a motor vehicle required under any Act to be insured under a motor vehicle liability policy, and (b) a vehicle prescribed by regulation to be an automobile. ”Motor vehicle” is defined in subsection 267.12(b) of the Insurance Act as having the same meaning as in subsection 1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O 1990, c.H-8.

9In the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-8 (“HTA”) the definition of a “motor vehicle” “includes an automobile, a motorcycle, a motor assisted bicycle unless otherwise indicated in this Act, and any other vehicle propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power…”

10The definitive test for the applicability of the definition of “automobile” was set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Adams v Pineland Amusements Ltd., 2007 ONCA 844 (“Adams”). The parties agreed that the following three-part test (the “Adams test”) is appropriate for the determination of whether a specific vehicle fits within the definition of “automobile”:

(i) is the vehicle an “automobile” in the ordinary parlance;

(ii) Is the vehicle defined as an “automobile” in the wording of the insurance policy; or,

(iii) Does the vehicle fall within any enlarged definition of “automobile” in any relevant statute?

11The parties agree that the vehicle involved in this incident was an “ATV”. The operation of an ATV is regulated by the Off-Road Vehicles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.4 (“ORVA”). The ORVA defines an “off-road vehicle” as a “vehicle propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power or wind and designed to travel, (a) on not more than three wheels, or (b) on more than three wheels and being a prescribed class of vehicle.”

12Both parties also agree that parts a) and b) of the Adams Test do not apply as an ATV is not an “automobile” in the ordinary parlance, nor is it defined as an automobile in any insurance policy connected to this matter. That leaves the third test for our consideration, which is does it fall within any enlarged definition of “automobile” in any relevant statute?

13Section 15(1) of the ORVA stipulates that no person shall drive an off-road vehicle unless it is insured under a motor vehicle liability policy and section 15(2) provides that “the owner may not permit the vehicle to be driven unless it is insured”. Section 15(9) provides that Sections (1) and (2) do not apply where the vehicle is driven on land occupied by the owner of the vehicle.

14Considering the above legislation, it would follow that the applicant is entitled to claim accident benefits if we find that the ATV was required to be insured under section 15 of the ORVA. If so, it would make the vehicle an “automobile” as defined in section 224(1) of the Insurance Act and, therefore, qualify as an “accident” pursuant to s. 3 of the Schedule.

ANALYSIS

15Given the facts of this case, we find that the ATV was required to be insured because it was regularly driven on public highways and roadways to access different points of interest on the owner’s property, as was the case on the day of the incident.

16The applicant argues that the exemption set out in s. 15(9) of the ORVA does not apply because the ATV in question regularly travelled along, and across public municipal roadways and highways for large stretches of time. For this reason, the use of the ATV was never intended to be restricted to private property, nor was it used in that manner. Therefore, it was required to be insured under an automobile policy as required by the legislation. The applicant maintains that it cannot be a rational legal premise, or a redeeming public policy, to hold that this ATV would be an automobile under the Insurance Act one moment, but then an exempted off-road vehicle under the ORVA a moment later, especially in the span of a single contemporaneous event. As such, the owners of the ATV were required to insure it under an automobile liability policy.

17The applicant offered no jurisprudence which mirrors the unique facts in this case. However, she asserts that the case law is well established that the Schedule is consumer protection legislation and exclusions should be narrowly interpreted. She relies on a decision of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario in Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund v. Wilhelmina Margaret Buckle 2012 ONFSCDRS 163 (“Buckle”) where the arbitrator determined that a golf cart driven on a public highway required insurance. Further, she posits that the decisions relied upon by the respondent are distinguishable because they discuss the notion or the possibility that various types of vehicles could have been driven on the highway but did not. She submits that even the Adams decision acknowledged that the issue of whether the vehicle was being driven illegally on a public highway without insurance was not an issue before the court.

18The respondent argues that the incident does not qualify as an accident because the collision occurred on the owner’s private property. Consequently, it was not required to be insured and the exemption set out in s. 15 (9) of the ORVA applies. In support of its position, the respondent cited several decisions, including Motors Insurance Corporation v. Cassondra Bouchard, 2012 FSCDRS 96; Copley v. Kerr Farms Ltd., 2002 CanLII 44900 (ON CA); Balon v. BelairDirect, 2023 CanLII 122940 (ON LAT); and, Benson v. Belair Insurance Company Inc., 2019 ONCA 840. It submits that all of these decisions support the principle that whether or not a vehicle can be driven on the highway is irrelevant to the analysis. Instead, it is the time and place of the incident that is determinative.

19We do not find the case law relied on by either party particularly helpful because the facts in those cases are different from the matter before us. The following are some examples:

a) In Bouchard, the adjudicator determined that the incident was not an accident because the applicant was operating a pocket bike on land occupied by the bike’s owner when the incident occurred. The arbitrator rejected the notion that the pocket bike needed to be insured because it could be driven on property not occupied by the owner. We find this case distinguishable because there was no evidence that the pocket bike was regularly driven on a public highway or municipal roadway as part of its ordinary use.

b) In Copley, the Court of Appeal overturned a motion judge’s decision that a tomato wagon required insurance on the basis that the possibility that the wagon could be driven on the highway was irrelevant. We find this decision distinguishable from the present case because the applicant and owner in this case regularly took the ATVs on municipal roadways and highways. This case also featured a mode of transportation which fell outside the definition of either an “off-road vehicle” under the ORVA and a “motor vehicle” under the HTA.

c) In Balon, the adjudicator determined that the incident was not an accident because the ATV was on private property when the incident occurred. The adjudicator rejected the applicant’s argument that the incident took place on a roadway because of a lack of evidence. We find this decision distinguishable because there was no evidence before the adjudicator that the applicant in that case was driving on a public roadway prior to the incident. In this case, the applicant and owner of the ATV specifically drove the ATV along and across a municipal roadway and public highway on the route taken on the day of the incident.

d) In Buckley, the applicant fell off a golf cart on the highway. Consequently, the arbitrator determined that, notwithstanding that it was not normal practice to operate a golf cart on a highway, the fact that it was used, on the day in question, meant it required insurance coverage.

20The applicant also highlighted that in Adams the sole issue before the court was whether a go-kart operated on private go-kart track required insurance. The court acknowledged that the go-kart in that case was not operated on a highway and the question of whether it could be illegally operated on a highway did not arise. In this case, the ATV was legally required to be insured because it was regularly operated on municipal roads and highways. We find that the route taken by the applicant prior to the incident included portions which were both on private property and on a municipally controlled roadway. In our view, if the route taken on the date in question was fully within one or the other category, our decision would be a simple one but, in this case, we must consider the fact that there is no way for the applicant to have been able to transit from the barn to the pond without travelling along and across a road. We do not find the authorities relied upon by either party particularly helpful because none of them involved the scenario where a vehicle was used on both private property and a highway as part of the sequence of events leading up to the accident.

21Under the ORVA, the only time an off-road vehicle is allowed on a roadway is to cross it, directly. Had the route taken by the applicant simply crossed 7^th^ Line EHS, the ATV would not have required insurance. We accept the applicant’s submission that the ATV cannot be both defined as a non-automobile, under s. 15(9) of ORVA, and as an “automobile”, under the Insurance Act, as part of the same continuous trip from the pond back to the barn. The applicant argues that because the ATV regularly travelled on highways, the ATV was exempt under s. 2 (1) of the ORVA which states that the Act does not apply to off road vehicles being operated on highways. The applicant argues that because the s. 15 (9) exemption of the ORVA does not apply, the ATV was required to be insured under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act (“CAIA”).

22The applicant relied on various photographs which depict the paths that needed to be travelled in order to access the swimming pond and the general store and that the applicant had to follow paths on either side of 7^th^ Line EHS. Both from the photographs, and from the applicant’s oral submissions the paths are offset from each other by what appears to be somewhere between 20 and 30 yards. Accordingly, there is no way to follow a route that includes both those paths without transiting along the roadway, which, by definition, includes both the roadbed and the shoulders. We agree that this was an inevitable consequence of transiting a property of this size which was bisected by public roadways. Further, the ATV was not being used as a farm implement or some other device designed to perform a singular task away from public roads. In our view, since the ATV was regularly driven along public roadways and highways it was required to be insured.

23Not only do we find the use of the ATV on a highway invalidates the applicability of the s. 15(9) exemption which is made for use exclusively on private property, but it introduces the regulatory requirement that any vehicle used on a highway must be insured. The Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act (“CAIA), R.S.O 1990, c.C.25 subsection 2(1) supports that no owner or lessee of a motor vehicle shall, a) operate a motor vehicle; or b) cause or permit the motor vehicle to be operated on a highway unless the motor vehicle is insured under a contract of automobile insurance. Consequently, we find that the ATV in this case meets part c) of the Adams Test as it falls within an enlarged definition of “automobile” in any relevant statute, primarily the CAIA.

24It is clear that the bulk of the route followed by the applicant, on the day of the incident, was on private property occupied by the owner of the ATV. In our view, the fact that she was using a roadway, for part of the trip, subsection 15(9) under the ORVA is not applicable. As a result, our decision is that the vehicle should be considered an “automobile” and the incident an “accident” as defined in the Schedule.

25We are conscious of the consumer protection nature of the Schedule and agree with the decision of Adjudicator Norris in Hagopian, relied upon by the applicant that “the consumer-protection aspect of the Schedule provides that it ought to be interpreted in favour of the applicant here. Excluding the applicant’s claim in this situation would require a narrow interpretation of the term “automobile” and would be contrary to the spirit of consumer-protection legislation.” In this case, we agree with the applicant that the ATV meets the definition of “automobile”. Consequently, we find that the applicant was involved in an accident and is entitled to claim accident benefits.

26Since we have determined that the applicant was involved in an accident, we find it unnecessary to address the arguments regarding estoppel advanced by both parties.

ORDER

27After considering the submissions of both parties as well as all the evidence, we find that the applicant was involved in an “accident” as defined by the Schedule.