Patricia Harris v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 119951

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17549/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from an impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Patricia Harris

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR:

Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Patricia Harris

For the Respondent:

Steve Grootenboer, Agent

Heard:

September 26, 2025

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Patricia Harris, appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2011 Chevy Equinox motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).

2The appellant’s vehicle was impounded on August 12, 2025, after police discovered it being operated by her son, Kevin Harris (K.H.), whose driver’s licence had been suspended following a conviction under the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (“Criminal Code”) for impaired driving. At the hearing, there was conflicting testimony about where the vehicle was detained and impounded. Those details are not essential to this case. The parties do not dispute the fact that the vehicle was being driven by K.H. at the time of impoundment.

3Subsection 55.1(1) of the Act allows for the impoundment of a vehicle for 45 days where a police officer is satisfied that the driver’s licence of the person who is driving a vehicle is under suspension at the time for, among other specified reasons, an indefinite suspension for impaired driving. This offence occurred on July 22, 2019. As a result of discovering this information at roadside, police impounded the vehicle pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the Act.

4The appellant filed her appeal with the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) on August 20, 2025. The hearing was held on the last day of the 45-day impoundment. The appellant was reminded that she should make efforts to retrieve the vehicle by the end of day to avoid any additional costs for impoundment. She was also advised that if she was successful in her appeal, the Registrar would only reimburse the cost of the impoundment period.

5The appellant appeals the impoundment pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUE

6The onus of proving any ground of appeal rests with the appellant. To succeed in her appeal, the appellant must establish this ground of appeal on a balance of probabilities.

7The issue is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

8Having considered the parties’ evidence and submissions, I find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, as the appellant has reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. I therefore dismiss the appeal and confirm the impoundment.

ANALYSIS

9It is undisputed between the parties that the appellant is the owner of the impounded vehicle, that K.H. was driving it at the time of impoundment, and that K.H.’s driver’s licence was suspended at the time because of the Criminal Code offence of impaired driving. I am satisfied that the vehicle was lawfully detained and impounded under s. 55.1 of the Act.

Will the appellant experience exceptional hardship as a result of the impoundment?

10I find that the appellant has failed to show that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship for the reasons which follow.

11As a first step, s. 10(1) of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. To establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in s. 10(1) of the Regulation is that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

12Section 10(4) of the Regulation provides that, in order to show that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available,

The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

13The appellant testifies that she lives in a rural area outside of Ottawa which is not regularly serviced by public transit. She cares for children with special needs and babysits other small children to supplement her monthly income from CPP and OAS. The appellant did not clearly establish why a vehicle is needed for her babysitting duties. However, she did state that she would use her vehicle to sometimes take her children with special needs for coffee, shopping or other errands.

14The appellant testifies that using taxi or other ride share programs are cost prohibitive and not an option for her at this time. Since her vehicle has been impounded, she has been able to obtain rides from friends. She also states that her daughter, who resides with her, has a vehicle and has helped by picking up groceries and running errands for the family home.

15The appellant has also made alternate arrangements for the children she cares for. She advised that her friend has been able to pick up the children from the bus stop while her vehicle is impounded. The appellant failed to advance any convincing evidence to support her ground of exceptional hardship. Conversely, she has provided examples of steps towards alleviating any exceptional hardship, which as discussed below, is more in line with inconvenience.

16The appellant also relies on the argument that the cost for the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship. During the hearing, the appellant confirmed that she does have another car, albeit difficult to start at times. She is considering selling it to help with the cost of impoundment. The appellant also stated that her son may be able to help pay the cost of the impoundment.

17I would note that the cost of impoundment can only be relied on if there are no alternatives. In this particular case, I find alternatives to be present, therefore, I am unable to consider the cost of impoundment as part of the exceptional hardship analysis in this case.

18The appellant did not offer any evidence to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that she has no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle. The appellant testified that she has been using other options and has been able to make other arrangements for the children she cares for. Her daughter owns a vehicle and has been able to obtain groceries and other necessities from the nearest town.

19I did not hear any evidence indicating a threat of health and safety to anyone relying on the vehicle. From a financial standpoint, the appellant continues to receive her monthly CPP and OAS.

20It appears the appellant has been able to meet her obligations and function while her vehicle is impounded. I find that she has reasonable alternatives which have allowed her to continue her daily routine with no major disruption. The loss of her vehicle is no doubt inconvenient, but she has considered, and indeed, taken advantage of opportunities to overcome this temporary loss. In any event, s. 10(2)(a) of the Regulation prohibits the Tribunal from considering inconvenience.

21The Regulation sets out that if the appellant fails to establish that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle, then an appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship cannot succeed. For the reasons set out in this decision, I find that the appellant has failed to discharge the threshold burden of establishing on a balance of probabilities that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. She therefore does not meet the test for exceptional hardship, as set out in the Regulation, based on the alternatives available to her.

ORDER

22For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal’s authority under s. 50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.