Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17910/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Erin Blake

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Erin Blake, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Wednesday, November 5, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Erin Blake (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Friday, October 24, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, her friend Ryan Valentini (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”), made under the Act.

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

There are alternatives to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant testified that she needs her vehicle to travel to and from her workplace. She works as a nurse at Owen Sound Hospital and typically works a 12-hour shift from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m., about six out of nine days. She testified that she has not looked into public transportation and believes it would not assist her in getting to work in a timely manner given her early start time. However, she believes she may be able to take public transportation after her shift ends but she has not looked at the bus schedule, does not know the location of the closest bus stop to her home, and buses have a reduced schedule on Saturdays and do not operate on Sundays.

14The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, she has been using taxis to travel to her place of employment and back home, but they are not affordable if she also has to pay the impoundment fees. She has taken a taxi about six times. She has also had a coworker drive her to and from work a few times. She has not missed any work as a result of the impoundment of her vehicle. She testified that she would continue to take taxis, ask her coworker for assistance, and look into public transportation to meet her transportation needs until her vehicle is released. In my view, she has maintained her work schedule with alternative methods of transportation.

15The appellant testified that she has two pets and if they needed medical attention, she would use a taxi or ask a friend to drive her to the veterinarian. Since the impoundment, her pets have not needed any medical attention.

16The appellant testified that she has had groceries delivered to her home, has no prescription needs, and she has not missed any medical appointments. She had a non-urgent eye doctor appointment scheduled during the impoundment period but has rescheduled it.

17I acknowledge the appellant’s testimony that she has been experiencing inconvenience while using taxis and obtaining rides from a coworker. However, I note the Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

18I find the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. The evidence establishes the appellant has been using taxi, gotten assistance from a coworker, and she may be able to take public transportation. She has also testified that she would continue to use these alternative transportation methods until the release of her vehicle.

19Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

20For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusion

21I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

22The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.