Global Transport Inc. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 116991

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17800/CVIS

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.3 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, (the “Act”) from an impoundment pursuant to section 82.1 of the Act.

Between:

Global Transport Inc.

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR:

Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Robert Riddell, paralegal

For the Respondent:

Patrick Moore, Counsel

Heard in writing

October 24, 2025

OVERVEW

1The appellant, Global Transport Inc., appeals the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) of August 4, 2025, to impound its 2009 trailer for 15-days after an inspection found a “critical defect” under s. 82.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), namely over 50% defective wheel brakes.

2Under s. 50.3(1) of the Act, an owner of commercial motor vehicle or trailer that “is impounded under s. 82.1” may appeal the impoundment. The trailer was impounded on August 4, 2025, for a 15-day period ending on August 19, 2025. The time to appeal the impoundment expired on August 19, 2025. The appellant filed its appeal on October 1, 2025, 43 days after the statutory limitation date to appeal.

3The appellant brings this motion to extend the time for filing of its appeal with the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). The Registrar opposes the motion. The motion was considered in writing after consideration of the written submissions from both parties.

ISSUES

4The issue to be decided on the motion is whether the appellant has established reasonable grounds to support an extension of time to appeal.

RESULT

5The appellant’s motion to extend the time to file the appeal is denied. The appeal shall not proceed.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

6Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch G gives the Tribunal the discretion to grant an extension of time where there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.

7In Manuel v. Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492, the Divisional Court ruled that, on a motion to extend the time to appeal, the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case requires that the extension be granted. The factors to be considered are:

a) the existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

b) the length of the delay;

c) prejudice to the other party; and

d) the merits of the appeal.

8I have considered the evidence relating to each of these factors as they apply to this case.

9The onus is on the appellant to establish there are grounds for the granting of the extension.

Bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period

10I do not find that the appellant had a bona fide intention to appeal within the 15-day appeal period.

11The appellant submits the delay in filing was not the result of neglect or disregard for the law, and instead, it acted in good faith and was not afforded information regarding the time to appeal or the procedure for filing an appeal. Notably, the appellant asserts it did engage the services of a legal representative the day after the impoundment to obtain legal advice regarding the incident and the impoundment, and it advised against filing an appeal. The appellant relied upon the legal advice that an appeal was not recommended. The appellant further asserts that, only after retaining the services of its current representative Mr. Robert Riddell on September 29, 2025, was it informed of its right to challenge the impoundment by way of an appeal to the Tribunal, and that the time to appeal had been exceeded.

12In support of its motion, the appellant presented a letter from Ms. Elena Balduk, dated October 3, 2025, providing further specifics noting the delay in filing an appeal arose as “a direct result of wrong legal advice” that the appellant relied upon. She states that, the day following the impoundment, the appellant contacted its paralegal whom it has worked with for years who advised that an appeal was not recommended as the impoundment was for 15 days, and this would not result in the appellant acquiring its equipment back any sooner than that. She states the advice was not correct legal advice, and the paralegal was not educated on all the policies and procedures related to the impoundment. Acting on the paralegal’s advice, the appellant unintentionally missed the prescribed deadline. The appellant later contacted Mr. Riddell for a second opinion and were advised that an appeal could be filed, and they took immediate action to file the appeal. The appellant submits this represents exceptional circumstances as the appellant was denied the opportunity to exercise its right of appeal through no fault of its own.

13The appellant also presented an email from Ms. Balduk, dated September 30, 2025, in which she indicates the appellant was also late to file the appeal due to a combination of unforeseen circumstances including delays in receiving “correct legal advice” from a previously hired paralegal, and the need to gather critical supporting documentation from multiple third parties. The appellant states once conditions stabilized, including financial hardship, the appellant acted promptly to proceed with the appeal.

14The appellant submits it would be contrary to the interests of justice and procedural fairness to deprive it the right to appeal due to misinformation, and the lack of notice regarding the statutory deadline.

15The Registrar takes the position that the appellant has not proven a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period and appears to have made the decision not to appeal after receiving legal advice from a paralegal. After the appeal period had ended, and only after speaking with Mr. Riddell on September 29, 2025, did the appellant decide to appeal. The Registrar submits that an intention to appeal was only formed after the appeal period had expired. I would agree with this submission.

16In finding the appellant did not have a bone fide intention to appeal within the 15-day appeal period, I note the appellant received legal advice during the impoundment period and choose not to appeal. The appellant makes clear that it engaged the services of a legal representative the day after the impoundment who advised it against filing an appeal, and it took that advice. The appellant submits the advice was incorrect, but I make no determination on whether the advice was incorrect nor am I required to do so in this motion. I note that, about 6 weeks later, and well after the 15-day period had elapsed, the appellant sought additional legal advice and decided to appeal. I am mindful to only consider the appellant’s bona fide intention to appeal within the prescribed period, and I find there was no such intention. While the appellant presented reasons for not filing within the 15-day period, I do not find them convincing in establishing an intention to appeal within the allowed time period.

17In addition, in my view, the appellant was afforded information on the appeal. The Notice of Impoundment, dated August 4, 2025, provides information under the heading “Appealing an impoundment” and lists two contact phone numbers and the website address for the Tribunal. The notice also states “for more information, or to obtain an appeal application” contact the Tribunal. Furthermore, the day after the impoundment, the appellant consulted a paralegal for legal advice, and I can not find that the appellant lacked information on the appeal process. Instead, it appears the appellant intentionally did not appeal within the prescribed period.

18Under the circumstances, I am not persuaded the appellant had a bona fide intention to file within the prescribed time.

Length of the delay

19The appellant submits the delay was not due to neglect or disregard for the law but misinformation and lack of notice regarding the statutory deadline.

20The Registrar submits the delay of 43 days is lengthy and significant, and I agree. One of the purposes of legislatively enacted limitation periods is to create a level of predictability and for parties, particularly respondents, to regulate their affairs on the basis of those limitation periods. The appeal period consisted of 15 days, and the appellant is well past that time period.

21I find the length of the delay is significant.

Prejudice

22I find there is some prejudice to the Registrar were I to grant the extension to appeal.

23The appellant submits there is no prejudice to the Registrar/Ministry of Transportation in allowing the appeal to proceed given the matter has been before the Ontario Court of Justice since August 4, 2025, and the first court date is scheduled for October 28, 2025.

24The Registrar submits there is prejudice to it as one of the two Ministry of Transportation officers that participated in the critical defect inspection retired on October 9, 2025, and likely would not be available as a witness for the Registrar.

25In my view, the length of the delay does create some prejudice and uncertainty for the Registrar as to when an impoundment could potentially be appealed. I further note that one of the Registrar’s witnesses is retired and has relevant evidence on the impoundment considering his involvement in the inspection. The Registrar would have to take additional steps to locate and arrange for the witness’s testimony.

The merits of the appeal

26I find the appellant has not met its burden in establishing there is merit to the appeal.

27On a motion to extend time, the appellant need not establish its case on a balance of probabilities but only that its version of events, if believed, could reasonably result in a favourable outcome. This is a low threshold.

28A commercial vehicle or any trailer drawn by it may be impounded if, on inspection, the vehicle is found to have a “critical defect” as defined under section 82.1 of the Act, and section 7(2) 5 of O. Reg. 512/97 (the “Regulation”). In this case, the Registrar impounded the trailer, alleging that there was a critical defect because, when inspected, over 50% of the brakes on the trailer were defective, specifically, “over 50% Defective Wheel Brakes.”

29The owner of a commercial vehicle or trailer which has been impounded because of a critical defect pursuant to s. 82.1 of the Act may, pursuant to s. 50.3, appeal the impoundment only on one of the two grounds set out in s. 50.3(3) of the Act:

(a) that the commercial motor vehicle or trailer that is impounded was stolen at the time the vehicle was detained under section 82.1; or

(b) that the commercial vehicle or trailer had no critical defects at the time of the inspection under section 82.1.

30In this case, the appellant relies upon section 50.3(3)(b), i.e., there was no critical defects at the time of the inspection.

31In its motion materials, the appellant states the “Tribunal will hear that procedural steps in the Officer’s inspection, creates reasonable doubt that the impoundment was valid.” No further details or evidence are provided in the motion materials as to the merits of the appeal and the appellant’s version of events. I note this conclusory assertion does not rise to the level of establishing that the appeal has merit.

32I also considered the reasons for appeal set forth in the Notice of Appeal (the “NOA”) which provides more specifics. The NOA states the inspection procedure used to determine the alleged critical defect was flawed. The appellant submits that officer Vaillancourt’s notes indicate the supply pressure was 98 PSI, but not what pressure was applied to the service brakes, and that officer Wheeler’s notes confirm that air pressure at 98 PSI at the time of service brake application. Further, that the officer’s notes indicate the alleged inoperative brakes were caused by an air valve that was obstructed. However, the certified mechanic who attended to perform the repair noted the brakes operated as intended, and they dispute the statement of the inspectors as to the cause of the brakes being inoperative. The driver of the vehicle also advises he believes the brakes were operating properly when the vehicle was stopped for inspection.

33It would appear the appellant has two potential witnesses that could testify the brakes were operative, and there was no critical defect. However, no evidence or details were provided regarding the observations of the mechanic or the driver of the vehicle beyond what is stated in the NOA, and I cannot find based upon the materials presented that the appeal has merit. The appellant has not met its onus in establishing merit to its appeal given the limited information provided.

34Given the above, I am unable to conclude the appellant’s appeal could result in a favourable outcome.

CONCLUSION

35I am not satisfied that the justice of the case requires an extension of time for filing the appeal be granted in the circumstances of the case. I conclude the appellant has not demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal within the statutorily prescribed time period of 15 days, the length of the delay is significant, and would result in prejudice to the Registrar. I am also unable to conclude the appellant’s appeal could result in a favourable outcome.

I ORDER AS FOLLOWS:

36The appellant’s motion to extend the time to file its appeal is denied. The appeal shall not proceed.