Trevor J. Boyne v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 114371

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Before: Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number:

Case Name: Trevor J. Boyne v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Written Submissions by:

For the Appellant: Trevor J. Boyne, Appellant

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

OVERVIEW

1The appellant filed a request for reconsideration form and supporting submissions on September 17, 2025, in respect of the Tribunal’s decision released on September 15, 2025 (“decision”).

2Following a videoconference hearing on July 29 and August 15, 2025, a panel confirmed the suspension of the appellant’s driver’s licence made pursuant to s. 48.3.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“HTA”).

3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria from Rule 18.2 are met:

a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;

b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or

c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

4The appellant is relying on Rule 18.2(a) and Rule 18.2(b) to support his request for reconsideration. He is asking the Tribunal to either set aside the decision, or, in the alternative, to order a rehearing.

5The respondent opposes the request for reconsideration.

RESULT

6The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

7The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requesting party—in this case, the appellant—must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.

8To understand the appellant’s position on reconsideration, it is important to first summarize the findings made by the panel.

9Following the suspension of his licence as a result of his failure to pass an evaluation conducted on December 27, 2024 by a Drug Recognition Expert (“DRE evaluation”), the appellant filed an appeal with the Tribunal under s. 50.1(2)(b)(ii) of the HTA. As explained by the panel at paragraph 23 of the decision, an individual seeking to appeal a suspension under s. 50.1(2)(b)(ii) of the HTA must demonstrate two things (emphasis in original):

(a) That his ability to operate a motor vehicle was not impaired by a drug or by a combination of a drug and alcohol, and

(b) That he had a medical condition at the time that impaired his performance of the evaluation that was conducted under s. 320.28(2) of the Criminal Code.

10Following a review of the evidence (including late-filed evidence from the respondent), the panel found the appellant did not meet the first branch of the test. This evidentiary assessment included: a blood test done in and around the time of the suspension; a toxicology report; and testimony from the police officer who found the appellant on December 27, 2024. The panel then concluded that, as the appellant did not meet the first branch of the s. 50.1(2)(b)(ii) test, they did not need to consider whether the second branch was met. Taken together, the panel confirmed the licence suspension.

11I am sympathetic to the appellant, especially as he is attempting to navigate this Tribunal process without the assistance of legal representation. However, it is still up to him to show that his request meets the test for reconsideration. I find he has not met the test under Rule 18.2 to merit a reconsideration.

12The appellant has three arguments in support of his request for reconsideration. First, he claims that the panel breached his right to procedural fairness by allowing the respondent to rely on late-filed materials—a procedural choice that “caused real prejudice and undermined the fairness of the hearing.” Second, the appellant argues that the panel erred by concluding he was impaired on December 27, 2024 “based mainly on a blood test result taken hours after arrest and on testimony from an officer who neither conducted a field sobriety test nor administrated the [DRE evaluation].” Finally, the appellant contends that the panel committed an error when it chose not to consider the medical condition branch of the s. 50.1(2)(b)(ii) test, especially as it was “the central ground” to his appeal.

13In reply, the appellant expands on his arguments from his initial submissions. Specifically, he argues that the only relevant determination under s. 48.3.1 of the HTA “is that of the evaluating officer conducting the DRE evaluation”, and he claims the “DRE results showed normal heart rate, blood pressure, and pupil size”. As such, the appellant submits that the panel erred by relying on “a toxicology report that only demonstrated the presence of methamphetamine, not impairment, and on observations of Officer Bender, who is not DRE-certified and did not conduct the evaluation.”

14Starting with the appellant’s claim that the panel breached his right to procedural fairness, I find this ground does not merit reconsideration. Procedural fairness is based on the principle that parties have the right to be heard, and part of this right involves knowing the case that they need to meet during a hearing. While it is important for parties to understand what evidence they will need to respond to at a hearing, I find the panel reached an appropriate balance between allowing the appellant to understand the opposing party’s case and permitting the respondent to rely on its evidence.

15In a detailed discussion found at paragraphs 3 – 17 of the decision, the panel considered the appellant’s motion to exclude late-filed evidence from the respondent. The panel noted that, while some of the respondent’s documents were submitted several days after the June 30, 2025 deadline, the hearing was adjourned from July 11 to July 29, 2025 to provide the parties with more time to prepare. The panel also observed that the appellant himself was in breach of the June 30, 2025 deadline, as he “was still submitting documents on the original July 11, 2025 hearing date”: see paragraph 11. Therefore, after concluding that the appellant did not encounter any prejudice from the late-filing (due to the additional weeks he had to review the evidence), the panel allowed the respondent to rely on its evidence.

16I also note that the panel allowed the appellant to make submissions about the amount of weight that should be assigned to the late-filed evidence: see paragraph 31.

17Taken together, I find the panel reached an appropriate balance between the competing interests of the parties. The appellant has not demonstrated a breach of procedural fairness.

18Turning to the appellant’s arguments based on alleged errors in the decision, I again find he has not met his onus to merit reconsideration under Rule 18.2.

19First, despite the appellant’s claim that the panel’s consideration of impairment went beyond what is allowed by the HTA, I do not accept this premise. Section 50.1(2)(b)(ii) provides the following authority to the Tribunal when considering appeals for suspensions made under s. 48.3.1 of the HTA:

The only grounds on which a person may appeal a suspension under section 48.3 or 48.3.1 and the only grounds on which the Tribunal may order that the suspension be set aside are,

(b) in the case of a suspension under section 48.3.1,

(ii) that the person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle or vessel was not impaired by a drug or by a combination of a drug and alcohol, and the person had a medical condition, at the time of the activity for which the suspension was imposed, that impaired his or her performance of the evaluation that was conducted under subsection 320.28 (2) of the Criminal Code (Canada).

20Section 50.1(2)(b)(ii) tasks the Tribunal with determining whether “the person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle or vessel was not impaired by a drug or by a combination of a drug and alcohol”. I see no wording in this provision that suggests this analysis must be limited to the DRE evaluation and the evidence from the individual who conducted it. The appellant has also not presented any legal authorities to support this interpretation.

21Similarly, though the appellant may question the findings made by the panel (e.g., relying on a blood test that showed the presence of a drug, but not impairment), I note that it is not sufficient on reconsideration to rely on disagreement alone. As noted above, the reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. Instead, a requesting party must demonstrate that the Tribunal committed a factual or legal error, and that the error would likely have impacted the outcome. Though the appellant may disagree with the decision, I do not find he has established that the panel erred in their assessment of the evidence of impairment.

22Finally, I do not find the appellant has shown the panel erred in determining that they did not have to address whether he had a medical condition. As is established in the plain language of s. 50.1(2)(b)(ii), it is not sufficient for an appellant to show that they had a medical condition. They must also demonstrate they were not impaired by a drug or a combination of a drug and alcohol at the time the licence suspension was imposed. Both branches of the s. 50.1(2)(b)(ii) test must be met to trigger this provision, so—by not meeting the first branch—the panel had no choice but to confirm the suspension. Put another way, even if the panel had assessed the medical condition branch (and found in favour of the appellant), the outcome of the decision would have remained the same—the suspension would be confirmed.

23The appellant has the onus to show he is entitled to a reconsideration, and I find he has not met this onus.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

24The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

Craig Mazerolle

Vice-Chair

Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal