Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17171/MED

An appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Tammy Morris

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Dr. Isla McPherson, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Did not attend

For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Agent

Held by teleconference: October 21, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Tammy Morris (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”) to suspend her Class G driver’s licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) after the Registrar received an unsolicited medical condition report stating that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect her ability to drive safely.

2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely substance use disorder, that is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend her licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. In the appellant’s written submissions, she states that she does not drink alcohol or use illegal drugs and does not have a medical condition that impairs her ability to drive a motor vehicle.

5Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

ISSUES

6The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to a drive motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.

7To resolve that issue, I will address the following questions:

i. Does the appellant suffer from substance use disorder?

ii. If so, is this medical condition likely to significantly interfere with her ability to a drive motor vehicle of the applicable class safely?

8The Registrar bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the answer to each of the above questions is “yes.”

RESULT

9Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from substance use disorder, and it is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely and I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE: Appellant did not attend the hearing October 21, 2025

1The appellant did not appear at the onset of the hearing.

2The appellant also did not attend the case conference held on October 1, 2025, and was unable to be reached by phone or email at the time of the case conference.

3The Tribunal issued a Notice of Hearing to the appellant’s email address on file on September 23, 2025. This Notice communicated the date and time of the hearing and the call-in information.

4Neither the appellant nor anyone on the appellant’s behalf reached out to the Tribunal to notify of her absence or request an adjournment. The Tribunal reached out to the appellant by phone and left a message shortly after the hearing began.

5After thirty minutes elapsed without communication from the appellant, I took submissions from the Registrar. The Registrar submitted their position to proceed with the hearing in the absence of the appellant. The Registrar cited reasons that the appellant had also not attend the case conference, had been notified multiple times of the proceedings via email, and adjourning would not be an efficient use of time.

6Section 7(3) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act (“SPPA”), states that, where notice of an electronic hearing has been given to a party in a proceeding and the party does not attend the hearing and has not sought a change of hearing format under s. 6(5)(c), the Tribunal may proceed in the absence of the party and the party is not entitled to any further notice in the proceeding. Further, Rule 3.7.1 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”) states that if a party, who has been given notice of a hearing in accordance with the SPPA, does not attend their hearing within thirty minutes of the scheduled start time, the Tribunal may proceed with the hearing in the absence of that party and/or make any order it considers appropriate under the circumstances.

7I considered that the appellant had been notified of both the case conference date and the hearing date by the Tribunal, and that the Tribunal had attempted to further reach the appellant by phone during both the case conference and hearing. Lastly, I considered that no communication at all had been received from the appellant suggesting she would be unable to attend the hearing. I therefore decided to proceed with the hearing without the appellant’s presence in accordance with the discretion afforded by s. 7(3) of the SPPA and Rule 3.7.1 of the Rules.

8Although the appellant did not attend this hearing, I considered the information in her NOA and submitted documents as they pertain to her position.

ANALYSIS

Does the appellant suffer from substance use disorder?

9The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely substance use disorder.

10The Registrar stated their position is supported by a Medical Condition Report (MCR) dated July 10, 2023. Emergency room physician Dr. D has documented on the MCR that the appellant suffers from a diagnosis of an uncontrolled substance use disorder due to alcohol and “multiple street drugs” and is non-compliant with treatment recommendations. Dr. D has further added the narrative statements, “This person should not be driving”, and “witnessed backing into a tree on hospital property”.

11Following submission of the MCR, the Registrar suspended the appellant’s driver’s licence effective July 22, 2023, and requested the completion of a Substance Abuse Assessment Form.

12The Registrar submitted that uncontrolled use of alcohol and drugs can and will interfere with the safe use of a motor vehicle, and that they took the appropriate action in suspending the appellant’s licence and requesting further information.

13The appellant submitted a personal letter to the Registrar almost a year later, dated June 10, 2024. The letter outlined that she did not drink alcohol or do drugs, and explained that there must have been a “glitch” in their system or it could have been “hacked by a vindictive individual”. The Registrar responded with a letter that confirmed the suspension and again requested the completion of a Substance Use Assessment Form.

14The appellant submitted an NOA and an additional 5 page written document. These submissions outline that her licence was suspended erroneously due to a “system error or possibly a false or fraudulent report”. The appellant writes that she was issued a fine for driving while under a medical suspension in 2018 but had not known she was suspended until notified by police. She supported this position with submission of a summons documenting the offence of driving a motor vehicle while under suspension on February 10, 2018. She writes that later when she was notified her licence was expiring, she booked and completed a road test, and at that time there was no suspension on her file, which led her to believe the issue had been resolved. However, she then writes that her suspension later reappeared and when she contacted the Medical Review Board and was told her licence was suspended in 2023, which she did not believe was accurate. She further writes she has not had a family doctor since 2014, Dr. S is not her family physician; she had only seen her once for a COVID-19 vaccination, and she did not diagnose her with any condition hat would affect her ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. She adds that she has requested a document from Dr. S to confirm that she does not have any medical condition that will affect her ability to drive and will submit it once it is received. However, the appellant did not provide any documentation from Dr. S. I note that Dr. S was listed as the appellant’s family physician on the MCR, but it is not otherwise communicated why the appellant described her interaction with Dr. S.

15The Registrar submitted that there is no indication of error within their records and the appellant was not suspended for medical reasons in 2018. In review of her driving record, it does indicate she was suspended for non-medical reasons at that time. The Registrar stated the information on the MCR matches their records, and no error has occurred with the suspension.

16The medical evidence before the Tribunal comprises a MCR documenting an uncontrolled substance use disorder due to alcohol and drugs. While the appellant’s written submissions argue that she does not drink alcohol or use drugs, she has not submitted any medical evidence or opinion to dispute the medical evidence in the MCR and was not available to provide testimony or for cross-examination.

17I have considered the appellant’s position that the suspension of her licence was due to a system error. However, I note that the MCR is clearly labeled with the appellant’s name, address and birthdate which matches the identifying information provided by the appellant herself in her submissions. In review of the Extended Driver Record Search in the Registrar’s submissions, I note the appellant had a suspended driver’s licence in 2018, but it does not indicate it was for medical reasons. In the 2018 summons provided by the appellant it indicates she was driving with a suspended licence but does not state anywhere that the licence was suspended for medical reasons. After review of all submissions, I do not believe there is any evidence to support the appellant’s claim that her licence was suspended for medical reasons due to a system error.

18The appellant filed a supplementary submission on October 26, 2025. This was outside of the filing period and filed after the hearing itself. Therefore, it did not play into my decision. However, on review of this supplementary submission, I note that the appellant raised the same points without providing any evidence to support their allegations of fraud. Therefore, even if I had considered this submission, it would not have affected my reasoning or disposition.

19Due to the reasons listed above, I find the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant has substance use disorder.

Is the appellant’s medical condition of substance use disorder likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

20I find that the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

21The Registrar argues that the appellant’s substance use disorder interferes with her ability to drive safely and relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [2025 Update] (the “CCMTA Standards”). Chapter 15 describes substance use disorders in general and the concerns with driving safely with respect to those conditions. Specifically Standard 15.6.3 states that drivers who are under the influence of alcohol and illicit drugs would be eligible for a licence if they:

i. Meet the criteria for remission and/or has abstained from the substance for 12 months.

ii. Earlier re-licensing may be considered upon favourable recommendation from an addictions specialist and/or treating physician recognized by the licensing authority, and the successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program.

iii. The functional abilities necessary for driving are not impaired.

iv. Where required a road test or other functional assessment shows that the functional abilities for driving are not impaired.

22The CCMTA Standards outline the effects of alcohol on the functions necessary for driving including reduced reaction times, blurred or double vision, altered depth perception, reduced judgement and insight, blunted alertness and reduced motor co-ordination. Furthermore, the use of alcohol impairs a driver’s judgment and behaviour towards others, including determining whether they are fit to drive or not. Although a person may, when not under the influence of alcohol, determine never to drive when intoxicated, their assessment of their ability to drive will likely be affected by having consumed alcohol. Those with severe alcohol use disorder area also at risk for alcohol withdrawal which can include seizures.

23The Registrar stated they have received no medical information to determine if any criteria in the CCMTA Standards have been met, and that their position to keep the appellant’s licence suspended is reasonable and supported by the law and the national medical standards. Their submission is that on the balance of probabilities the medical submissions support that the appellant does suffer from a medical condition that is likely to interfere with her ability to drive safely.

24The appellant’s position in her written submissions is that she does not have a medical condition that will interfere with her ability to drive. While she has stated she does not drink alcohol or use illicit drugs, she has not elaborated any further on this statement. She provides no information regarding what happened on July 9, 2023, that led to her interaction with ER physician Dr. D and the MCR being completed.

25In her submissions she writes that she has not had any accidents, has no outstanding fines and has a clean driving record. She writes that the hardships caused by her licence suspension including relying on others for transportation to work and declining a job opportunity due to her suspended licence. She further writes the challenges in owning a business as her business requires her to travel. She reiterates several times that her licence suspension was done in error.

26While I acknowledge the appellant’s position that she does not have a medical condition that will impair her ability to drive safely, I find it concerning that Dr. D has clearly communicated his medical opinion that the appellant should not be driving and that she backed up into a tree on hospital property. Furthermore, there is no alternative explanation provided by the appellant as to this event, and the appellant was not available to provide testimony or for cross-examination.

27Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but is not bound by them.

28I appreciate the hardships that the appellant is undergoing with the loss of her driver’s licence, but given the medical evidence supports that the appellant’s drug and alcohol use has resulted in an accident, I believe that a period of abstinence from alcohol and drugs is reasonable and prudent for road safety given the risks associated with driving. The CCMTA Standards indicate a period of 12 months of abstinence is advised although a shorter period of time can be considered under certain conditions. There is no evidence to suggest the appellant has had a period of abstinence from drugs or alcohol.

29Although I am not bound by the CCMTA Standards, they are written by physicians and experts across the country and are the result of a lengthy and intensive process to provide medical standards based on the best evidence available with a focus on functional ability to drive rather than exclusively on medical diagnoses.

30I find the CCMTA Standards relevant and am persuaded to apply them given the circumstances of this case. My review of the evidence shows that the conditions recommended for relicensing outlined in the CCMTA Standards have not been met.

31As such, for the reasons cited, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition of substance use disorder is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

Conclusion

32I find that the Registrar has discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely substance use disorder, and that this condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

ORDER

33For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

Released: November 4, 2025

__________________________

Dr. Isla McPherson, Member

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