Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17811/HTA

In the matter of a motion seeking a stay of an order to suspend a Class A driver’s licence pursuant to s. 47 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8.

Between:

Jatinder Singh Khangura

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

MOTION DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Vijayant Sood, Paralegal

For the Respondent:

David Milner, Counsel

HEARD: by way of written submissions

OVERVIEW

1Jatinder Singh Khangura, (the “appellant”) appeals the suspension of his Class A driver’s licence commencing September 4, 2025, by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “respondent”), under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).

2A hearing on the licence suspension is scheduled to commence on November 13, 2025.

3The appellant filed a Notice of Motion with the Tribunal on October 2, 2025, seeking a stay of the licence suspension until the Tribunal has rendered a final determination of the appeal.

ISSUES

4The issue to be determined is:

i. Whether the appellant’s licence suspension should be stayed pending a final determination of his appeal of the suspension before the Tribunal.

RESULT

5I find the appellant has not established that he meets the test for a stay of the suspension pending a determination of his appeal. The motion is denied.

ANALYSIS

Legal test to order a stay

6It is well established that the 1994 Supreme Court decision in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, 1994 CanLII 117 (“RJR-MacDonald”) is the test to be applied in motions seeking a stay of an order of an administrative body. The party seeking the stay must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that:

i. the appeal raises a serious issue to be tried;

ii. the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and

iii. the balance of convenience favours granting a stay.

7No one criteria of the three is determinative; they must be considered cumulatively on the question of whether the justice of the case merits or does not merit a stay.

There is a serious issue to be tried

8I find that there is a serious issue to be determined on the appeal.

9This first stage is a low threshold. The appellant need not demonstrate the likelihood of succeeding in its appeal, only that the matter before the Tribunal has merit, i.e., it is not frivolous or vexatious.

10The appellant submits that he is working as a commercial driver to support his family, and the suspension has eliminated the family’s sole source of income. He alleges that he has a clean driving record with zero convictions, collisions or demerit points in the past many years. He states that the suspension has deprived him of income. He further alleges that he has not been provided with any evidence to support the respondent’s allegation of dishonesty during the Class A testing and/or training process, or any disclosure which justifies the suspension.

11The respondent did not make any submissions to suggest there was no serious issue to be tried in the appeal.

12I am persuaded by the appellant’s submissions that he seeks to defend his financial livelihood. I find there is merit to the appeal, meaning the appeal is not vexatious or frivolous.

13Accordingly, I find there is a serious issue to be tried.

Irreparable harm has not been established

14I am not satisfied that denying a stay will result in irreparable harm to the appellant.

15At this stage, the appellant must demonstrate that irreparable harm will result if relief is not granted. “Irreparable” refers to the nature of the harm rather than its magnitude. For example, financial loss could be deemed irreparable if it is unclear how such a loss might be recovered. As noted in the Tribunal’s decision in Amarjot Lamba o/a Whitehill Realty International Inc. v. Registrar, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, 2022 CanLII 45261 (ON LAT) (“Lamba”) at paragraph 22, the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald described the harm as that:

“…which either cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect damages from the other. Examples… include instances where one party will be put out of business by the court’s decision, … where one party will suffer permanent market loss or irrevocable damage to its business reputation… or where permanent loss of natural resources will be the result when challenged activity isn’t enjoined.”

16The Court in Lamba states that evidence of irreparable harm must be clear and not speculative.

17The appellant submits that he has zero convictions, collisions or demerit points in many years, and he is a safe, responsible driver with an unblemished record. In his affidavit, the appellant states the suspension has eliminated his family’s sole source of income causing immediate and irreparable harm, and without it he cannot support his family.

18The respondent submits the suspension has already ended, on October 14, 2025, and no longer prevents the appellant from driving altogether and that he presently holds a Class G licence, and is therefore, not deprived of the privilege of driving a motor vehicle. It further submits the appellant may regain, through testing at the earliest available date, a class of driver’s licence that would allow him to drive larger commercial motor vehicles.

19I find the appellant has not demonstrated that the denial of a stay would result in irreparable harm. As noted in RJR-MacDonald, irreparable harm would typically be associated with some type of irrevocable or permanent damage. While the appellant has asserted the licence suspension deprived him of income to support his family, he has not presented any evidence to show that the financial loss is irrevocable and cannot be mitigated or recovered to some degree.

20I find that the appellant has not demonstrated, on a balance of probabilities, that a denial of the stay would result in irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience is not in favour of the appellant

21At this third stage, RJR-MacDonald requires the Tribunal to consider which of the two parties will suffer the greater harm from the granting or refusal of a stay. Specifically, whether the harm to the appellant from refusing a stay is greater, less than or equal to the harm to the public interest by granting a stay. Therefore, to demonstrate the balance of convenience favours granting the stay, the appellant must show on a balance of probabilities that the harm to him from refusing the stay is greater than the harm to the public interest from granting it. I find the appellant has not met this burden.

22The appellant submits that he is a safe, responsible driver with an unblemished record and his driver’s abstract confirms his spotless record. He submits the harm imposed on him by refusing the stay will be the elimination of his income and the financial support for his family as the sole income earner.

23The respondent submits that the balance of convenience weighs against granting a stay.

24When the nature and declared purpose of the legislation is to promote the public interest, as it is here, the Tribunal must assume that the legislation has this effect. In order to overcome the assumed benefit to the public interest arising from the continued application of the legislation, the appellant must prove that granting a stay, which would result in a suspension of the legislation, would itself provide a public benefit. I find the appellant has not made any submissions or directed me to evidence relating to the public benefit to be provided by granting a stay.

25Although the appellant alleges the stay will deprive him of income, he did not present any evidence to demonstrate losses, or whether those losses could be mitigated in some way. I do not find he has established that the expected harm he will suffer outweighs the public’s interest in ensuring the safety of the highways.

26I find the appellant has not shown on a balance of probabilities how the harm from refusing the stay of the suspension is greater than the harm to the public interest from granting it.

27I find the balance of convenience favours the denial of a stay because the appellant has not met his onus to demonstrate that the harm from refusing a stay exceeds the harm to the public interest from granting a stay.

Conclusion

28I find the appellant has not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that a stay should be granted.

ORDER

29The motion to stay the appellant’s driver’s Class A licence suspension is denied.