Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17792/HTA

In the matter of a motion seeking a stay of an order to suspend a Class A driver’s licence pursuant to s. 47 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, Ch. H8 (the “Act”).

Between:

Baljit Singh

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

MOTION DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Jeffery Campbell

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Vijayant Sood, Paralegal

For the Respondent: David Milner, Counsel

HEARD: by way of written submissions

OVERVIEW

1Baljit Singh, (the “appellant”) appeals from the suspension of his Class A driver’s licence September 2, 2025, for 90 days commencing September 4, 2025, by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, the respondent, under s. 47 of the Act.

2A hearing on the licence suspension is scheduled to commence on November 12, 2025.

3The appellant filed a Notice of Motion with the Tribunal on September 29, 2025, seeking a stay of the licence suspension until the Tribunal has rendered a final determination of the appeal.

ISSUES

[4] The issue to be determined is: i. Whether the licence suspension should be stayed pending the conclusion of the hearing on merits of the suspension.

RESULT

5The motion is denied.

ANALYSIS

Legal test to order a stay

6It is well established that the 1994 Supreme Court decision in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, 1994 CanLII 117 (“RJR-MacDonald”) is the test to be applied in motions seeking interlocutory relief in the form of a stay of an administrative decision. The party seeking the stay must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that:

i. the appeal raises a serious issue to be tried; ii. the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and iii. the balance of convenience favours granting a stay.

7No one criteria of the three is determinative; they must be considered cumulatively on the question of whether the justice of the case merits or does not merit a stay.

i. Serious issue to be tried

8There is a serious issue to be tried.

9In this first stage, it is not required that the appellant demonstrate the likelihood of succeeding in its appeal, only that the matter before the Tribunal has merit, i.e., it is not frivolous or vexatious.

10Prior to the suspension, the appellant was a holder of a Class A licence which permits him to drive any combination of a motor vehicle and towed vehicles where the towed vehicles exceed a total gross weight of 4,600 kilograms, but not a bus carrying passengers. In his Affidavit dated September 30, 2025, the appellant submits that “I am the sole income earner for my family” and “The suspension has deprived me of income. Without it I cannot support my family. The harm is irreparable”.

11The respondent submits that it assumes this is a serious issue to tried.

12I find there is a serious issue to be tried, which is to say that the appeal is not vexatious or frivolous. I am persuaded that the denial of the appellant’s sole income by virtue of the suspension of his Class A licence is a serious issue to be tried.

ii. Irreparable Harm

13Denying a stay will not result in irreparable harm.

14In the second stage of the RJR MacDonald test, the appellant must demonstrate that irreparable harm will result if relief is not granted. “Irreparable” refers to the nature of the harm rather than its magnitude. For example, financial loss could be deemed irreparable if it is unclear how such a loss might be recovered. As noted in the Tribunal’s decision in Amarjot Lamba o/a Whitehill Realty International Inc. v. Registrar, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, 2022 CanLII 45261 (ON LAT) (“Lamba”) at paragraph 22, the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald described the harm as that:

“…which either cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect damages from the other. Examples… include instances where one party will be put out of business by the court’s decision, … where one party will suffer permanent market loss or irrevocable damage to its business reputation… or where permanent loss of natural resources will be the result when challenged activity isn’t enjoined.”

15Lamba states that evidence of irreparable harm must be clear and not speculative.

16As noted, the appellant stated that he is the sole income earner of his family. It is his submission that the suspension has led to the elimination of his family’s income, causing irreparable harm.

17The respondent submits that an initial suspension of the appellant’s Class G licence has already ended, no longer depriving the appellant of the privilege of driving a motor vehicle. It submits that the appellant may regain, through testing at the earliest available date, a Class A driver’s licence that would allow him to drive larger commercial motor vehicles.

18I find the appellant has not demonstrated that the denial of a stay would result in irreparable harm. As noted in RJR-MacDonald, irreparable harm would typically be associated with some type of irrevocable or permanent damage. While the appellant has alluded to the licence suspension resulting in a complete loss of employment or self-employment income during the period of the suspension, he has not provided me with any evidence to show that the financial loss is irrevocable and cannot be mitigated or recovered to some degree.

19Regarding the appellant’s Class A licence, the respondent submits that the appellant may also regain, through testing at the earliest available date, a class of driver’s licence that would allow the appellant to drive larger commercial motor vehicles. This would mitigate any losses that the appellant may incur due to the suspension of his Class A licence.

20Similarly, the maintenance of the appellant’s Class G licence privileges may provide some recovery or mitigation of the effects of the suspension, including access to temporary, alternative employment or self-employment. I am persuaded by the respondent’s submissions which point to the potential for the appellant compensating for or mitigating the harm imposed by the suspension order.

21I find that the appellant has not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that a denial of the stay would result in irreparable harm to the appellant.

iii. Balance of Convenience

22The balance of convenience favors the denial of the stay.

23The third stage of the RJR-MacDonald test requires that the appellant establishes that it will suffer greater harm from a refusal of a stay than the respondent will by the granting of it.

24The appellant submits that the benefit of granting a stay is that he will be able to resume his employment or self-employment income. However, the appellant did not provide any documentation (financial or otherwise) to assist me in either qualifying or quantifying the appellant’s claim of financial harm should the stay not be granted. Although the appellant alleges that the stay will result in significant financial losses to himself and his family, he did not present any evidence in support of whether, or the extent to which, those losses will be suffered, or whether those losses may be mitigated in some way. Absent evidence supporting this allegation, and absent the appellant presenting any significant details with respect to his financial losses, I do not find that he has established that the expected harm he will suffer outweighs the public’s interest in ensuring the safety of the highways

25The respondent did not make specific submissions on the balance of convenience criteria.

26The Act exists to regulate drivers and the operation of vehicles in the interest of safety on public highways, therefore the onus falls to the appellant to demonstrate that the balance of convenience favors the granting of a stay. However, largely due to the lack of evidence with respect to the appellant’s argument that the balance of convenience favors the granting of a stay, I find the opposite. I find that the balance of convenience favours the denial of a stay. The appellant has failed to demonstrate how the harm incurred by not granting the requested stay surpasses that of the harm to the public interest from granting it.

Conclusion

27I find that the appeal raises a serious issue to be tried, that the appellant will not suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted, and the balance of convenience favours denying a stay.

28The appellant has not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that a stay should be granted.

ORDER

29The motion to stay the Class A suspension of the appellant’s driver’s licence is denied.