Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17420/TSSEA and 17562/TSSEA

In the matter of an appeal under the Towing and Vehicle Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021 S.O. 2021 (the “Act”), from Cancellation Orders of its vehicle storage and tow operator certificates under the Act.

Between:

2845011 Ontario Inc. o/a FL Recovery

Appellant

And

Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards

Respondent

MOTION DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Dagmara Szczudlo

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Anton Anisan, Appellant Zain Atcha, Counsel

For the Respondent: Patrick Moore, Counsel

Heard By Videoconference September 29, 2025

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, 2845011 Ontario Inc. operating as FL Recovery, appeals a decision of the Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards (the “respondent”) to cancel its Tow Operator Certificate and Vehicle Storage Certificate under the Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021 (the “Act”) and Ontario Regulation 167/23 (the “Regulation”).

2The cancellation orders were issued on June 10, 2025 for both the Tow Operator Certificate and Vehicle Storage Certificate, and were ordered to take effect on June 11, 2025, at 12:00 a.m. The original cancellation orders were amended by the respondent on July 18, 2025 once satisfactory proof of insurance coverage was provided by the appellant.

3The appellant filed separate Notices of Appeal of the cancellation orders with the Licence Appeal Tribunal (“Tribunal”). These Notices of Appeal resulted in Tribunal file numbers 17420/TSSEA and 17562/TSSEA.

4On August 25, 2025, the appellant filed a Notice of Motion requesting that the Tribunal order a stay of the cancellation order pending the outcome of a hearing on the merits of both appeals. The Notice of Motion applied to both Tribunal file numbers 17420/TSSEA and 17562/TSSEA.

ISSUE

5The issue to be decided is:

a) Whether, pursuant to section 37(3) of O. Reg. 167/23 (the “Regulation”) under the Act, the Tribunal should order a stay of the cancellation order pending the outcome of a hearing.

RESULT

6A stay of the cancellation order is denied.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Denied request to add 2nd affidavit from appellant dated August 21, 2025 as an exhibit

7During the motion hearing on September 29, 2025, I denied the appellant’s request to admit a second affidavit from Anton Anisan dated August 21, 2025 (“affidavit #2”) and relied instead on the original affidavit dated July 23, 2025 (“affidavit #1”) as an exhibit for the hearing.

8The appellant served affidavit #1 on the Ministry of Transportation on July 24, 2025, and referenced the document in a file transfer to the Tribunal dated August 26, 2025, however, did not file affidavit #1 with the Tribunal in advance of the motion hearing. The appellant sent a document titled ‘Affidavit of Anton Anisan’ during the motion hearing; however, this affidavit was dated August 21, 2025 and it became apparent that two separate affidavits were obtained.

9The respondent did not object to the use of affidavit #1 as an exhibit, however, opposed the use of affidavit #2 since it was not produced in advance of the motion hearing. The respondent submits that as per directions from the Tribunal, all materials that the appellant intended to rely upon at the motion hearing were to be served and filed by September 16, 2025. The appellant confirmed that affidavit #2 was not served and filed in advance of the motion hearing.

10The following due dates were provided to the parties in response to the Notice of Motion filled by the appellant:

a) The appellant shall serve and file it’s written submissions with respect to its motion no later than 5:00 p.m., September 16, 2025. The submissions shall be no longer than 6 double-spaced pages in length, exclusive of evidence and authorities.

b) The respondent shall serve and file it’s responding written submissions with respect to its motion no later than 5:00 p.m., September 23, 2025. The submissions shall be no longer than 6 double-spaced pages in length, exclusive of evidence and authorities.

c) The appellant shall serve and file it’s reply written submissions (if any) no later than 5:00 p.m., September 26, 2025. The submissions shall be no longer than 3 double-spaced pages in length, exclusive of evidence and authorities.”

11Having considered the factors outlined in Rule 9.3, I denied the appellant’s request to admit affidavit #2 and admitted only affidavit #1 dated July 23, 2025 as an exhibit. During a review of the two affidavits, I found that both files contained nine paragraphs with similar content with the key difference being the addition of arguments that “granting the stay would preserve the status quo and avoid irreparable prejudice to FL Recovery Inc. while not harming the public interest” and a substitution of the following list of irreparable harms that FL Recovery Inc. will suffer without a stay of the cancellation orders:

a) Loss of contracts and clientele.

b) Reputational harm.

c) Interruption of operations and inability to earn income.

d) Ongoing liabilities such as rent, insurance, and leases with no income to offset these expenses.

e) Layoffs and job losses for employees.

12Pursuant to s. 15(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, a Tribunal may admit into evidence any relevant document or thing. I find that an affidavit from the appellant is relevant to the issue in dispute, however, also find that affidavit #2 does not include any specific details that go beyond submissions already made in the Factum of The Moving Party. The appellant did not provide reasons why affidavit #2 was not served and filed as per the due dates for the motion hearing, submitting that it was an error. As per Rule 9.3, since the appellant failed to comply with Tribunal directions with respect to disclosure, exchange, production, or inspection of documents or things, I did not grant permission for the addition of affidavit #2 for the hearing.

REASONS and ANALYSIS

Legal test to order a stay

13Section 37(3) of the Regulation stipulates that filing an appeal on a cancellation order issued under the Act does not stay the decision unless the Tribunal orders otherwise. In other words, the cancellation takes effect on the day indicated in the order, in this case, June 11, 2025, unless the Tribunal orders a stay.

14It is well established that the 1994 Supreme Court decision in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, 1994 CanLII 117 (“RJR-MacDonald”) is the test to be applied in motions seeking interlocutory relief. The party seeking the stay must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that:

a) the appeal raises a serious issue to be tried;

b) the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and

c) the balance of convenience favours granting a stay.

15No one criteria of the three is determinative; they must be considered cumulatively on the question of whether the justice of the case merits or does not merit a stay.

Serious issue to be tried

16This first stage is a low threshold. The appellant need not demonstrate the likelihood of succeeding in its appeal, only that the matter before the Tribunal has merit, i.e., it is not frivolous or vexatious.

17For the reasons that follow, I find the appellant has met this part of the test.

18The appellant argues that both appeals raise serious, multifaceted, and substantive issues related to allegations of corporate independence/affiliation, unresolved and disputed complaints, as well as procedural fairness. The appellant further submits that interim relief via a stay of the cancellation orders is an indispensable judicial instrument when there is a risk of permanent business extinction before an appeal is heard. The appellant relies on Captain Roadside Inc. v. Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards, 2025 CanLII 58823 (ON LAT), in which the Tribunal granted a stay of a cancellation order.

19The respondent agrees with the appellant that there is a low bar for this element of the test and notes that there are approximately fifteen grounds for the amended cancellation orders. The respondent concedes that the matter of insurance is resolved and is not an ongoing serious issue for the substantive hearing as of July 18, 2025 when the Ministry was able to verify that the company had all the required insurance coverage.

20I find that the appellant has met this threshold, and the appeal is neither frivolous nor vexatious because there are multiple and serious allegations related to the cancellation of the tow operator and storage operator certificates that need to be decided at the substantive hearing.

21I find the appellant has met its onus of establishing that there is a serious issue to be tried before the Tribunal.

Irreparable Harm

22The second part of the test requires the appellant to demonstrate that irreparable harm will result if the stay is not granted. “Irreparable” refers to the nature of the harm rather than its magnitude. For instance, financial harm could be deemed irreparable if it is unclear how such a loss might be recovered. The Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald that described the harm as that:

“…which either cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect damages from the other. Examples … include instances where one party will be put out of business by the court’s decision, … where one party will suffer permanent market loss or irrevocable damage to its business reputation…”

23For the reasons that follow, I find that the appellant has not met this part of the test.

24The appellant submits that since June 2025, FL Recovery has been entirely non-operational, and its revenue streams have ceased. Despite this, costs such as rent, insurance, utilities, etc. continue to accrue. The appellant further submits that company contractors have been dismissed and its reputation has been tarnished by the stigma of cancellation with cascading effects on its future ability to obtain contracts. Finally, the appellant submits that FL Recovery has already been dormant for months and by the time a hearing takes place, the business will disintegrate. It argues that the harm extends beyond the corporation to its contractors, suppliers, and customers and is both irreparable and systemic.

25The respondent submits that the regulatory provisions do not grant an automatic stay of cancellation orders related to TSSEA and argues that this legislative approach was intentional to indicate that there is a risk in permitting tow and vehicle storage operators to continue to operate pending the outcome of an appeal.

26The respondent refers me to paragraphs 10 to 13 of the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Sazant v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (Ontario), 2011 CarswellOnt 15914 (“Sazant”) which held that there must be clear proof of irreparable harm and that the harm must be to the moving party as opposed to others (in this case such as employees/drivers). Sazant describes irreparable harm at para. 11 as not speculative and that financial considerations are not dispositive:

“Evidence of irreparable harm must be clear and not speculative, and it must be supported by evidence that demonstrates that he would suffer it. In other words, it is Dr. Sazant who must suffer irreparable harm; not his patients or other third parties. In virtually all cases where a governing body of professionals decides to revoke a member's privilege of practice, a financial inconvenience or loss will inevitably result. Thus, although it is a proper factor to consider, it will generally be far from dispositive.”

27The respondent submits that it is inevitable that the loss of a certificate or permit will likely result in financial harm, but the trier of fact must consider the extent of the harm when considering this factor.

28The respondent also refers to me to paragraphs 28 and 29 of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice case of Hartstein Swine Co. Ltd. v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles), 2018 ONSC 6655 which denied a request for a stay of a cancellation order and submits that a general assertion of irreparable harm was not sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm in Hartstein Swine Co. Ltd.

29The respondent submits that Hartstein Swine Co. Ltd illustrates that specific evidence must be presented for the trier of fact to determine irreparable harm and in the present case, the appellant has not led any evidence of irreparable harm. The respondent submits that affidavit #1 from the appellant does not mention irreparable harm or any ill effects from the cancellation orders and the appellant has not met its onus to prove irreparable harm.

30The respondent also referred me to two recent Tribunal motion decisions: 1000422207 Ontario Inc. v. Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards, 2025 ONLAT TSSEA 17302 (released July 25, 2025) and Southwest Towing Inc. v. Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards, 2025 ONLAT TSSEA 17419 and 17541/TSSEA (released September 25, 2025), in which the Tribunal denied a stay of the cancellation order pursuant to section 37(3) of the Regulation.

31I am not bound by previous decisions of the Tribunal, but I am bound by decisions from the Supreme and Divisional Courts. Based on caselaw above, I agree that the irrevocable harm must be clear and not speculative and not only a financial inconvenience. Similarly, I find Hartstein Swine Co. Ltd. identifies the need for specific evidence in understanding if denial of a stay would cause irreparable harm. [addition and italics mine]

32I agree with the respondent that the appellant has not demonstrated irreparable harm will occur with evidence. I accept the appellant’s submissions that financial loss has already occurred from the effects of the cancellation order because company operations have effectively ceased, however, I have not been pointed to evidence to assess if they are irreparable. The appellant has not pointed or directed me to evidence of irreparable harm for FL Recovery and relied on general and speculative assertions of harm instead, contrary to the standard established in the case law.

33I find the appellant has not met its onus in demonstrating that not granting a stay will result in irreparable harm.

Balance of Convenience

34The third part of the test compels the Tribunal to consider which of the two parties will suffer the greater harm from the granting or refusal of a stay. As such, I must compare the harm to the appellant from not granting a stay and the harm to the public interest in granting a stay.

35For the reasons that follow, I find that the appellant has not met this part of the test.

36The appellant submits that denying a stay is an existential risk to the business and such an action effectively pre-judges the pending appeal. The appellant further submits that if businesses perceive that appeals cannot be pursued meaningfully because interim relief is routinely denied, regulatory legitimacy itself suffers. Continuing, the appellant argues that the company is willing to restrict its operation to a single vehicle under close scrutiny from the regulator, including the provision of monthly insurance confirmations, mandatory reporting of dispatch and invoices as well as independent audits during the stay, if granted.

37The appellant argues that the affidavit of Andrew Gill, Senior Regulatory Compliance Administrator in in the Towing and Vehicle Storage Office of the Commercial Safety and Compliance Branch of the Ministry of Transportation does not assist the Tribunal in assessing the motion and is founded on speculation, inference, and unverified complaints. The appellant submits that this affidavit seeks to pre-emptively address issues which are reserved for the substantive hearing and identifies the following deficiencies in the affidavit:

a) It references a sub-lease at 42 Stafford Drive, Brampton and makes claims of affiliation with 2345098 Ontario Inc. operating as New4Wheels Auto Collision on the basis of similarity in business names;

b) It references ten complaints and disputed Provincial Offences Act (“POA”) violations which have not been verified or proven;

c) It demonstrates that the Director acted prematurely and imposed the most drastic sanction without considering evidence that was already available with respect to business insurance;

d) It emphasizes that the Region of Peel already has over a hundred licenced storage operators, and the public has not suffered as a result of the cancellations; however, the presence of other operators does not justify extinguishing FL Recovery as an operator without a fair hearing;

e) It dismisses the appeal on the basis that company drivers are independent contractors and not employees;

f) It suggests that tow truck drivers can find work elsewhere in the Greater Toronto Area; and

g) It has minimal probative value as evidence due to inferences and speculation and does not establish facts for the Tribunal.

38The appellant submits that the Tribunal should grant a stay and allow the appeal to be heard on its merits without accepting contested allegations in Mr. Gill’s affidavit as fact.

39The respondent argues that there are approximately fifteen grounds for the amended cancellation orders and only one ground is related to a relationship between the appellant and a company referred to as New4Wheels Auto Collision. Taken together, the grounds present serious concerns regarding the company’s practices and pose a harm to the public interest if a stay is granted.

40The respondent submits that FL Recovery has already been convicted of violations of TSSEA and the Highway Traffic Act and relies on the affidavit of Mr. Gill and its associated exhibits, including the Commercial Vehicle Operator Record for 2845011 Ontario Inc. generated on September 11, 2025 (“CVOR Record”). According to this record, FL Recovery has an overall violation rate of 59.67%.

41The respondent also relies on a Motor Vehicle Collision report documenting a collision that occurred on April 10, 2025. On this date, Jason Camara, a tow truck driver for the appellant, made a left turn against the traffic signal while driving a tow truck for the appellant, striking and injuring a child in the crosswalk. The child was transported to hospital because of the collision.

42The respondent submits that the Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is granted and relies on GFL Environmental Inc. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2014 ONSC 2728, specifically paragraph 46 in which Justice Purell states that:

in RJR-MacDonald, the Supreme Court accepted that public authorities will suffer irreparable harm if their regulatory authority is interfered with and that thus in cases involving a public authority, it will be necessary to balance the irreparable harm suffered by the party seeking a stay with the inevitable irreparable harm suffered by the public authority.

43The respondent also relies on H&B Transportation Ltd. v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles), [2004] O.J. No. 5431 (Div. Ct.) to submit that when it comes to safety, it is too important to take a risk:

“When I take into account the public interest, particularly when it has to do with safety, it is simply too important to take a risk. Therefore the balance of convenience in my view speaks against granting a stay.”

44I agree with caselaw presented by the respondent that public safety outweighs financial harm to the appellant. I accept that procedural fairness requires that statements made by Mr. Gill in his affidavit are tested and subject to cross-examination at the substantive issues hearing. While I am aware that it’s unacceptable to rely on untested statements as fact when considering the motion for stay, I don’t agree that all information in Mr. Gill’s affidavit is not factual or useful when assessing the balance of convenience.

45I find the CVOR Record to be persuasive in assessing risk to public safety, particularly in relation the overall violation rate of 59.67% for the company. According to an exhibit in Mr. Gill’s affidavit, only 0.53% of the total registered carriers in Ontario (333 out of 61,773) have a violation rate between 50 and 70%. Based on this information, I find that FL Recovery has a high violation rate in relation to its peers and granting a stay for a company with this violation rate presents a risk to the public interest.

46I am also persuaded by the sanctions and convictions included in the CVOR Record, as these are related to violations of the Act and the Highway Traffic Act and are relevant to assessing the harm, not just to the regulator’s interest but also to the driving public. I find that there is enough support from the CVOR Record and current convictions to warrant denying a stay in the present circumstances.

47Accordingly, I find the balance of convenience favours denying a stay of the cancellation order.

48Taking the three elements of RJR-MacDonald cumulatively, I find the justice of the case favours denying a stay because although there is a serious case to be tried, the appellant has failed to persuade me of the potential for irreparable harm from denying a stay, and the balance of convenience favours denying a stay.

Conclusion

49The appellant has not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that a stay should be granted.

ORDER

50A stay of the cancellation order is denied pursuant to section 37(3) of the Regulation.