Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17809/HTA

In the matter of a motion seeking a stay of an order to suspend a Class A driver’s licence pursuant to s. 47 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, Ch. H8 (the “Act”).

Between:

Robanpreet Singh

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

MOTION DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Colin Osterberg

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Vijayant Sood, Paralegal

For the Respondent: David Milner, Counsel

HEARD: by way of written submissions

OVERVIEW

1Robanpreet Singh, the appellant, appeals from the suspension of his Class A driver’s licence September 2, 2025, for 90 days commencing September 4, 2025, by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, the respondent, under s. 47 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, Ch. H8 (the “Act”).

2A hearing on the licence suspension is scheduled to commence on October 28, 2025.

3The appellant filed a Notice of Motion with the Tribunal on October 1, 2025, seeking a stay of the licence suspension until the Tribunal has rendered a final determination of the hearing.

ISSUES

4The issue to be determined is:

i. Whether the licence suspension should be stayed pending the conclusion of the hearing on the merits of the suspension.

RESULT

5The motion to stay the licence suspension is denied.

ANALYSIS

Legal test to order a stay

6It is well established that the 1994 Supreme Court decision in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, 1994 CanLII 117 (“RJR-MacDonald”) is the test to be applied in motions seeking a stay of an order of an administrative body. The party seeking the stay must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that:

i. the appeal raises a serious issue to be tried;

ii. the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and

iii. the balance of convenience favours granting a stay.

7No one criteria of the three is determinative; they must be considered cumulatively on the question of whether the justice of the case merits or does not merit a stay.

Serious issue to be tried

8There is a serious issue to be tried.

9This first stage is a low threshold. The appellant need not demonstrate the likelihood of succeeding in its appeal, only that the matter before the Tribunal has merit, i.e., it is not frivolous or vexatious.

10The appellant submits that he depends on his Class A licence which permits him to drive any combination of a motor vehicle and towed vehicles where the towed vehicles exceed a total gross weight of 4,600 kilograms, but not a bus carrying passengers, for his family’s livelihood and that the suspension is unwarranted. The appellant alleges that the suspension has eliminated the appellant’s family’s only income and that the appellant has a clean driving record prior to the suspension.

11Further, the appellant alleges that he has not been provided with any evidence to support the Registrar’s allegation that he obtained his Class A licence as the result of dishonesty or any disclosure which justifies the suspension.

12The respondent submits that it assumes this is a serious issue to tried. Further, the respondent has not set out the specific section of the Act it relies on as grounds for the suspension. In circumstances where the respondent fails to set out the specific grounds for suspension, it cannot be said that the appeal is vexatious or frivolous.

13In its motion materials, the respondent has produced no evidence to support its allegation that the appellant obtained his Class A licence as the result of dishonesty or which otherwise justifies the suspension.

14The respondent states in its materials filed for this motion that the “drivers licence suspension at issue ended on or before 14 October, 2025”. The respondent may be implying that the suspension cannot be stayed because it is no longer in effect. However, without further information about the current status of the appellant’s licence, and the basis upon which the respondent has imposed that status, I cannot conclude that the appeal is vexatious or frivolous.

15I find there is a serious issue to be tried, which is to say that the appeal is not vexatious or frivolous.

16I am persuaded by the appellant’s submissions that he seeks to defend his interests in relation to maintaining his family income and livelihood. The respondent has not presented evidence or submissions which suggest that there is no serious issue to be tried.

17Accordingly, I find there is a serious issue to be tried.

Irreparable Harm

18I am not satisfied that denying a stay will result in irreparable harm.

19At this stage, the appellant must demonstrate that irreparable harm will result if relief is not granted. “Irreparable” refers to the nature of the harm rather than its magnitude. For example, financial loss could be deemed irreparable if it is unclear how such a loss might be recovered. As noted in the Tribunal’s decision in Amarjot Lamba o/a Whitehill Realty International Inc. v. Registrar, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, 2022 CanLII 45261 (ON LAT) (“Lamba”) at paragraph 22, the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald described the harm as that:

“…which either cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect damages from the other. Examples… include instances where one party will be put out of business by the court’s decision, … where one party will suffer permanent market loss or irrevocable damage to its business reputation… or where permanent loss of natural resources will be the result when challenged activity isn’t enjoined.”

20The Court in Lamba states that evidence of irreparable harm must be clear and not speculative.

21The appellant submits that the suspension has eliminated his family’s income, causing immediate and irreparable harm. He submits that he has a clean driving record with zero convictions, collisions or demerit points, in the last five years.

22The respondent submits that the suspension has already ended and no longer prevents the appellant from driving; that he holds a Class G licence; and that he is not deprived of the privilege of driving a motor vehicle. It submits that the appellant may regain, through testing at the earliest available date, a class of driver’s licence that would allow him to drive larger commercial motor vehicles.

23I find the appellant has not demonstrated that the denial of a stay would result in irreparable harm. As noted in RJR-MacDonald, irreparable harm would typically be associated with some type of irrevocable or permanent damage. While the appellant has alluded to the licence suspension resulting in a complete loss of employment or self-employment income during the period of the suspension, he has not provided me with any evidence to show that the financial loss is irrevocable and cannot be mitigated or recovered to some degree.

24The respondent describes a process whereby the appellant may be able to regain his Class A licence privileges, which suggests the effect of the suspension could be mitigated. Similarly, the maintenance of the appellant’s Class G licence privileges may provide some recovery or mitigation of the effects of the suspension, including access to temporary, alternative employment or self-employment. I am persuaded by the respondent’s submissions which point to the potential for the appellant compensating for or mitigating the harm imposed by the suspension order.

25I find that the appellant has not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that a denial of the stay would result in irreparable harm.

Balance of Convenience

26At this third stage, RJR-MacDonald compels the Tribunal to consider which of the two parties will suffer the greater harm from the granting or refusal of a stay. it compels me to consider whether the harm to the appellant from refusing a stay is greater, less than or equal to the harm to the public interest by granting a stay. Therefore, to demonstrate the balance of convenience favours granting the stay, the appellant must show on a balance of probabilities that the harm to him from refusing the stay is greater than the harm to the public interest from granting it.

27The appellant submits that the harm imposed on him by refusing a stay will be the elimination of his employment or self-employment income and the follow-on effects of that loss of income on his family. Although the appellant alleges that the stay will result in significant financial losses to himself and his family, he did not present any evidence in support of whether, or the extent to which, those losses will be suffered, or whether those losses could be mitigated in some way. Absent evidence supporting this allegation, and absent the appellant presenting any significant details with respect to his financial losses, I do not find that he has established that the expected harm he will suffer outweighs the public’s interest in ensuring the safety of the highways.

28The respondent did not make specific submissions on the balance of convenience criteria.

29I find that the appellant has not shown on a balance of probabilities how the harm from refusing the stay of the suspension is greater than the harm to the public interest from granting it.

30I find the balance of convenience favours the denial of a stay because the appellant has not met his onus to demonstrate that the harm to him from refusing a stay exceeds the harm to the public interest from granting a stay.

Conclusion

31I find that the appeal raises a serious issue to be tried, that the appellant will not suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted, and the balance of convenience favours denying a stay.

32The appellant has not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that a stay should be granted.

ORDER

33I order the following:

i. The motion to stay the appellant’s driver’s Class A licence suspension is denied.