Ahmad Daud Maqsudi v. Minister of Transportation, 2025 CanLII 105103

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17470/MED

An appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, (the "Act") from a decision of the Minister of Transportation to downgrade the class of licence pursuant to Section 32(5)(b)(i) of the Act.

Between:

Ahmad Daud Maqsudi Appellant

and

Minister of Transportation Respondent

DECISION & ORDER

ADJUDICATORS: Dr. Kailey Minnings, Member Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Ahmad Daud Maqsudi Tariq Ahmed (interpreter for the appellant)

For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenbooer, Representative

Heard: September 12, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Ahmad Daud Maqsudi (the "appellant") appeals from the decision of Minister of Transportation (the "Minister" or the "respondent") to downgrade his driver's licence from a commercial to a "G" licence pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the "Act"), after the respondent received a report from a health care provider that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect his safety to drive a commercial vehicle.

2The Minister has the authority under s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Act to impose the conditions authorized by the regulations, remove any conditions or endorsements or change the class or classes of driver's licence held by the person, in accordance with the results of the examinations and other prescribed requirements.

1Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the "Regulation") states that a holder of a driver's licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

2The Minister takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely syncope and loss of consciousness, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a commercial vehicle safely and that this provides sufficient reason to downgrade his licence under s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Act. Furthermore, the report indicates that he no longer meets the national medical standards for a commercial licence. In order to regain his commercial licence, the appellant is required to file a further report from his treating physician, specialist or nurse practitioner with confirmation that he has not experienced any further episodes for at least one year.

3The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. He acknowledges that he sought medical attention after being involved in a collision in the basement parking lot of his apartment building. He described that he felt dizzy just prior to the accident but denies losing consciousness. He explained that he sought medical attention to show due diligence as a school bus driver. The appellant, whose first language is not English and required a translator at the hearing, strongly disagrees with the findings in the medical condition report and believes there was a mistake in the translation provided by his son that day to the attending medical staff.

4After a hearing, section 50(2) of the Act provides that the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the "Tribunal") may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Minister.

ISSUE

5The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a commercial motor vehicle safely.

6To resolve that issue, we will address the following questions:

i. Does the appellant suffer from the medical condition alleged?

ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely?

The Minister bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the answer to each of these questions is 'yes.'

RESULT

7Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, we find that the respondent has satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely syncope and loss of consciousness, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely and we confirm the respondent's decision to change the class of the appellant's driver's licence.

ANALYSIS

8The appellant works as a school bus driver, 5 days per week for 2 hours in the morning and 2 hours in the afternoon. He transports a total of 9 students (three in the morning and six in the afternoon).

9The appellant explained that on June 12, 2025, at approximately 5:30 p.m., while parking his personal vehicle in the underground garage of his apartment building, he became dizzy while backing into his parking spot. He subsequently hit a column. He was alone in the vehicle and there were no witnesses.

10He subsequently explained the incident to his son, who brought him to the Emergency Department for evaluation.

11By letter dated July 28, 2025, the respondent advised the appellant that his driver's licence was suspended due to syncope and loss of consciousness. They reached this decision after receiving an unsolicited Medical Condition Report, authored by an emergency room physician, dated June 12, 2025, indicating the appellant experienced a single episode of syncope which has not yet been diagnosed.

12The appellant maintains that the translation provided by his son on the day he attended the hospital was incorrect and misinterpreted that he suffered loss of consciousness. He states that although he felt dizzy, he did not lose consciousness. He claims to feel healthy and attributes this unexplained episode to dehydration. He testified that it was particularly hot on the day of the accident and he believes he did not consume enough water. The appellant explained that he never experienced anything similar in the past and decided to attend the emergency room after informing his son and wanting to demonstrate due diligence as a school bus driver.

13To date, the appellant has not provided information to satisfy the respondent of his ability to operate a vehicle of the applicable class safely. At the hearing, the appellant testified that if he felt that he was unable to safely drive, he would not jeopardize the safety of those he transports.

14When questioned why he did not go back to the doctor to clarify the mistranslation, the appellant could not provide an answer.

15Bari Maqsudi, the appellant's son, appeared as a witness at the hearing. He testified that he was concerned about his father's health and insisted that he attend the hospital after the incident. He further states that he takes responsibility for mistranslating his father's account of what happened and how he was feeling. He later tried to clarify what he had said with his father's cardiologist but it resulted in no amendment or reconsideration of the diagnosis.

16The respondent challenged the witness's testimony stating that he is not a healthcare professional and that he did not observe the episode his father experienced. Despite this, the Tribunal still attaches some weight to the witness's testimony as he was speaking on his father's behalf at the hospital and was able to provide his observations immediately after his father first experienced symptoms.

17The respondent submitted that there is nothing in the medical reports to corroborate the appellant's claim that what he experienced was dehydration or excessive heat. It only mentions symptoms consistent with syncope and loss of consciousness.

18The respondent also submits that the Canadian Council of Motor Transportation Administrators (CCMTA) standards are clear in this particular situation. It sets out the period of 12 months without reoccurrence in order for a commercial licence to be reinstated.

19The respondent further asserts that this is the most prudent and lawful thing to do in this circumstance as it protects public safety and other road users.

Does the appellant suffer from the medical condition alleged?

20The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely, syncope/loss of consciousness.

21The Minister's position is supported by the following medical reports:

• An unsolicited Medical Condition Report ("MCR") completed by Emergency physician Dr. Cindy Cui which is dated June 12, 2025. The MCR indicates that the appellant suffered from an episode of Sudden Incapacitation due to Syncope. Dr. Cui writes, "isolated episode of syncope NYD [not yet diagnosed]"
• A Seizures and Loss of Consciousness form ("SLOC") dated July 18, 2025, completed by cardiologist Dr. Ho Ping Kong, which indicates that the appellant suffered one episode of atypical vasovagal syncope which occurred between less than three months ago, and that the underlying cause has been treated or resolved for greater than one month. Dr. Ho Ping Kong writes, "episode 1-2s possible LOC [loss of consciousness] June 12, 2025. Thought probable vasovagal." He also writes that investigations of a 2D echocardiogram, a 72-hour Holter monitor, and an exercise stress test were normal.
• a July 18, 2025 medical progress note from cardiologist Dr. Ho Ping Kong. The progress note does not describe the episode in question but does state that there have been no further episodes of presyncope, syncope, or altered level of consciousness. In the opinion & recommendation section of his note, the cardiologist writes, "He presented in early June with an episode of possible syncope of unknown etiology. By history, I suspect this was vagal in nature.... It has been over 1 month since this episode. I believe it is reasonable that he be allowed to resume driving both with a private G license as well as with his class E license as a school bus driver."

22The appellant disagrees that he suffered from syncope or that he lost consciousness and attributes his dizziness to dehydration and excessive heat. He points to his cardiologist's choice of wording in the above medical notes, which state "possible syncope" and "possible loss of consciousness". He asserts that the idea that he lost consciousness was a result of a mistranslation of his symptoms at the time of his medical assessments.

23When questioned by the Tribunal, the appellant testified that he was unsure about the nature of the dizziness he experienced, that he did not experience any warning symptoms prior to the dizziness, and that he does not recall the exact events that occurred which led to the minor collision, but that it all happened in an instant.

24We prefer the opinions of the two physicians to the appellant's opinion of the incident in question. An emergency room physician and cardiologist would be skilled in assessing and diagnosing syncopal episodes. We note that the MCR form clearly indicates that there was an episode of syncope, and the SLOC form further specifies that the episode was atypical vasovagal syncope. We place more weight on the two physicians' medical documentation than on the testimony of the appellant. While we acknowledge that the cardiologist writes, "possible syncope" and "possible LOC" in his assessments, he also follows by stating "... by history, I suspect this was vagal in nature" and "Thought probable vasovagal", which supports that, on a balance of probabilities, a vasovagal episode occurred.

25We further find that it would be unlikely that such a significant mistranslation would go unnoticed or uncorrected for so long by the appellant and his son, particularly when it resulted in a referral to a cardiologist, several cardiac investigations, and a driver's licence suspension and eventually downgrade. We note that none of the medical documentation indicates that there has been a miscommunication or mistranslation of any sort, nor do the medical notes clarify the symptoms experienced or offer an alternative explanation for the incident in question. For these reasons, we find that the Minister has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from syncope.

Is the appellant's medical condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely?

26We find that the Minister has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant's medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a commercial vehicle safely.

27The respondent's representative stated that the appellant's condition can interfere with a driver's ability to drive a commercial vehicle safely and presents a safety risk to other road safety due to the risk of sudden incapacitation. They further stated that the Minister has not received the confirmation that they require in terms of the 12-month period set out in the CCMTA for reoccurrence.

28The Minister relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [2025] (the "CCMTA Standards"). Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Minister to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration, although they are not binding requirements.

29The respondent's representative referred to Chapter 19.6.8 of the CCMTA Standards (Single or recurrent unexplained, single or recurrent atypical vasovagal, or recurrent typical vasovagal syncope – Commercial drivers) which indicates that commercial drivers are eligible for a licence if it has been at least 12 months since the last episode of syncope. He emphasized that the appellant's treating cardiologist checked off "atypical vasovagal syncope" on the SLOC form, which, according to the CCMTA standard, is vasovagal syncope that occurs in the sitting position or is not preceded by warning signs that are sufficient to allow a driver to pull off the road before losing consciousness.

30The appellant denies that he has a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a commercial vehicle safely. He denies that he lost consciousness on June 12, 2025, and stated that if he felt that he was unable to safely drive, he would not jeopardize the safety of those he transports.

31Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Minister to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but are not bound by them.

32We are concerned that on June 12, 2025, the appellant suffered an episode while driving that resulted in a minor collision. As above, we agree with the medical opinions of the treating physicians that this was likely vasovagal syncope, a condition which can occur suddenly without warning, can cause sudden incapacitation and cannot be compensated for. We find that should this occur while the appellant is driving a school bus, the outcome could be catastrophic.

33We acknowledge that the appellant's cardiologist supports a return to commercial driving, however, we contrast that with what is laid out in CCMTA standard 19.6.8. which indicates that commercial drivers are eligible for a licence if it has been at least 12 months since the last episode of atypical syncope. It is reasonable in the case of unexplained, atypical syncope to refrain from driving for a period of time in order to ensure that no further episodes are likely, especially when the underlying cause of the syncope is not known. At the time of the hearing, only 3 months had passed since the event. We accept that one year is a reasonable waiting period in the appellant's circumstance.

34Based on the totality of the evidence and submissions before us, we find, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant has a medical condition, namely syncope and loss of consciousness, which affects his ability to safely operate a commercial motor vehicle.

35For these reasons, we agree with the respondent's position that, on a balance of probabilities, the appellant's medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.

Conclusion

36We find that the respondent has discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.

ORDER

37For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, we confirm the Minister's decision to change the class of the appellant's driver's licence.

LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL

Dr. Kailey Minnings, Adjudicator

Raymond C. Ramdayal, Adjudicator