Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16631/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Millennium Car & Truck Rentals

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

RE-HEARING DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Dagmara Szczudlo

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Rajesh Singh, Appellant Eric Sabbah, Paralegal

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

HEARD By Teleconference September 11 and October 3, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Millennium Car & Truck Rentals (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Monday, January 6, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Moin Khan (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The Ministry of Transportation system amended the impoundment order to 180 days because this was the third impoundment on record for Co-Operators General Insurance Co. who was the registered owner of the vehicle on the date it was detained.

3The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) with the Licence Appeal Tribunal on January 10, 2025 and a teleconference hearing was held on January 23, 2025. The Tribunal confirmed the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle in a decision released on January 29, 2025.

4The appellant requested a reconsideration of the Tribunal decision on May 21, 2025. The Tribunal granted the re-consideration request, cancelled the decision released January 29, 2025, and ordered a re-hearing. The re-consideration decision was released by the Tribunal on August 26, 2025.

5The re-hearing commenced on September 11, 2025 and was completed on October 3, 2025.

6The appellant’s original NOA which documents an appeal on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship is used as the basis for the re-hearing decision.

ISSUES

7The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

8For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Selected Motion Record information admitted as exhibits for the appellant

9At the onset of the hearing on September 11, 2025, I partially granted the appellant’s request to admit a 28-page, and subsequently a 43-page Motion Record document as exhibits for the hearing.

10The appellant did not serve nor file any separate documents for the re-hearing and requested that specific documents which were previously filed with the Tribunal and served on the respondent for the reconsideration request were admitted for the re-hearing. The appellant sent a document tilted Motion Record containing 28 pages to the Tribunal and the respondent after the re-hearing started. During examination-in-chief of a witness, it became apparent that certain pages in the Motion Record were blank/missing, and the appellant emailed a second version of the document, containing 43 pages where the missing information was present.

11The respondent opposed the request to rely on the Motion Record and submitted that motion materials filed for other adjudicative events are not relevant and the re-hearing is not an opportunity to discuss prior events and decisions on the file. The respondent further submitted that materials that the appellant intended to rely on at the re-hearing should have been filed by the appellant in advance of the re-hearing.

12Having considered the factors outlined in Rule 9.3 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023, I partially granted the appellant’s request and admitted only Tabs G, H, I, and J in both re-submitted Motion Record documents as exhibits. According to the table of contents, the tabs contained information regarding the Bill of Sale to Millenium, ownership, timeline of repair and delayed ownership transfer as well as a financial hardship overview. The second file containing 43 pages was more complete and serves as exhibit 4 for the re-hearing.

13Pursuant to s. 15(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, a Tribunal may admit into evidence any relevant document or thing. I find that the admitted documents are relevant to the issue in dispute and any prejudice associated with their late submission could be cured by a brief delay in the proceedings, particularly since the documents were previously shared with the respondent in relation to earlier adjudicative events associated with this file. As a result, the materials were admitted as exhibits and the hearing was paused several times to permit review of the re-sent Motion Records by the respondent and the Tribunal.

14I was also persuaded by the fact that the reconsideration decision released by the Tribunal on August 26, 2025 did not contain instructions regarding re-filing of materials for the re-hearing. A case conference was not scheduled following the re-consideration decision and the matter proceeded directly to a re-hearing. The decision which ordered a re-hearing did not include instructions nor dates when re-hearing materials should be filed by both parties.

Submissions of the Registrar for the original hearing admitted as an exhibit for re-hearing

15The respondent’s submissions and evidence for the original hearing, a document containing 127 pages, was admitted as an exhibit for the re-hearing without opposition from the appellant.

Appellant’s request to add unspecified email between Ministry of Transportation and Ms. Pereira as an exhibit denied

16At the onset of the second day of the re-hearing, I denied the appellant’s request to add an unspecified email between the Ministry of Transportation and Ms. Pereira.

17The appellant submitted that there is an email between the Ministry of Transportation and the agent for the respondent in this proceeding Ms. Pereira that he is having difficulty locating but would like to add as an exhibit in the proceeding. The appellant submitted that this email was relevant to the length of the impoundment period. The appellant requested assistance from Ms. Pereira to locate this email and she declined.

18Having considered the factors outlined in Rule 9.3, I denied the appellant’s request to search for and file the email for the re-hearing. I found the request to be poorly defined and relied on paragraph [9] of the Re-Hearing Continuation Order released by the Tribunal on September 12, 2025, which ordered that “the continued re-hearing shall be limited to the exhibits already filed” and “no new exhibits or witnesses will be permitted”. I also found that the appellant did not clearly explain the content of the email nor how it was relevant to the length of the impoundment or the issue in dispute.

19As a result, the unspecified email was not admitted as an exhibit for the re-hearing.

Appellant’s request to add an issue in dispute for the re-hearing denied

20On the second day of the re-hearing, I denied the appellant’s request to add an issue in dispute.

21The appellant submitted that the Tribunal’s decision from the original hearing (released on January 29, 2025) included two issues in dispute and he requested that the re-hearing also considers the issue of: “Does s. 50.2(4) of the Act apply because there has been at least one previous impoundment of a motor vehicle owned by the appellant prior to the date of the impoundment that is under appeal?”.

22The respondent opposed the request and submitted that the Act outlines specific grounds for appeal of an impoundment and the proposed issue is not available as a ground of appeal to the appellant.

23Based on a review of the NOA filed by the appellant on January 10, 2025, I find that the only ground of appeal selected on this form is that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship. The respondent did not argue that the ground of exceptional hardship was not available to the appellant at the re-hearing, therefore the appeal proceeded on this ground. I agree with the respondent that the appeal ground requested to be added is not available to the appellant as per section 50.2 (3) of the Act. As a result, I declined the appellant’s request to add this issue and conveyed that the decision will include an analysis related to the period of impoundment in the context of exceptional hardship.

ANALYSIS

24For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

25I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

26The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

27If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

28If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

29The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

30The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

31I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

32The appellant submits that the impoundment will result in exceptional financial hardship for the company and relies on the testimony of Rajesh Singh, who is responsible for the appellant’s business operations. Mr. Singh testified that he purchased the 2016 Honda CRV from Impact Auto Auctions and relied on a Bill of Sale dated October 17, 2024 to support his testimony. The vehicle was sold by the auction house on behalf of the Co-Operators General Insurance Company and was transferred to an auto shop for repairs immediately after the purchase by Damion’s Towing. Mr. Singh testified that he was under the impression that Impact Auto Auctions would transfer the vehicle ownership to the appellant as is the practice by some auction houses. If this was not the case, the omission would have been discovered when the appellant attempted to transfer the ownership to another buyer at Service Ontario.

33The appellant had an interested buyer once the vehicle was repaired, and steps were taken to prepare it for sale. The driver of the 2016 Honda CRV on the date it was detained was one of the appellant’s customer service employees who decided to fill up the car at a nearby gas station. Mr. Singh testified that the driver did not notice that dealer plates were not installed on the vehicle when he left the lot, and this was the initial reason why the car attracted the attention of the Police. The Police followed the car into the appellant’s lot, discovered that the driver had a suspended driver’s license, and proceeded to detain the car for impoundment.

34The appellant testified that the impoundment will result in severe financial hardship to the company because the costs associated with the car purchase, repairs, and extended impoundment of 180 days will likely exceed its current market value. He estimated that the company would take a loss of approximately $16,000 if the impoundment is confirmed. The appellant lost the pending sale and potential rental revenue from the vehicle and may need to incur additional repair fees since the car was parked for an extended period at the impound lot.

35In continuing testimony, the appellant stated that this was its first impoundment and if the impoundment period was for 45 days, the company would pay the fees and would still be able to sell the car without a loss. Finally, Mr. Singh testified that he does not have any personal vehicles registered to himself and he uses company vehicles for his personal needs. He testified that the appellant’s inventory of vehicles varies between 120 to 180 cars and the majority of these vehicles would be drivable. He stated he has been able to meet his personal needs during the impoundment of the 2016 Honda CRV with alternate cars or by relying on his wife or friends.

36The respondent submits that the impounded vehicle was not registered to the appellant on the date the vehicle was impounded (January 6, 2025). Instead, it remained registered to Co-Operators General Insurance Company and Mr. Singh made no attempts to inquire whether the auction house transferred ownership after his purchase. The respondent also submits that the vehicle registration was transferred to the appellant on January 17, 2025.

37In relation to the period of impoundment, the respondent submitted that this is set based on Ministry of Transportation records and the RIN number of the vehicle owner at the time of impoundment. Since Co-Operators General Insurance was the registered owner on January 6, 2025, and this was the third impoundment against their RIN, an impoundment period of 180 days was assigned as per section 55.1 (3) of the Act.

38The respondent submitted that sections 50.2 (3) and 50.2 (5) of the Act set out the grounds for appeal and the Tribunal’s powers on appeal. The Act does not give the Tribunal jurisdiction to determine whether the proper impound period was applied by the Ministry of Transportation as per section 55.1 (3), nor does the appellant have a right to appeal on this ground.

39Finally, the respondent submits that the appellant was not the owner of the vehicle on the date the vehicle was impounded. According to the Bill of Sale relied upon by the appellant, the vehicle was acquired on October 17, 2024. Section 11 (2) of the Act requires that “within six days after becoming the owner of a motor vehicle” every person shall apply to the Ministry for a new permit for the vehicle. The respondent argues that ownership is based on the name on the permit, not the alleged date of acquisition and requests that the impoundment be confirmed.

40I considered the testimony of both parties and find that the appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no alternative to the impounded car. I am persuaded by the respondent’s evidence that the appellant has access to additional vehicles as outlined in the Registered Identification Number (“RIN”) summary. The RIN lists dozens of additional plated vehicles registered to the appellant which are available to continue business operations as well as for authorized personal use for certain employees. While financial loss associated with this impoundment is a possibility for the appellant, the legislation does not permit me to consider financial or economic loss as factors unless there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, which is not the case.

41I agree with the respondent that the Act does not give the Tribunal jurisdiction to determine whether the proper impound period was applied by the Ministry of Transportation as per section 55.1 (3), nor does the appellant have a right to appeal on this ground. As a result, I cannot grant relief for negative consequences flowing from an omission to transfer ownership from Co-Operators General Insurance to the appellant and reduce the impound period from 180 days to 45 days.

42I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

43Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion

44I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

45The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Released: October 16, 2025

__________________________

Dagmara Szczudlo

Adjudicator