Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17631/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Shler Gharib

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Michael Beauchesne

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Shler Gharib, Appellant (Self-Represented)

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: by teleconference Wednesday, September 24, 2025

1Shler Gharib (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of what she alleges is no longer her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The motor vehicle was impounded on Monday, August 18, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Vasilis Profitis (the “operator”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment (the “Notice”) was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUE

3The issue in dispute is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship pursuant to section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below, the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

The appellant may pursue her appeal despite filing it beyond the 15-day limitation period specified in Regulation 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

5I found the appellant established reasonable grounds to extend the limitation period of her appeal.

6Section 9 of the Regulation provides that an appeal to the Tribunal under section 50.2 of the Act with respect to the impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act shall be commenced by filing with the Tribunal a notice of appeal, together with the fee established by the Tribunal, within 15 days after the day the vehicle was detained under subsection 55.1(1) of the Act.

7Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, Chapter 12,

Schedule G, says that despite any limitation of time under any Act for the giving of any notice requiring a hearing by the Tribunal, it may extend the notice limitation period and provide subsequent directions it considers proper, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.

8The appellant acknowledged filing her Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) more than 15 days after the vehicle was detained for impoundment. She explained that the Notice arrived “late” via mail and that this delayed her filing. The appellant further shared that the mail she reviewed at the end of August—which a family member had retrieved from the post office on her behalf—did not include the Notice. She conveyed that she reviewed the Notice only after she subsequently retrieved more mail from the post office a few days later on September 2, 2025. The appellant emphasized that she then acted immediately to address the Notice by consulting police and Service Ontario officials, ultimately filing her appeal on September 9, 2025.

9The respondent does not consent to the appellant’s motion and asks that the Tribunal dismiss the appeal without a hearing. The respondent argued that it received notification from police about the impounded vehicle on August 18, 2025, and issued the Notice to the appellant on the following day. The respondent maintained that September 2, 2025—the day the appellant says she received the Notice—is, in fact, the 15-day deadline and that there is no evidence of a bona fide attempt to appeal the impoundment by that time. The respondent added that the appellant missed the appeal deadline by seven days despite the Notice indicating she had an option to appeal the impoundment and providing contact information for the Tribunal.

10When considering whether to extend a limitation period, the Tribunal refers to the four-part test in Manuel v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492 (“Manuel”). This test requires the Tribunal to contemplate whether: (1) the appellant demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal within the prescribed period; (2) the length of the delay: (3) prejudice to the other party (i.e. the respondent in this matter); and (4) whether a reasonable prospect of the appellant being successful exists. In Manuel, the Court confirmed that all four factors must be considered and no one factor is determinative.

Bona fide intention

11While I agree with the respondent that the appellant did not establish a bona fide intention to appeal within the 15-day limitation period, I found the delayed receipt of the Notice to be a mitigating factor. Section 55.1(7) of the Act says the respondent may provide notice of the impoundment to the appellant by mailing it to her at the latest address appearing in the transportation ministry’s records. I was satisfied this was done, but neither party referred me to a section of the Act that provides specifically for when the Notice would be deemed received when sent by regular mail, as this Notice was. I noted the Act generally applies a five-day period to receive most regular mail issued by the Registrar. This means the Notice likely should have been delivered on or about August 25, 2025—given that August 24, 2025, was a Sunday—which would have left the appellant approximately eight days to file her appeal within the 15-day limitation period.

12However, I was persuaded the appellant received her Notice at some point after August 25, 2025. She related that she reviewed all the mail a family member had retrieved at the end of August 2025, and that the Notice was not there at that time. As such, I was satisfied the letter was delivered at some point after August 24, 2025, and up to September 2, 2025, when the appellant shared that she had personally retrieved it from the post office. I found this was at the end of the limitation period and therefore did not afford the appellant a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate a bona fide existence to appeal within 15 days of the vehicle’s impoundment. Given that the appellant could not have known about the impoundment save for the Notice, I further found that the actions she promptly took to subsequently file her appeal within eight days (i.e. consulting police and Service Ontario officials about the Notice) constitute a bona fide intention to appeal.

Length of delay

13In my view, the length of delay was short at just eight days beyond the limitation period. Further, I am persuaded that the appellant provided a reasonable explanation for the delay.

Prejudice to the respondent

14I was satisfied the respondent was not prejudiced by the delayed filing of the appeal. While the appellant did not address prejudice to the respondent in her submissions, I found the delay resulting from the extension of the appeal period would not hinder the respondent’s ability to make its case as it had filed a document brief for the hearing and was prepared to make arguments.

The merits of the appeal

15I was not persuaded that the appellant’s appeal had much merit. The particulars provided in the appellant’s Notice of Appeal did not bear on the test for exceptional hardship. Further, the Ministry of Transportation (“MTO”) records produced by the respondent indicated the appellant has an alterative to the impounded vehicle.

Justice of the case

16While the appellant’s case appeared to have little merit, she had nevertheless demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal almost immediately upon receiving the Notice. Further, the length of delay was short and an extension of time would not prejudice the respondent. In my view, this analysis of the Manuel factors, when taken together, established reasonable grounds to extend the limitation period of the appeal. I therefore applied Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act to extend the notice limitation period and allow the appellant’s appeal of her vehicle impoundment.

ANALYSIS

17For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to section 55.1 the Act, the appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he satisfies one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in section 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship.

18I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under the Regulation.

19The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

20If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

21If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

22The Tribunal is generally precluded by section 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, section 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

23The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

24I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

25The appellant submits it is unfair to pay impound fees because she earlier sold the vehicle and was not the owner at the time it was detained to be impounded. While the appellant acknowledged that she failed to notify MTO of the sale until well after the vehicle was impounded, she maintains she was unaware of her responsibility to do so, thinking instead that the new owner was accountable to register it under his name. The appellant maintains that the investigations she undertook to resolve the impoundment with police and government officials has significantly disrupted her life to the point of hardship.

26The respondent argues that the appellant was the registered owner of the vehicle at the time it was detained to be impounded and has not established exceptional hardship as defined in the Regulations under the Act.

27The appellant’s position is unpersuasive. The respondent pointed to certified MTO records that indicate the appellant is the registered owner of a plated 2023 Tesla. The appellant acknowledged during cross-examination that this is her vehicle, which she uses for her transportation needs and to “maintain her life routines.” She also agreed that she was the registered owner of the impounded vehicle at the time it was detained despite producing evidence—such as a handwritten bill of sale dated November 8, 2024, and an auto insurance cancellation request dated November 12, 2024—to demonstrate the vehicle was earlier sold. In fact, the appellant also produced a “sold status request” form and accompanying vehicle registration application that establish she first reported the sale of the impounded vehicle to MTO on September 4, 2025—several weeks after it was detained.

28To prove exceptional hardship, the Act requires the appellant to show she has no alternative to the impounded vehicle. The appellant testified that she owns and uses an alternate vehicle—that being the 2023 Tesla registered to her. I therefore find the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

29Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation. As such, I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

CONCLUSION

30I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

31The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.