Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Tina M. Roote

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Jan Dymond, Vice-Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Tina M. Roote, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Sadia Ashraf, Agent

Heard by teleconference: October 1, 2024

OVERVIEW

1Tina M. Roote (the “appellant”) appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2015 Chevrolet Cruz under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on September 13, 2024. At the time of the impoundment, Randolph Scott Besito was driving the vehicle while his licence was under suspension resulting from a prescribed criminal conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that impoundment of the vehicle will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED

3Section 50.2 of the Act provides that the owner of an impounded vehicle may appeal the impoundment to the Tribunal. That section limits the grounds upon which the Tribunal can order the release of the vehicle. The appellant’s appeal is based on whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

4For the reasons that follow, I find that the appellant has failed to establish that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship in accordance with section 50(3)(d) of the Act and the relevant regulation.

ANALYSIS

Has the appellant established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship?

5I find that the appellant has not established exceptional hardship under the Act and the appeal must be dismissed as a result.

6The burden is on the appellant to prove that, on a balance of probabilities, the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as defined in the Act and regulations.

7Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

8Section 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

“…the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.”

9If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will be dismissed.

10If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses. The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

11The appellant’s submission for exceptional hardship focuses on her lack of access to a vehicle for personal use and, therefore, the impact of the impoundment on her ability to transport her son to work and competitions in Ontario, including an upcoming competition in London Ontario, as well as the financial impact of the impoundment fees on her son’s training.

12The appellant indicated that her sixteen-year-old son participates in competitive Brazilian jiu-jitsu, and a significant portion of her personal vehicle use is to take her son to his part time employment at a gym, training, and competitions outside the community including in London, Ontario.

13The appellant testified that she is seasonally employed with the local food bank/community garden and has access to a vehicle provided by her employer to fulfill her duties of employment; however, it is not available for her personal use. She will have access to this vehicle for the duration of the impoundment. The appellant submits that there is no public transit in her community. She says that few residents in her community own vehicles and therefore borrowing or depending on someone else for personal use is not feasible. Her adult daughter has a vehicle; however, she lives in another community and is not able to assist the appellant.

14The appellant acknowledged that, since the impoundment, she has managed to fit necessary daily tasks such as grocery shopping into her work travel and that the lack of access to her vehicle had not prevented her or her son from attending any medical appointments. She testified that the community in which she lives has emergency services and that there is a walk-in medical clinic within walking distance of her home.

15The appellant further testified that, as one of the few people in her community with a vehicle, she is called upon regularly to transport other people to shop, buy prescriptions and attend appointments. She stated that she cannot use her employer’s vehicle for these trips. She is not aware of whether the people who usually rely upon her have been able to make alternative arrangements. The appellant also acknowledges that her son had not missed any work because of the vehicle impoundment.

16The appellant says that she has not investigated whether her son might be able to travel to London for his competition with another member of her son’s local training facility or the possibility of renting a vehicle.

17She also testifies that her son has an opportunity to pursue his competitive Brazilian jiu-jitsu training in Brazil this coming winter and that she has been saving in order that he might attend. She testifies that the impoundment fees would significantly deplete those savings. She says that her employment contract will end on October 30, 2024 and she has not secured new employment.

18The respondent submits that the appellant has not met her onus to show that no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available because she has access to her employer’s vehicle to maintain her own employment and has been able to use it to purchase groceries and drive her son to his employment.

19The respondent submits that the impoundment is an inconvenience rather than a hardship. The respondent submits that the appellant gave no evidence that individuals who rely on the appellant for transportation have been impacted by the impoundment, that any of the people she transports have missed urgent medical appointments, or that the appellant’s son has not been able to get to his employment. The respondent further submits that the appellant could potentially rent a vehicle for longer trips such as taking her son to competitions.

20The Act permits impacts of an impoundment such as economic loss/financial hardship to be considered only under limited circumstances and only if there is first a finding that no alternative vehicle is available.

21I have considered the submissions of both parties and find that the appellant has not met her onus to show that she has no alternative vehicle available. Even though she lacks public transit and taxi/ride-share services, her access to a vehicle for work has enabled her to able to continue her employment and take care of necessary activities such as grocery shopping and driving her son to work.

22As a result of the above finding, I am unable to consider financial hardship as a ground for releasing the appellant’s vehicle.

23I find that the appellant has failed to establish this ground of appeal.

ORDER

24On the basis of the evidence presented at the hearing and the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.

Jan Dymond

Vice-Chair