Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15463/MED

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Wayne Phillips

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Dr. Erica Weinberg

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Wayne Phillips, Self-Represented

For the Respondent:

Ian Sookram, Representative

HEARD by teleconference: January 4, 2024

OVERVIEW

1Wayne Phillips (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar” or the “respondent”) to suspend their Class G licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).

2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation (the “Ministry”) may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a condition, namely severe substance use disorder, that is likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend their licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. They deny they suffer from severe substance use disorder and deny that they suffer from a medical condition which interferes with their ability to drive safely.

5Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

6At the outset of the hearing, it became apparent that the appellant wished to rely on late submissions sent only to the respondent.

7In accordance with Rule 9.3 of the Licence Appeal Rules, 2023, the appellant and the respondent had the opportunity to make submissions on whether to allow the appellant’s late submissions into evidence.

8In making my determination to allow one (i.e., the document related to the appellant’s 2023 work training) of the three late submissions into evidence, I took into consideration that: the case conference report and order indicated that “the parties had until end of day December 28, 2023 to exchange documents to be relied upon at the hearing and file them with the Tribunal”; the appellant did not recall that the documents needed to be filed with the Tribunal; the submissions were sent to the respondent by the appellant’s wife on January 2, 2024; the appellant’s wife had technical difficulties changing the format of the documents; two of the documents had already been sent in and received prior to the case conference, albeit in a different format; the appellant may be prejudiced by excluding the one document related to their recent work training; and the respondent did not oppose the admission of the one document into evidence.

ISSUES

9The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

10To resolve that issue, I will address the following questions:

i. Does the appellant suffer from severe substance use disorder?

ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

11The Registrar bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the answer to each of the above questions is “yes.”

RESULT

12Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has not satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely and I set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

ANALYSIS

Does the appellant suffer from severe substance use disorder?

13The evidence presented at the hearing does not establish on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely severe substance use disorder.

14On October 25, 2023, the appellant’s treating physician, Dr. W., completed a substance use assessment form. The form was completed at the request of the appellant to satisfy a previous condition the appellant had on their driver’s licence.

15By letter dated November 9, 2023, the Registrar informed the appellant that their driver’s licence was suspended for the condition of severe substance use disorder, effective November 19, 2023.

16The Registrar’s position is supported by Dr. W.’s October 25, 2023 completed substance use assessment form, which indicated that the appellant: has severe substance use disorder to illicit substances and/or non-prescribed pharmaceuticals and prescribed medication; has been abstinent from all substances that have been or are currently a problem for less than six months; is physically dependent on prescription medication (e.g., methadone or suboxone); and has been taking the medication at the dosage prescribed for at least six months. In the ‘Comments’ Section, Dr. W. wrote, “Opioid dependence treated with suboxone. His condition has improved steadily over the past few months and he seems to be on a therapeutic dose of suboxone”.

17As a licenced a duly qualified physician in the province of Ontario, I know that opioid agonist therapy (“OAT”), i.e., methadone or suboxone, is an effective treatment for opioid dependence and helps stabilize people’s lives. I take notice of these facts pursuant to s. 16(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22.

18The appellant acknowledged they have had substance use issues, are a patient of Dr. W. and have been relatively stable on OAT under Dr. W.’s care. The appellant candidly admitted that, following the death of two close relatives in August 2023, they “fell off” (i.e., suffered a relapse). The appellant stated that they: are in a program; are doing their best; submit to frequent urine drug screens (“UDS”); have had clean UDS for at least three months; are responsible; continue to be employed; and have support of their family.

19Dr. W., the appellant’s OAT physician, testified on behalf of the appellant.

20Dr. W. indicated that the timing of the completion of the substance use assessment form coincided with a short period of time in which the appellant had relapsed/wasn’t well and, by definition, was suffering from severe substance use disorder. Dr. W. emphasized that: in the five years the appellant has been under their care, the appellant has mostly been stable; during this short period of instability there was no indication that the appellant was not safe to drive; and they did not feel the need to report the appellant to the Ministry for dangerous driving (i.e., a medical condition report).

21Dr. W. further indicated that currently the appellant: does not satisfy the definition of severe substance use disorder; has opioid dependence which is once again stable on OAT; follows the OAT treatment program which includes talk therapy and frequent UDS; and the UDS support the appellant’s abstinence from non-prescribed substances.

22After a careful consideration of the totality of Dr. W.’s written and oral evidence, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant does not suffer from severe substance use disorder.

23I find that the Registrar has not established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from severe substance use disorder.

Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

24Having found that the appellant does not suffer from severe substance use disorder, I do not have to consider whether the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

Conclusion

25I find that the Registrar has not discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from the medical condition of severe substance use disorder that is likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

ORDER

26For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.