Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16046/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of the Act.
Between:
David L. Little
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR:
Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
David L. Little
For the Respondent:
Sadia Ashraf, Agent
Heard:
July 15, 2024
OVERVIEW
1The appellant, David L. Little, appeals the 45-day impoundment of his 2019 Ford Escape under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).
2The appellant’s vehicle was impounded on June 28, 2024, after police found his son operating the vehicle while his driver’s licence was under a Criminal Code suspension. The appellant states that he was not in the vehicle at the time it was pulled over and impounded. He states he became aware after receiving a telephone call from police that same night.
3The appellant confirmed that he was aware of his son’s previous driving history but states it was his belief that all matters had been resolved with the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) and his son was properly licenced. In actual fact, his son’s licence was still under a Criminal Code suspension under section 41 and 43 of the Highway Traffic Act (the “Act”) at the time of the impoundment.
4Subsection 55.1(2) of the Act allows for the impoundment of a vehicle for 45 days where a police officer is satisfied that the driver’s licence of the person who is driving a vehicle at the time of its detention is under suspension for certain Criminal Code offences. In this case, the appellant’s son’s driver’s licence was under suspension, pursuant to sections 41 and 43 of the Act following a conviction for driving with over 80 mgs of blood-alcohol level and a further conviction of operation while prohibited.
5As a result, police impounded the vehicle pursuant to s. 55.1(1)1. of the Act.
ISSUE
6The appellant appeals the impoundment on the grounds that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, relying on s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
RESULT
7Having considered the parties’ evidence and submissions, I find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, as the appellant has reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. I therefore dismiss the appeal and confirm the impoundment.
ANALYSIS
8It is undisputed between the parties that the appellant is the owner of the impounded vehicle and that his son was driving at the time it was impounded. The appellant states that he believed his son was properly licenced and had resolved his previous issues with the MTO. He states that after the impoundment, police made him aware of where he can conduct his own online check to verify someone’s driver’s licence prior to loaning them his car. He states that he will utilize this service in the future.
9The appellant confirmed that he is only relying on the ground that the loss of his vehicle has resulted in exceptional hardship.
10The appellant states that the impoundment resulted in significant inconvenience and to him and his wife. During this time, his wife has had to transport him to work both ways, resulting in him being late for work on occasion. He has not missed any days of work and his employer is aware of the impoundment. He testified that there are no work vehicles available which he can use in the interim.
11He states that he lives in an area which requires a car, with the nearest convenience store being about a 10-minute drive away. He also operates a farm which is also approximately 10 minutes away. He states that he relies on the vehicle to transport water for his horses as there is no electricity at the farm. However, it was confirmed during the hearing that at this time his stepdaughter has been able to help out by maintaining the farm resulting in no harm or neglect to the animals.
12The appellant has also been able to secure rides with his son-in-law who lives in Raymore, Ontario. Both his daughter and son-in-law live approximately 10 minutes away from his home and they have 2 vehicles. When asked if he could borrow one of the vehicles, he stated that they are very busy with other obligations and he did not wish to inconvenience them.
13During the impoundment period, the appellant’s wife has been able to pick up groceries on her way home from work. Any medication is obtained from a nearby pharmacy and the appellant’s son-in-law has picked up medication for the couple to assist them during this time.
14During the hearing, the respondent questioned the appellant about some additional vehicles which appear under his name. The appellant confirmed that he no longer has those vehicles and will be contacting MTO to have them removed from his record.
15The respondent argues that the appellant has access to other transportation. He has been able to maintain his household and has been able to secure help from other family members.
16Furthermore, the appellant has not missed work and neither he nor his wife have missed any medical appointments.
Has the appellant experienced exceptional hardship as a result of the impoundment?
17I find that the appellant has failed to show that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship for the reasons which follow.
18As a first step, s. 10(1) of O. Reg. 631/98 (“Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. To establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in s. 10(1) of the Regulation is that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
19Section 10(4) of the Regulation provides that, in order to show that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available,
The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
20The appellant did not offer any evidence to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that he had no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle. In fact, the appellant testified that he has been using other options, such as getting rides from other family members if necessary. The family appears to have pulled together to assist the appellant and his wife during this time. These efforts and availability of alternatives to the impounded vehicle makes his grounds of exceptional hardship uncompelling.
21I find that the appellant does have reasonable alternatives. They have allowed him to continue his daily routine with no major disruption. The loss of his vehicle is no doubt inconvenient, but he has considered and indeed taken advantage of opportunities to overcome this temporary loss. Importantly, s. 10(2)(a) of the Regulation expressly disallows me from considering inconvenience.
22The Regulation sets out that if the appellant fails to establish that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle, then an appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship cannot succeed. For the reasons set out in this decision, I find that the appellant has failed to discharge the threshold burden of establishing on a balance of probabilities that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. He therefore does not meet the test for exceptional hardship, as set out in the Regulation, based on the alternatives available to him.
ORDER
23For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal’s authority under s.50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm the impoundment order.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member
Released: August 29, 2024

