An appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of that Act
Between:
Ashley Lucas
Appellant
-and-
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR: Jeffery Campbell, Vice-Chair
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Ashley Lucas, Appellant
For the Respondent: Sadia Ashraf, Agent
Heard by Teleconference: July 15, 2024
Overview
1Ashley Lucas (the “appellant”) appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2018 Mitsubishi RVR (the “vehicle”) on June 28, 2024, under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). At the time of the impoundment, the vehicle was being driven by D.W. (the “driver”) whose licence was suspended due to a criminal conviction.
2The appellant appealed the impoundment to the Tribunal on July 4, 2024.
ISSUES
3The issue to be determined is:
i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
RESULT
4On the evidence before me at the hearing, I find that the appellant has demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship. I order the Registrar to release the vehicle.
ANALYSIS
The impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Act and the Regulation
5Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. To establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in s. 10(1) of the Regulation is that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, with s. 10(4) of the Regulation requiring the owner to demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any vehicle during the impound period. If I find that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle, then the appeal will fail and I need not consider any other requirements of the test for exceptional hardship.
6If it is found there is no alternative to the vehicle, the Tribunal must consider, in accordance with section 10 of the Regulation, whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle or a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. The Tribunal is prohibited from considering whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to any person. It may consider financial or economic loss, but only if the loss will be immediate, significant and long-lasting and the impact will be on a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle other than the suspended driver.
7The respondent presented documentary evidence which established that the appellant is the registered owner of the vehicle and that the vehicle was stopped while being driven by D.W. whose licence was suspended due to a criminal conviction.
8The appellant submits that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship due the risk to health and safety of someone ordinarily transported by the vehicle to the financial costs of the impoundment.
9The appellant is a single mother of four children, three whom live with her. The appellant is currently on ODSP and CPP Disability payments due to her medical conditions. Her 27-year-old daughter has serious medical conditions. The appellant advises that the daughter has an educational level of a pre-schooler. The appellant’s 16-year-old son has been diagnosed with a serious medical condition for which he receives regular eye appointments. Another 17-year-old daughter lives with the appellant and a 24-year-old daughter lives elsewhere.
10Because of her medical conditions, the appellant receives monthly blood testing and is on prescription medications. Her 27-year-old daughter also has regular medical appointments. Both the appellant’s and her daughter’s appointments are all in Tillsonburg, Ontario, a 17-kilometer distance from their home. Between she and her daughter, they have 3 to 4 medical appointments per month. Her son has also missed an eye appointment due to the impoundment.
11The appellant testified that she has no family that could be of assistance in helping her and her children with respect to transportation (her parents do not drive and her sister lives an hour away). She also has no friends or neighbours that can assist with transportation.
12The appellant admitted that there are taxi services available for medical appointments, but she is not able financially to afford the $35.00 fare each way to Tillsonburg and return. She also testified that she is unable to afford a rental vehicle.
13The appellant agreed with the respondent that she does have access to 911 services, although she believes that an ambulance would not be as expeditious as her own vehicle should she or her children have a medical emergency.
14With respect to groceries and prescriptions, she is able to walk to the convenience store in her town of Otterville, Ontario. The appellant testified that her daughter’s boyfriend and her respite worker have been kind enough to deliver those to her.
15The respondent submits that the appellant does have access to reasonable alternatives to the vehicle, and therefore does not meet the threshold test for exceptional hardship. The respondent submits that the appellant is able to walk to obtain groceries and/or have others deliver them to her. The appellant has access to emergency services if needed. The appellant can order her groceries online and can request her pharmacy to deliver her prescriptions. Also, the appellant has access to 911 emergency services as needed.
16I am in agreement with the respondent’s submissions, with the exception of the final one. While 911 emergency services are available to the appellant, I agree with the appellant that those services are not a reasonable alternative to having the readiness and availability of her own vehicle. The appellant is a single mother with two children who have ongoing medical needs (both of whom who have missed medical appointments due to the impoundment of the vehicle). The appellant herself has medical needs and has missed medical appointments.
Conclusion
17There are few cases where the applicability of the threat to the health and safety of a person normally transported by the vehicle is more relevant that that of a single parent with children with medical needs. In the case at hand, I have concluded that emergency services are not a reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle. I also conclude that the unavailability of that vehicle (despite the accessibility to emergency services) does create a threat to the health and safety of the appellant and her children in both the missing of scheduled medical appointments and in the situation of a potential medical emergency.
18Given the above, I find that appellant has established on a balance of probabilities that she meets the test for exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Act and the Regulation.
I ORDER AS FOLLOWS:
19Pursuant to s. 50(2)(5) of the Act, I order the Registrar to release the appellant’s motor vehicle.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
____________________________
Jeffery Campbell, Vice-Chair
Released: July 17, 2024