Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15956/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Angela Patriquin

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Rebecca Hines

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Angela Patriquin, Appellant

For the Respondent:

Sadia Ashraf, Program Advisor

Heard by Teleconference:

June 13, 2024

OVERVIEW

1Angela Patriquin (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her 2012 Dodge Ram on May 18, 2024, for 45 days under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA”). At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was driving the vehicle while her driving privileges were under suspension resulting from a prescribed Criminal Code conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

1. Will the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA?

RESULT

4I find the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA. As a result, I confirm the impoundment.

ANALYSIS

5The appellant’s vehicle was impounded pursuant to s. 55.1(1)1 of the HTA, because she was driving the vehicle while her licence was suspended, as a result of a conviction for a prescribed offence under the Criminal Code.

6The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded in accordance with s. 55.1 may, under the provisions of s. 50.2 of the HTA, appeal the impoundment and request an order from the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) that the Registrar release the vehicle.

7A vehicle owner may only appeal a vehicle impoundment on one or more of the five grounds provided in subsection 50.2(3). The appellant relies on s.50.2(3)(d) noted above.

The impoundment of the vehicle will not result in exceptional hardship.

8Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria by which exceptional hardship is defined for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA. Subsection 10(1) compels the Tribunal to first consider whether the owner has alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

9Subsection 10(4) of the Regulation places the burden on the owner to demonstrate there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, which includes considering and inquiring into every reasonable option such as using another vehicle and making arrangements to manage without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

10Only if the appellant demonstrates that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available to her, may I consider the other factors and criteria in the Regulation that define the exceptional hardship test, for example, financial loss, loss of employment, or the health and safety of persons who may rely on the impounded vehicle. Subsection 10 (3)(d) of the Regulation supports that these types of losses must be to someone other than the suspended driver. Importantly, the Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

The appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

11The appellant testified that the impounded vehicle is her family’s only viable source of transportation, and that they rely on it to commute to work, school, church, attend medical appointments, take her daughter to extra curricular activities, and obtain groceries. Prior to the impoundment, the appellant’s mother, who lives close by would walk over and drive her to work. Since the impoundment the appellant has had to take public transit to work, however she has been late several times because she must transfer between three bus lines. Further, it takes 45 minutes for her to get to work by public transit, which is normally a 20-minute drive. The appellant submits that she is at risk of losing her job if she continues to be late. In addition, her daughter has been unable to attend cadets since the impoundment. She submits that her husband is currently attending treatment for a serious illness, and she has health issues as well and all three members of the family have an upcoming appointment with their family doctor on the same day at the end of June which will be missed. She also has physiotherapy appointments which will need to be rescheduled. She has taxis and Uber available to her, but it costs $20 one way, which they cannot afford because her husband was on medical leave for seven months. Finally, she does not have any friends and family members nearby who can assist with transportation.

12The appellant acknowledged that her husband owns a 2021 Ford, but that vehicle is a two-seater, and cannot transport their family of three, is too expensive on gas and is used for her husband’s plumbing business. During cross-examination, the appellant conceded that since the impoundment her husband has been using the vehicle to attend work and medical appointments. However, he missed two because he could not park the vehicle underground due to its size. Her husband has also been driving their daughter to school, church, and to obtain groceries. But the appellant has been unable to attend because the vehicle is a two-seater. The appellant also admitted that they could reschedule their family appointment with the family doctor to go in shifts of two, but this would be inconvenient.

13I find the appellant was honest and forthright in her testimony and believe that the impoundment has caused her significant stress in an already challenging time in her life. However, I find that although the alternative modes of transportation available to her are inconvenient, there are alternatives to the impounded vehicle during the impound period. She has taken public transit to work, although it takes longer and is inconvenient. Further, her husband and daughter have been able to attend work, school, medical appointments and obtain groceries. Although the impoundment has caused inconvenience, the appellant and her family have been able to manage without the impounded vehicle during the impound period. As already highlighted above, the Tribunal cannot take inconvenience into account when considering whether the exceptional hardship has been met. Since there are alternative modes of transportation available to the appellant, I need not take into consideration the other factors such as financial loss, loss of employment, or the health and safety of persons who may rely on the impounded vehicle.

CONCLUSION

14For the above-noted reasons, I find the appellant has not proven that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under the provisions of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation.

ORDER

15Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I confirm the impoundment.