Karambir S. Sahota v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2024 CanLII 49035

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15894/MVIA

An appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of that Act

Between:

Karambir S. Sahota Appellant

-and-

Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Jeffery Campbell, Vice-Chair

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Karambir S. Sahota, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by teleconference: May 24, 2024

OVERVIEW

1Karambir Sahota (the “appellant”) appeals the 45-day impoundment of his 2016 Mitsubishi RVR (the “vehicle”) on May 3, 2024, under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The Registrar alleges that, at the time of the impoundment, the vehicle was being driven by A.A.B., whose licence was suspended due to a criminal conviction.

2The appellant appealed the impoundment to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (“Tribunal”) on May 10, 2024.

3Subsection 50.2(3) of the Act sets out the available grounds on which the Tribunal may release the vehicle. The grounds of appeal raised by the appellant is that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

4The issue to be determined is:

i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

5On the evidence before me at the hearing, I find that the appellant has demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ANALYSIS

Issue - The impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Act and the Regulation

6Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that we must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. To establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in s. 10(1) of the Regulation is that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, with s. 10(4) of the Regulation requiring the owner to demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any vehicle during the impound period. If we find that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle, then the appeal will fail and we need not consider any other requirements of the test for exceptional hardship.

7If it is found there is no alternative to the vehicle, the Tribunal must consider, in accordance with section 10 of the Regulation, whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle or a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. The Tribunal is prohibited from considering whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to any person. It may consider financial or economic loss, but only if the loss will be immediate, significant and long-lasting and the impact will be on a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle other than the suspended driver.

8The respondent presented documentary evidence which established that the appellant is the registered owner of the vehicle and that the vehicle was stopped while being driven by A.A.B while her licence was under suspension due to a criminal conviction. I am therefore satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded.

9The appellant submits that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

10The respondent submits that the appellant does have access to reasonable alternatives to the vehicle, and therefore does not meet the threshold test for exceptional hardship.

11The appellant testified that he lives with his wife, the driver, in Aurora, Ontario. They also have a daughter, who was born on May 16, 2024.

12The appellant testified that he is able to obtain groceries and necessities as he can walk to the grocery store. For heavy grocery loads, he reluctantly used taxis when necessary. He can also use ride-sharing or taxis, although on a regular basis, this would be too expensive as he is the only income-earner in his young family. He will be forced to use a taxi or ride-sharing for a weigh-in appointment for their newborn on May 28, 2024.

13The appellant testified that, other than a dentist appointment, he has not missed, nor expects to miss, any medical appointments.

14The appellant testified that he is employed as a telecommunications specialist in the construction of an office building in downtown Toronto, a 45-minute drive from his home. His work hours are from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. on weekdays. Since the impoundment, the appellant has received rides to and from work with a co-worker. He has also borrowed a friend’s car twice during the impoundment period. However, neither of those options continue to be available for various reasons. He has no other friends or co-workers who can assist him in his ability to get to work.

15He testified that transit is available from his home to Union Station in Toronto. However, the first available transit leaves at 5:41 a.m. and does not arrive at Union Station until 6:33. He then must walk to his worksite, leaving him more than 30 minutes late each day. The appellant testified that he is concerned that repetitive lateness may result in his termination from his job. As his is a union job, his employer is unable to adjust the appellant’s work hours. His employer is aware of the situation of the impoundment, but he was informed that there is nothing that they can do to accommodate his lateness.

16It is in this area (that of transportation to and from his employment) that I am satisfied that the appellant has no reasonable alternative. Although taxis and ride-sharing are available, those would be cost prohibitive to and from work on a regular basis and therefore not a reasonable option in the appellant’s particular circumstances. He testified that a rental vehicle is also so cost prohibitive as not to be a reasonable alternative. Public Transit would have him arrive at his employment 30 minutes late each day until the date of the release of the vehicle on June 17, 2024, a total of 16 working days. I find that the appellant’s concern with respect to the consequences of that tardiness is reasonable, including that of a possible lay-off due to his repeated lateness. Public Transit therefore is not an alternative in the appellant’s circumstances. I therefore conclude that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. In doing so I have not considered inconvenience to the appellant, or financial or economic loss. However, when a potential alternative is entirely cost-prohibitive or not fit for purpose, it is in my view not a reasonable option.

17Because I have concluded that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, I may now go on to consider whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship. In doing so, I may also consider whether the impoundment will result in loss of employment, if the loss will be immediate, significant, and long-lasting.

CONCLUSION

18I conclude that there exists a real possibility of the appellants loss of his employment due to the lack of reasonable alternate means of transportation, and the appellant’s repetitive lateness to his employment due to being forced to utilize public transit. I also conclude that such a loss will be immediate, significant and long-lasting. On that basis, I find that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Act and the Regulation.

19It is advisable to note that, in this case, where the driver has some time left in the suspension of her licence, under s. 55.1(3) of the Act, a second occurrence would subject the vehicle to a 90-day impoundment, and under s. 50.2(4) of the Act, the exceptional hardship ground could not be used in an appeal for a second impoundment of this vehicle, or any vehicle owned by the appellant.

I ORDER AS FOLLOWS:

20Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, I order the release of the appellant’s vehicle.