Sophia McLennan v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2024 CanLII 46884

Date: 2024-05-17

Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Sophia McLennan Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISON AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Laura Hodgson, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: S. McLennan, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: L. Pereira, Agent

Held by teleconference: May 17, 2024

OVERVIEW

1The appellant’s vehicle was impounded under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 (the “Act”). This provision allows a police officer to detain and then impound a motor vehicle in certain circumstances, including if the person driving the vehicle at the time has a suspended driver’s licence for a specified Criminal Code-related reason. Here, the appellant’s acquaintance K.H. was driving her vehicle while under a specified Criminal Code related suspension.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment of the vehicle causes “exceptional hardship”.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

• Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act?

RESULT

4I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment results in exceptional hardship under the Act. I confirm the impoundment.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

Will the Impoundment Result in Exceptional Hardship?

5It was not disputed that the driver of the vehicle, K.H., had a specified Criminal Code related licence suspension at the time the vehicle was detained for impoundment nor that the appellant is the registered owner of the vehicle. I am satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded.

6While the appellant’s Notice of Appeal suggested that she contested the lawfulness of the impoundment, at the hearing she clarified that she was only appealing on the ground of “exceptional hardship”.

7Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. If the owner fails to establish that there is no alternative available, then her appeal must fail.

8In order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person. This includes using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without a vehicle.

9Only if the appellant demonstrates that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle can the Tribunal then consider other criteria including, in limited circumstances: financial loss; loss of employment; and loss of education or training. The Tribunal cannot consider “inconvenience to any person” in determining exceptional hardship.

10The appellant testified that she requires her car for transportation to her workplace in Toronto. She works at a restaurant that she co-owns with her sister. The restaurant also provides occasional catering services. In connection with a secondary business, the appellant intermittently delivers imported goods to customers in the GTA.

11The appellant is a single parent. She lives with her sister and her sister’s children in Brampton. Her sister owns a vehicle. The appellant’s sister also works at the family restaurant but, according to the appellant, they don’t share rides as they work at different times. The appellant testified that she rarely borrows her sister’s vehicle but did not explain why that vehicle cannot be used for their restaurant catering deliveries. The appellant has not inquired into a rental vehicle during the impoundment period but believes it would be too costly. Since the impoundment, she has been commuting to her restaurant via Uber and provided some receipts as evidence. She testified that the restaurant has been unable to fulfill some recent catering orders. Her teenaged daughter has been taking either an Uber or public transit to and from school, while the other children have bus transportation. The appellant indicated that the vehicle impoundment meant that she recently had to cancel a family outing. The appellant’s aunt, whom the appellant often transports to medical appointments, has found other transportation during the impoundment period.

12In the respondent’s submission the appellant has an alternative to the impounded vehicle as she has been using Uber and made alternative arrangements for her family members.

CONCLUSION

13I recognize the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle has been financially stressful and inconvenient for the appellant. As noted, inconvenience is not a factor the Tribunal can consider. The appellant has not established that she does not have an alternative to her impounded vehicle as set out in s. 10 (4) of the Regulation. She has used private transportation services (Uber) to attend her restaurant and has not missed employment. During the impoundment the restaurant has not made catering deliveries nor is the appellant making deliveries for her imported goods business. It was not established, however, that that the appellant has considered every reasonable alternative (e.g., use of her sister’s vehicle or a short-term rental). The appellant has not established “exceptional hardship”.

ORDER

14The Tribunal confirms the impoundment of the appellant’s motor vehicle.