Kavita Singh v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2024 CanLII 33189

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15741/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Between:

Kavita Singh

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Kavita Singh

For the Respondent: Sadia Ashraf, Representative

HEARD: April 2, 2024

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Kavita Singh, appeals from the 45-day impoundment of a 2012 Toyota Corolla motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on March 7, 2024. At the time of the impoundment, her roommate, Christopher Allen was driving the vehicle while his licence was suspended.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

4I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. The impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5The respondent presented uncontradicted evidence which establishes that:

i. the appellant is the registered owner of the impounded vehicle, a 2012 Toyota motor vehicle (the “vehicle”);

ii. on March 7, 2024, the police discovered the impounded vehicle being driven by Christopher Allen (the “driver”); and

iii. the licence of the driver was under suspension for a Criminal Code conviction at the time of the impoundment.

Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship

6The burden is on the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as it is defined in the Act and regulations. I find that the appellant has not met her burden. I find the appellant has alternative means of transportation available to her.

7Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

8Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

9If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will fail.

10If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses.

11The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

12The appellant testified that the vehicle is her main transportation to and from work, and to take her child to and from daycare, and take her ailing father to his medical appointments. Since the impoundment, she has had to reduce her hours of work, which resulted in lower pay, and the impoundment has made it more difficult to attend to her daily tasks.

13The appellant acknowledges that there is another motor vehicle, a 2014 Nissan, registered in her name but testified that her mother is its primary driver. Her mother does not reside with her or her father, and the appellant states that she is unable to use the Nissan vehicle as it is her mother’s primary source of transportation. Nonetheless, since the impoundment, on one occasion her mother gave the appellant and her father a ride to his medical appointment in the Nissan vehicle.

14Since the impoundment, the appellant has been regularly using public transportation to travel to work. She testified that it takes her about an hour to travel to work on public transportation. She testified that she has missed some time from work as she was unable to find transportation and she had to take her father to his medical appointments. She has also used public transportation to attend her father’s residence and to attend her daughter’s daycare. She testified that sometimes if the weather is nice, she and her daughter will walk from the daycare to their home which is about a 5-10 minute walk.

15The appellant has also used Ubers, including to take her father to his medical appointments, to obtain groceries, and to attend her daughter’s daycare. She has also used Instacart to have her groceries delivered.

16The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, her daughter has been able to attend her daycare. She and her daughter have not missed any medical appointments. Her father has missed one or two appointments. However, she acknowledges that she could have used an Uber to take him to his medical appointments(s), but was unable to obtain the time off of work to take him.

17I find that the evidence before the Tribunal establishes that there are alternative means of transportation available to the appellant. I find that the evidence establishes that, since the impoundment, the appellant has relied upon public transportation and Ubers to complete her essential tasks. She has access to public transportation to attend her workplace and her daughter’s daycare, and her father’s residence. She has used Ubers to take her father to his medical appointments and to go groceries shopping. I find that alternative forms of transportation have been used.

18Under the circumstances, I find the appellant has not proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available and the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.

19Although the impoundment has resulted in inconvenience, the appellant has failed to prove exceptional hardship under the Act and the appeal must fail.

ORDER

20On the basis of the evidence presented at the hearing, and pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.