Rochelle Jones v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2024 CanLII 23480

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15685/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Between:

Rochelle Jones

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Rochelle Jones, Self-Represented

For the Respondent:

Sadia Ashraf, Representative

HEARD: March 6, 2024

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Rochelle Jones, appeals under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the "Act") from the 45-day impoundment of a 2022 Hyundai motor vehicle. The appellant's motor vehicle was impounded on February 11, 2024. At the time it was detained in order to be impounded, Steven Burt was driving the vehicle while his licence was suspended as a result of a Criminal Code conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

4I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, and therefore, the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5The respondent presented uncontradicted evidence which establishes that:

i. the appellant is the registered owner of the impounded vehicle, a 2022 Hyundai vehicle (the "vehicle");

ii. on February 11, 2024, the police discovered the vehicle being driven by Steven Burt (the "driver"); and

iii. the licence of the driver was under suspension for a Criminal Code conviction at the time the police detained the vehicle for impoundment.

Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship

6The burden is on the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as it is defined in the Act and regulations. I find the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle and she has not met her burden.

7Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the "Regulation") sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

8Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

9If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will fail.

10If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then subsection 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to subsection 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses.

11The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

12The appellant testified that she works fulltime at a daycare in Sault Ste. Marie and she lives about a half hour drive away in Echo Bay. She testified that Echo Bay has a small population of about 600 people and there is no public transportation available from Echo Bay to Sault Ste Marie. She testified that the first week of the impoundment, she was unable to attend her workplace. She testified that, the second week of the impoundment period, she was able to use a rental vehicle to attend her workplace. She testified that she needed to attend her place of employment or risk losing her employment. She testified that she did not have sufficient credit on her credit card to rent a vehicle, and thus, her mother is renting the vehicle for her on her credit card. This is a week to week rental. The appellant testified that she would need to pay her mother back for the cost of the rental vehicle, and the amount is onerous for her. She testified that her level of debt may require her to relinquish her apartment and move back into her parents' home. She testified that she lives by herself.

13I accept the appellant's testimony that the cost of the rental vehicle is onerous and inconvenient for her.

14The appellant testified that she is unable to borrow her parents' vehicle as they reside about a 40 minute drive from her home and they are responsible for driving her niece and nephew to school everyday.

15The appellant testified that she also provides respite care for an adult living with a disability during one weekend a month. During the first week of the impoundment, the appellant was unable to attend and had to cancel for the period February 8 to 11, 2024.

16The appellant testified that she missed a medical appointment scheduled during the first week of the impoundment but was able to reschedule to a date after the impoundment period. She was also unable to obtain groceries for the first week of the impoundment period but she is now able to obtain groceries with the rental vehicle.

17I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. On the contrary, after the first week of the impoundment, the appellant has been using a rental vehicle to attend to her work engagements, obtain groceries and complete her essential tasks. While the rental of the vehicle is not cost effective and she will need to reimburse her mother for the cost of the rental vehicle, nonetheless, I find that this alternative form of transportation is being utilized by the appellant. I note that I may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

18In this case, the appellant continues to use the rental vehicle to attend work and complete personal tasks including grocery shopping. The evidence establishes that the appellant has an alternative to the impounded vehicle available to her.

19I find that the appellant has not proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available and her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.

20Under the circumstances, I find the appellant has not proven exceptional hardship and the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail.

ORDER

21Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, the impoundment of the appellant's vehicle is confirmed.