Tanya Hobbins v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2024 CanLII 18089

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15663/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Between:

Tanya Hobbins

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Rebecca Hines

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Tanya Hobbins, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Sadia Ashraf, Program Advisor

HEARD: February 29, 2024

OVERVIEW

1Tanya Hobbins, the appellant, appeals from the 45-day impoundment of her 2020 Dodge Caravan under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on February 19, 2024. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant’s husband was driving the vehicle while his licence was under suspension resulting from a prescribed criminal conviction.

2The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded in accordance with s. 55.1 may, under the provisions of s. 50.2 of the Act, appeal the impoundment and request an order from the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) allowing the appeal and that the Registrar release the vehicle.

3A vehicle owner may only appeal a vehicle impoundment on one or more of the five grounds provided in subsection 50.2(3). The appellant relies on sections 50.2(3) (a) and (d) and submits that the vehicle was stolen at the time of the impoundment and that the impoundment of the vehicle will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

4The issues in dispute are:

i. Whether the vehicle was stolen at the time of the impoundment under section 50.2(3)(a) of the Act.

ii. Will the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act?

RESULT

5I find the vehicle was stolen, and therefore, pursuant to section 50.2(5), I order the respondent to release the vehicle. Since I have determined that the vehicle was stolen, I need not consider whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ANALYSIS

The appellant’s vehicle was stolen at the time of the impoundment.

6The burden is on the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the vehicle was stolen. I am satisfied that the appellant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that the vehicle was stolen at the time of the impoundment.

7The respondent presented unrefuted evidence that the appellant’s husband’s licence was suspended for a prescribed Criminal Code offence pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the Act at the time of the impoundment. Accordingly, the vehicle was lawfully impounded.

8The word “stolen” is not defined in the Act.

9The Divisional Court, in the case of Marshall v. Ontario Registrar of Motor Vehicles, [2002] O.J. No. 745 (“Marshall”), has provided the following definition of “stolen” in the impoundment context. In that case, the Court stated that a vehicle is “stolen” within the meaning of the Act,

…when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily.

10The appellant testified that on the date of the impoundment, her husband took her vehicle without her permission while she was sleeping because she had been ill. She submits that when she woke up, her husband informed her that the vehicle had been impounded and that she spoke with a police officer who did not ask her whether the vehicle was taken without her permission. The appellant acknowledged that she was aware that her husband’s licence was under suspension from an incident from over seven years ago and that he knew that he was not to drive any vehicle. She submits that she kept her car keys in her purse beside her bed and she had no reason to suspect that he would take her vehicle because he had never taken her vehicle before. Further, her husband knows that he does not have permission to go into her purse for any reason.

11The respondent takes the position that the appellant has not proven that the vehicle was stolen because no charges were laid against her husband. Further, even though the appellant was aware of her husband’s driving history, no preventative measures were taken to ensure that the keys to the vehicle were in a locked and secure space. In addition, the appellant had not had any explicit conversations with her husband that he was not to drive her vehicle. The respondent submits that the appellant could have taken additional steps to prevent the vehicle from being taken.

12I find the appellant’s testimony to be credible and forthright, and I accept it. I find that the vehicle was stolen on the date of the impoundment because it was taken without the appellant’s permission. As highlighted in Marshall, the courts have defined a vehicle as stolen “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily.” In this case, her husband did not have permission to take the appellant’s vehicle. He took the vehicle while his wife was asleep and she was not awake to stop him.

13Further, I disagree with the respondent that the unsecured storage of the car keys equates to the appellant’s consent for her husband to drive the vehicle. Although the appellant stored her car keys in her purse, I accept the appellant’s testimony that her husband knows that he cannot go into her purse and that he, fully aware of his licence status, would know it would be illegal for him to drive any vehicle. There was no indication in the appellant’s history with her husband of him having ever taken the vehicle, and therefore she could not have predicted that he would take her car while she was ill and asleep. Lastly, I disagree with the respondent that the lack of any criminal charge against her husband undermines her appeal. I find it is understandable that a wife would not pressure or insist that police lay charges against her husband because of the potential consequences of those charges.

14Given all of the above, I find on a balance of probabilities that the driver took the appellant’s vehicle without consent or permission with the intent of depriving the appellant of it on a temporary basis. In the context of this case, this taking amounts to the driver having stolen the vehicle. I find this consistent with the definition of stolen highlighted by the court in Marshall. The vehicle should therefore be released.

Conclusion

15The appellant has established that the vehicle was stolen on the date of the impoundment.

ORDER

16On the basis of the evidence and submissions presented at the hearing, and pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, I order the respondent to release the appellant’s motor vehicle.