Racine v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2024 CanLII 156

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15454/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act.

Between:

Cole Racine

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Cole Racine

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard:

December 6, 2023

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Cole Racine, appeals the 45-day impoundment of his 2021 Ram Truck under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).

2The appellant’s vehicle was impounded on November 16, 2023, after police found him operating the vehicle while his driver’s licence was under a Criminal Code suspension. His driving record also indicates that an ignition interlock will be applicable after reinstatement.

3Subsection 55.1(1) of the Act allows for the impoundment of a vehicle for 45 days where a police officer is satisfied that the driver’s licence of the person who is driving a vehicle is under suspension for certain Criminal Code offences. In this case, the appellant’s licence is suspended until October 19, 2024, for driving while his ability is impaired. As a result, police impounded the vehicle pursuant to this subsection of the Act.

ISSUE

4The appellant appeals the impoundment on the grounds that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, relying on s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

5To succeed in his appeal, the appellant must establish this ground of appeal on a balance of probabilities.

CONCLUSION

6Having considered the parties’ evidence and submissions, I find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as the appellant has reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. I therefore dismiss the appeal and confirm the impoundment.

ANALYSIS

7It is undisputed between the parties that the appellant is the owner of the impounded vehicle and that he was driving at the time it was impounded. He takes full responsibility for his actions and admits to driving when he knew he was suspended from doing so.

8The appellant knowingly drove the vehicle while his licence was under suspension for a Criminal Code conviction for an alcohol related offence. Based on the uncontradicted evidence in this case, I am satisfied that the vehicle was lawfully detained and impounded under s. 55.1 of the Act.

9During the hearing, the appellant testified that he has been experiencing financial hardship since the COVID-19 pandemic. He explained that he had an opportunity to make money for a renovation job he was hired for. He was in the process of transporting tools and equipment to the job site when he was pulled over by police. He states that he has been working on the renovation project for a few weeks and would typically get a ride to the job site. On November 16, 2023, he was unable to secure a ride so decided to drive himself.

10The appellant testified that he is typically able to get a ride from certain individuals but it would be subject to their availability. The appellant explained that he has now hired a driver to transport him to the job site. It is unclear to me how the appellant is able to hire a driver when he described his financial situation as severely constrained.

11What is clear is that the appellant has been able to avail himself of other alternatives to the impounded vehicle including getting rides from his girlfriend, friends, and his personal bicycle. His ability to hire a 3rd party driver indicates that there are other options which are available to him even on a temporary basis.

12The appellant also testified that his girlfriend has a vehicle which she uses for work. The same vehicle is used to pick up groceries and run errands if necessary.

13While there is no doubt the impoundment of his vehicle has been inconvenient, the appellant appears to have managed well by using alternative means of transport. These alternatives have shown to be effective and reasonable.

Has the appellant experienced exceptional hardship as a result of the impoundment?

14I find that the appellant has failed to show that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship for the reasons which follow.

15As a first step, s. 10(1) of O. Reg. 631/98 (“Regulation”) elaborates on exceptional hardship. Section 10(4) sets out the need for an appellant to establish that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. This is a necessary first step in establishing exceptional hardship. Section 10(4) of the Regulation provides, as follows:

The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

16Section 10 (1) of the Regulation requires me to consider whether “no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available”. The appellant did not offer any evidence to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that he had no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle. In fact, the appellant provided testimony to show that he has been able to get rides to and from his job sites. His girlfriend, with whom he lives, also has a vehicle. This vehicle is not typically available for the appellant since she uses it for work. Nonetheless, his girlfriend is able to use the vehicle to obtain groceries and other errands for the household.

17The appellant has not missed any medical appointments and has been able to attend work when it is available. He also noted that he was in the process of hiring a driver who would be able to transport him to his job site since other methods are not always reliable as was the case on November 16, 2023.

18I find that the appellant does have reasonable alternatives. For the most part, they have allowed him to continue his daily routine with no major disruption. The loss of his vehicle is no doubt inconvenient, however, this loss is only temporary and there is nothing compelling to suggest any urgency in the vehicle being released from impound.

19The Regulation sets out that if the appellant fails to establish that there are no reasonable alternatives, then the ground of exceptional hardship is not available as a ground of appeal. For the reasons set out in this decision, I find that the appellant has failed to discharge the threshold burden of establishing that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

20The appellant has failed to satisfy the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) on a balance of probabilities that he meets the test for exceptional hardship, as set out in the Regulation, based on the alternatives available to him.

ORDER

21For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal’s authority under s.50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm the impoundment.