Melissa Chin-A-Loy v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2024 CanLII 153

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15346/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Melissa Chin-A-Loy Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent

DECISION and ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Bruce Stanton

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Melissa Chin-A-Loy, appellant (self-represented)

For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Agent for the Registrar

Heard by Teleconference: December 19, 2023

OVERVIEW

1Melissa Chin-A-Loy (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her 2018 Ford Taurus on December 2, 2023, for 45 days under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).

2The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded in accordance with s. 55.1 may, under the provisions of s. 50.2 of the Act, appeal the impoundment and request an order from the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) that the Registrar release the vehicle.

3For the Tribunal to order the vehicle released, the appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that she satisfies at least one of the five grounds set out in s. 50.2(3) of the Act. The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship (s. 50.2(3)(d)).

ISSUES

4The issue in dispute is:

(a) Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act?

RESULT

5I find that the appellant has not proven that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship. Therefore, the impoundment is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

Circumstances leading to the impoundment

6Under s. 55.1 of the Act, where a police officer is satisfied that a person was driving a motor vehicle while his or her licence is under suspension for certain driving-related Criminal Code convictions, the officer must detain and impound the vehicle.

7The vehicle is jointly owned by the appellant and her fiancé, Joshua Munroe. Mr. Munroe was driving the vehicle at the time it was detained for impoundment.

8The respondent presented unrefuted evidence that Mr. Munroe’s licence was under suspension for a prescribed Criminal Code offence pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act at the time it was detained. Accordingly, the vehicle was lawfully impounded.

Issue 1: Exceptional Hardship

9I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship.

10Ontario Regulation 631/98 (the “Regulation”), under the Act, sets out the criteria the Tribunal must consider in determining whether an impoundment will result in exceptional hardship. Section 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Only when there is no alternative may I consider other consequences of the impoundment such as financial or economic loss in determining whether the exceptional hardship test has been met.

11For an appellant to establish that there is no alternative, s. 10(4) of the Regulation requires that every reasonable alternative or option to the impounded vehicle has been explored and inquired into.

The appellant has alternatives

12The appellant testified that she is the only licensed driver in the household and the only income earner. The impounded vehicle is their only vehicle. She submits that it has been difficult and inconvenient to manage without it.

13The appellant has resorted to using public transit to get to and from work at an early childhood/daycare centre, five days per week, and submits the trip on transit requires a 30-minute walk to the closest transit stop followed another 30 minutes or more on a bus and/or GO Train. She is scheduled to start work each day at 8:00 a.m. Her 2-year-old son accompanies her to the daycare centre each day and is enrolled there. The appellant submits that she has not used taxis or Uber extensively during the impoundment.

14The appellant submits that her employer is aware of her transportation circumstances and has been accommodating of her occasional late arrival. The appellant did not reveal if any workdays had been missed since the impoundment.

15The appellant submits that she has missed at least one medical appointment due to the impoundment but that it has been satisfactorily rescheduled. She has a routine, non-urgent dental appointment coming later in December and anticipates she will need to reschedule it if the vehicle is still impounded.

16The appellant’s parents, who live 30 minutes drive away, have been helping the appellant with some of the transportation needs, once per week on average, to get groceries and household needs.

17Mr. Munroe has custody obligations for his two daughters on weekends which require weekly trips to and from Lindsay, a one-hour drive each way. The appellant testified that the daughters’ mother has been assisting with some of driving to and from Lindsay since the impoundment.

18The appellant testified that she cannot afford the fees to collect the vehicle from impoundment at the end of the 45 days. Mr. Munroe was laid off work in September and has not been able to find new employment. He is not receiving EI benefits.

19The respondent acknowledged that the impoundment has been inconvenient and disruptive to the family’s routines but submits the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle. She has been using transit to get to and from work, and receiving assistance from family members and her stepdaughters’ mother to meet the household’s transportation needs while the vehicle is impounded. The respondent submits that financial considerations cannot be considered in the test for exceptional hardship if the appellant has alternatives.

20I agree with the respondent. Based on the appellant’s description of how the family is coping without their only vehicle, it is evident they are making use of alternatives. She is using transit each day to get to and from work, and daycare for her son, and did not indicate any workdays had been missed. Her employer is accommodating these circumstances and family members are helping during off-hours and for trips to/from Lindsay. Taxi and Uber services are available, though not routinely used.

21As discussed above, section 10(1) of the Regulation stipulates that only when there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle may I consider other factors in determining if the impoundment is resulting in exceptional hardship. Since the appellant has alternatives, financial stress and loss, including fees for the vehicle’s release, cannot be considered.

CONCLUSION

22Accordingly, I find the appellant did not meet her burden to prove on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship in accordance with s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act and s. 10 of the Regulation.

ORDER

23Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm impoundment of the vehicle.