Licence Appeal Tribunal
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15400/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1(3) of the Act.
Between:
Mandy Sorrell Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR: Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Mandy Sorrell
For the Respondent: Sadia Ashraf, Agent
Heard by Teleconference: November 27, 2023
OVERVIEW
1The appellant, Mandy Sorrell, appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2017 Ford Escape under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the "Act").
2The appellant's vehicle was impounded on November 16, 2023, after police found it being operated by her boyfriend, J.H., while his driver's licence was under a Criminal Code suspension. The appellant was in the passenger's seat of the vehicle at the time it was pulled over by police.
3Subsection 55.1(1) of the Act allows for the impoundment of a vehicle for 45 days where a police officer is satisfied that the driver's licence of the person who is driving a vehicle is under suspension for certain Criminal Code offences. In this case, J.H.'s licence is suspended until May 10, 2026, for having a blood/alcohol content in excess of 0.08%. He has a poor driving record which dates back to 2001 and is currently listed as suspended, cancelled, unlicensed and unrenewable. As a result, police impounded the vehicle pursuant to this subsection of the Act.
ISSUE
4The appellant appeals the impoundment on the grounds that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, relying on s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
RESULT
5Having considered the parties' evidence and submissions, I find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as the appellant has reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. I therefore dismiss the appeal and confirm the impoundment.
ANALYSIS
6It is undisputed between the parties that the appellant is the owner of the impounded vehicle and that J.H. was driving at the time it was impounded. The appellant admits to knowing that J.H. is not authorized to drive. At the time, she and J.H. were returning home after a short visit in Toronto. The appellant was originally driving on the journey home, when at a certain point, she became tired and was unable to continue. She then asked J.H. to continue driving as she did not want to miss a meeting she had in Chatham, Ontario. According to her testimony, the appellant made this request despite the fact knowing that J.H.'s driver's licence was under suspension following a Criminal Code conviction for an alcohol related offence. Based on the uncontradicted evidence in this case, I am satisfied that the vehicle was lawfully detained and impounded under s. 55.1 of the Act.
7During the hearing, the appellant explained that she uses her vehicle to drive her daughter to and from school each day. She also works two jobs and uses the vehicle to get back and forth to her places of employment which she described as being on the opposite end of the city. The appellant explained that her financial situation is currently unstable and she is barely able to pay her monthly bills.
8While there is no doubt the impoundment of her vehicle has been inconvenient, the appellant appears to have managed well by using alternative means of transport. These alternatives have shown to be effective and reasonable.
Has the appellant experienced exceptional hardship as a result of the impoundment?
9I find that the appellant has failed to show that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship for the reasons which follow.
10As a first step, s. 10(1) of O. Reg. 631/98 ("Regulation") elaborates on exceptional hardship. Section 10(4) sets out the need for an appellant to establish that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. This is a necessary first step in establishing exceptional hardship. Section 10(4) of the Regulation provides, as follows:
The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
11Section 10 (1) of the Regulation requires me to consider whether "no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available". The appellant did not offer any evidence to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that she had no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle. In fact, the appellant provided testimony to show that she has been taking advantage of other options such as cabs and buses to get around. Her mother also lives in close proximity to her and she has been able to pick up the appellant's daughter from school when necessary.
12The appellant has been able to obtain her groceries and has not missed any medical appointments. She has also maintained her employment and has not missed any days of work.
13It was noted during the hearing that the appellant also has another personal vehicle. Unfortunately, while driving it to a mechanic she became involved in an accident rendering the vehicle unusable for now. Nonetheless, the appellant has been able to fulfill the duties of taking care of her family and maintaining her employment while her vehicle is impounded.
14I find that the appellant does have reasonable alternatives. They have allowed her to continue her daily routine with no major disruption. The loss of her vehicle is no doubt inconvenient, however, this temporary loss is something that the appellant appears to have overcome.
15The Regulation sets out that if the appellant fails to establish that there are no reasonable alternatives, then the ground of exceptional hardship is not available as a ground of appeal. For the reasons set out in this decision, I find that the appellant has failed to discharge the threshold burden of establishing that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle.
16The appellant has failed to satisfy the Tribunal on a balance of probabilities that she meets the test for exceptional hardship, as set out in the Regulation, based on the alternatives available to her.
ORDER
17For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal's authority under s.50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm the impoundment order.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member
Released: January 3, 2024