Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16433/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of the Act.
Between:
Milan Mitrovic
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR:
Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Milan Mitrovic
For the Respondent:
Sadia Ashraf, Agent
Heard:
December 3, 2024
OVERVIEW
1The appellant, Milan Mitrovic, appeals the 45-day impoundment of his 2020 Ram pickup under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).
2The appellant’s vehicle was impounded on October 24, 2024, after police found him operating the vehicle while without an ignition interlock device. This condition on his driver’s licence stems from a previous conviction on January 12, 2018, for failing to provide a breath sample. As a result, his licence was suspended for a period ending on October 1, 2019. After serving that suspension, he was required to complete a remedial program and was subject to a mandatory ignition interlock condition. Along with being enrolled in the ignition interlock program, he was also mailed a substance use form by the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) which he was to have completed by his medical practitioner. Since the form was never completed, he remained subject to the ignition interlock condition. At the time he was pulled over, his vehicle did not have an ignition interlock device installed despite it being a condition noted on his driver’s licence.
3At the hearing, the appellant confirmed that he was driving on the day of the impoundment but denied any knowledge of being subject to an interlock condition. He states that while aware of the request for a doctor’s note and the substance use form, he did not know he needed to provide these items. He did not appear to take the request seriously. He confirmed that he completed the Back on Track program and stated that he thought that the ignition interlock requirement would be automatically cleared from his record after 7 years. He states he now regrets not having sent the information to the Medical Review Team of the MTO. He states that it was his belief that since he refrained from driving for 2 years, the interlock condition and completion of any further paperwork did not apply to him.
4The appellant states that he has now been successful in having the ignition interlock device removed as a condition for him to drive a motor vehicle. He accepts responsibility for his actions and states he should have provided the substance use form when requested.
5The appellant does not dispute the respondent’s record which shows that he is required to have an ignition interlock as a result of a Criminal Code suspension under section 41 and 43 of the Act from a conviction dating back to January 12, 2018.
6Subsection 55.1(2) of the Act allows for the impoundment of a vehicle for 45 days where a police officer is satisfied that the driver’s licence of the person who is driving a vehicle at the time of its detention is under suspension for certain Criminal Code offences. In this case, the appellant’s vehicle did not have an ignition interlock device which was a condition for him to be operating a vehicle.
7As a result, police impounded the vehicle pursuant to s. 55.1(1)(1) of the Act.
ISSUE
8The appellant appeals the impoundment on the grounds that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, relying on s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
RESULT
9Having considered the parties’ evidence and submissions, I find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, as the appellant has reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. I therefore dismiss the appeal and confirm the impoundment.
ANALYSIS
Has the appellant experienced exceptional hardship as a result of the impoundment?
10The test for exceptional hardship is set out in s. 10(1) of Ontario Regulation 631/98 (“Regulation”). To establish exceptional hardship, I must first determine that there is no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle.
11Section 10(4) of the Regulation provides that, in order to show that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available,
The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
12The appellant argues that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship since he depends on his vehicle to get to and from work. He testified that he has missed some days of work due to not having a vehicle available to him. However, further questioning by the respondent revealed that there are alternatives available to him which he has been accessing.
13More specifically, the appellant has been able to borrow and share a vehicle with his mother who also works. This arrangement has required the appellant to make certain adjustments to his schedule which I find reasonable, albeit inconvenient. Importantly, s. 10(2)(a) of the Regulation expressly disallows me from considering inconvenience in my consideration of exceptional hardship.
14The appellant has also rented a vehicle for a short period of time, but this proved to be unaffordable for him in the long run. As a result, he had to discontinue the rental contract.
15The respondent argues that although the rental of a vehicle was unsustainable, the other alternative forms of transportation that exist leave the grounds of exceptional hardship unavailable to the appellant.
16In addition to these alternative options, the appellant also confirmed that there is public transit available in the area he resides. However, he states that it is not a viable option for him since he is required to bring his work tools and other heavy equipment to job sites. To mitigate this, the appellant has been able to securely store his tools on job sites so that he is not required to transport them each day.
17I agree with the respondent and find the appellant’s testimony reflects his ability to explore, consider and utilize alternative forms of transportation during the impoundment period.
18The Regulation sets out that if the appellant fails to establish that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle, then an appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship cannot succeed.
19For the reasons set out, I find that the appellant has failed to discharge the threshold burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. He therefore does not meet the test for exceptional hardship as set out in the Regulations under the Act.
ORDER
20For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal’s authority under s.50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm the impoundment order.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member
Released: December 19, 2024