Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16233/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Between:

Rebecca Howe

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Did Not Attend

For the Respondent:

Sadia Ashraf, Representative

HEARD: October 31, 2024

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Rebecca Howe, appeals under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”) from the 45-day impoundment of a 2010 Buick motor vehicle. At the time it was detained in order to be impounded, Nathan Graham was driving the vehicle while his licence was suspended as a result of a Criminal Code conviction.

2The appellant’s motor vehicle was detained in order to be impounded on August 31, 2024. The 45-day impoundment period ended on October 15, 2024. It is unknown if the appellant has retrieved the vehicle given that the 45-day impoundment period has elapsed.

3A hearing on the appeal was originally scheduled for October 18, 2024. At the hearing on October 18, 2024, Ms. Sadia Ashraf, a representative of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) attended, but the appellant did not attend. The Tribunal made efforts to contact the appellant to ascertain her attendance. Tribunal staff called the appellant and spoke with someone from the appellant’s household and was told that she was “out” but she was supposed to sign into something today for the “Licence Tribunal”, and asked that the hearing information be resent to the appellant. The hearing details were resent to the appellant by email. Nonetheless, the appellant did not appear and the hearing was adjourned to allow the attendance of the appellant.

4The hearing was rescheduled to October 31, 2024, and again the appellant did not appear. I note that on October 22, 2024, the parties were emailed the Tribunal’s Order adjourning the hearing date. In addition, a Notice of Rescheduled Hearing was emailed to the parties on October 22, 2024, and a reminder email was sent to the parties on October 29, 2024. I waited the requisite time, and during that time, Tribunal staff called the appellant but were unable to speak with her. The appellant did not respond to any attempt to contact her. Given the above and that an adjournment had already been granted once to allow for the attendance of the appellant, the hearing proceeded without the appellant.

5A review of the Notice of Appeal, dated September 3, 2024, reveals that the appellant is appealing on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

6The issue in dispute is:

i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

7I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s motor vehicle. I find that the appellant brought forward no evidence to support a finding that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

ANALYSIS

8The respondent presented uncontradicted evidence which establishes that:

i. the appellant is the registered owner of the impounded vehicle, a 2010 Buick motor vehicle (the “vehicle”);

ii. on August 31, 2024, the police discovered the vehicle being driven by Nathan Graham (the “driver”); and

iii. the licence of the driver was under suspension for a Criminal Code conviction at the time the police detained the vehicle for impoundment.

Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship

9The burden is on the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as it is defined in the Act and regulations. I find the appellant has not met her burden.

10Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

11Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

12If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will fail.

13If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then subsection 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to subsection 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses.

14The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

15I note that the appellant did not appear at the hearing to provide any testimony, did not submit any written submissions, and did not offer any documentary evidence. No other witnesses testified on her behalf. Thus, in making a determination, I reviewed and relied upon the Notice of Appeal which provides some details on the appellant’s position. The appellant states in the Notice of Appeal:

At the time of the offense I was not driving my vehicle and was unaware the person had a suspended license or that these consequences were able to happen. Personally my drivers license is not suspended.

My vehicle is my life line to get to work and pay my bills as I live in a rural area in Acton, ON where public transit is not accessible. Having no access to my vehicle will mean I will lose my job and benefits which help pay for important medications. If I end up losing my job and am unable to make money will possibly lose my place of residence and fall seriously behind in debt.

16The information in the Notice of Appeal is the only evidence provided in support of the appellant’s appeal. When considering this information, I am unable to conclude that the appellant has no alternative to the impounded vehicle. While I note that the appellant states that she lives in a rural area in Acton, ON where public transportation is not accessible, I have no further details in this regard. Other than this statement, there is no further evidence before the Tribunal to indicate that the appellant does not have access to taxi services or Ubers/ride sharing services. There is also no evidence before the Tribunal to indicate that the appellant does not have access to a rental vehicle, or the ability to borrow a vehicle from family or friends, or be driven by them.

17Despite the fact that the onus is on the appellant to establish this ground of appeal, she did not attend the hearing or provide sufficient evidence for this hearing to support her ground of appeal.

18I find that the appellant has not proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available and her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.

19Under the circumstances, I find the appellant has not proven exceptional hardship and the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail.

ORDER

20Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.