Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act.
Between:
Megan LaForme Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISON AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR: Laura Hodgson, Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Megan LaForme, Self-Represented
For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent
Held by teleconference: January 30, 2024
Overview
1The appellant’s vehicle was impounded under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 (the “Act”).
2The appellant appeals on the grounds of “exceptional hardship”. The respondent submits that, pursuant to the Act, this ground of appeal is not available to the appellant because her vehicle was previously impounded.
Issues
3The issues in dispute are:
i. Whether the appellant can rely on the ground of exceptional hardship
ii. If so, whether impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under the Act.
Result
4I find that the Act does not permit the appellant to rely on the ground of “exceptional hardship” because of a prior vehicle impoundment. The appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment confirmed.
Evidence and Analysis
The Ground of Exceptional Hardship is Not Available
5On January 2, 2024, the appellant’s partner drove her vehicle and was stopped by police. Her partner had a condition on his licence prohibiting him from driving without an ignition interlock device. The appellant’s vehicle, which was not equipped with this device, was detained and impounded under s. 55.1 of the Act.
6The impoundment was for 90 days because this was the second impoundment of a vehicle owned by the appellant within two years (Act, s. 55.1(3) and O. Reg 631/98, s.1). The respondent established that on October 20, 2022, the appellant’s vehicle was impounded for 45 days because another driver drove the appellant’s vehicle while her licence was suspended.
7The appellant acknowledged this prior impoundment. The appellant also testified that the current impoundment is causing significant hardship as she cannot attend work. The appellant testified that she assumed her partner could drive her car and she was unaware of his driving history.
8Section 50.2 of the Act sets out the grounds on which the owner of a motor vehicle may appeal its impoundment. Included in those grounds is s. 50.2(3)(d): “that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship”. However, s. 50.2(4) provides that clause 3(d) “does not apply if there was a previous impoundment under section 55.1 with respect to any motor vehicle owned by the same owner”.
9Because the appellant’s vehicle was previously impounded under section 55.1, I am unable to consider exceptional hardship as a ground for appeal. No other ground for appeal was argued or established on the evidence and the appeal must be dismissed.
Order
10The Tribunal confirms the impoundment of the appellant’s motor vehicle.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Laura Hodgson, Member
Released: February 5, 2024