Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 15159/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Cassandra-Jane Doner

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Rebecca Hines

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Cassandra-Jane Doner, Appellant

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent for the Registrar

Heard by Teleconference:

September 14, 2023

OVERVIEW

1Cassandra-Jane Doner (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her 2022 Hyundai Elantra on August 5, 2023, for 45 days under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA”). At the time of the impoundment, her spouse was driving the vehicle while his driving privileges were under suspension resulting from a prescribed Criminal Code conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

1. Will the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA?

RESULT

4I find the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and confirm the impoundment.

ANALYSIS

5The appellant’s vehicle was impounded pursuant to s. 55.1(1)1 of the HTA, because her spouse was driving the vehicle while his licence was suspended.

6The respondent presented unrefuted evidence that the spouse’s licence was suspended for a prescribed Criminal Code offence pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the HTA at the time of the impoundment. Accordingly, the vehicle was lawfully impounded.

7The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded in accordance with s. 55.1 may, under the provisions of s. 50.2 of the HTA, appeal the impoundment and request an order from the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”), allowing the appeal and that the Registrar release the vehicle.

8A vehicle owner may only appeal a vehicle impoundment on one or more of the five grounds provided in subsection 50.2(3). The appellant relies on s. 50.2(3)(d), i.e., that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

9For her appeal to succeed, the appellant must prove on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

The impoundment of the vehicle will not result in exceptional hardship.

10Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria by which exceptional hardship is defined for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA. Subsection 10(1) compels the Tribunal to first consider whether the owner has alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

11Subsection 10(4) of the Regulation places the burden on the owner to demonstrate there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, which includes considering and inquiring into every reasonable option such as using another vehicle and making arrangements to manage without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

12Only if the appellant demonstrates that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available to her, may I consider the other factors and criteria in the Regulation that define the exceptional hardship test, for example, financial loss, loss of employment, or the health and safety of persons who may rely on the impounded vehicle. Importantly, the Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

The appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant testified that she needs her vehicle back because she cannot afford the impoundment fees or the cost of taking taxis and Uber. Further, the appellant and her spouse recently separated, and she is now a single mother of an eight-year-old and a six-month-old infant. She has been on maternity leave and is on EI and needs her vehicle back to go back to work because she is not receiving any support from the children’s father and has additional expenses caused by the impoundment. Her employer is a 30-minute drive from her home. In addition, her 6-month-old recently missed a doctor’s appointment to get her six-month vaccination shots because the doctor’s office is an hour away.

14The applicant also confirmed that she does not have family and friends in the area to assist her with transportation.

15During cross-examination, the applicant conceded that only the one appointment has been missed and she was able to reschedule it. Further, she has paid for grocery delivery during the impoundment period. She has also taken Uber and has access to public transit which is very inconvenient with an infant.

16Although the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle has caused stress, inconvenience, and has had financial consequences, I find that she has alternatives to the impounded vehicle because she has access to other means of transportation such as public transit and Uber. Despite the fact that public transit is inconvenient this is an alternative means of transportation.

18As highlighted above, inconvenience is not a factor taken into consideration when determining whether the exceptional hardship test has been met.

19I am not satisfied that, the appellant has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that she is without alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

CONCLUSION

20I find the appellant has not proven the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under the provisions of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation.

ORDER

21Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.