Ellen Thorne v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2023 CanLII 87433

Date: 2023-09-21

Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Ellen Thorne

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Kevin Lundy, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Ellen Thorne, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Andrew Sookhoo, Agent

Heard by Teleconference: September 20, 2023

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

OVERVIEW

1Ellen Thorne (the 'appellant') appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the 'Act'). The appellant's motor vehicle was impounded on August 23, 2023. At the time of the impoundment, the driver, Grenville Sinclair ('G.S.'), was operating the appellant's vehicle with a suspended licence. The appellant is the registered owner of the impounded vehicle, a blue 2004 Toyota Sierra van. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of forty-five days ending October 7, 2023.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED

3The issue to be determined is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship pursuant to subsection 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below, the appeal is dismissed and the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

5Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the 'Regulation') sets out the criteria and factors that the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the 'Tribunal') must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

6Subsection 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider, first, whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

7In the present case, the appellant resides in Kitchener but had loaned her vehicle to her sister who resides out of town. Her brother, G.S., removed the vehicle from the appellant's sister's property to go fishing without advising the appellant or apparently her sister. The appellant was not present at the time that her brother took the vehicle. The appellant did not contact the police to report the vehicle stolen and has no intention of doing so but has discussed the impoundment with him with respect to assisting with the cost to release it. As her brother used to drive extensively as part of his employment, she assumed that his driver's licence was in good standing.

8The appellant owns another motor vehicle, a 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe. However, the Santa Fe is presently at the mechanic's shop undergoing repairs for an unknown sound emanating from its rear area, possibly the muffler. The appellant was unclear on the precise source of the noise and suggested that that the vehicle is at the mechanic's shop to diagnose the problem. She was unsure how long it will remain at the mechanic's shop as the mechanic is presently waiting for parts to arrive to resolve the noise problem. However, in the absence of evidence of a more serious mechanical issue, I do not find that the appellant established that the Santa Fe is not presently roadworthy or unsafe to operate. She simply prefers to drive the Sierra as it is lower to the ground than the Santa Fe and therefore more accessible given her knee and back issues.

9The appellant relies on the impounded vehicle to attend doctor's appointments and therapy and also to visit her husband who is presently hospitalized. Both she and her husband are seniors and cannot afford to pay the impoundment fees to release the vehicle from the impound lot. However, the evidence suggests that the impoundment of the subject vehicle represents more of an inconvenience than an exceptional hardship as the appellant has been able to make other transportation arrangements in its absence. She has not missed any medical appointments and has been able to arrange for delivery of her medications. While there is no convenient public transit available near her residence, she has access to taxi services and her niece is able to drive her on errands such as grocery shopping. Her other brother lives nearby and is also able to give her rides to the grocery store. As well, because her doctor's office is not far from her home, a taxi ride is not unduly costly. As a result, she has been able to visit her husband at the hospital at least every other day. Although the appellant believes that her husband may be moved to Freeport at some point in the near future, she did not suggest that her niece or her brother could not continue to provide transportation to visit him.

10Ultimately, I find that the appellant has not demonstrated that there were no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available and her appeal under subsection 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.

ORDER

11For the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant's vehicle is confirmed.