Licence Appeal Tribunal
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 22-001517/AABS
In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.
Between:
Salvacion Aleta
Applicant
and
BelairDirect Insurance Company
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR: Laura Goulet
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant: Salvacion Aleta, Applicant Mariana Slomyanski, Counsel Yamini Kundu, Counsel
For the Respondent: Tara Lemke, Counsel Alex Herle, Counsel
Interpreter (Tagalog language): Christopher Sabili
Hearing Reporter: Mallory MacChesney
HEARD: by Videoconference: July 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 & 11, 2023
OVERVIEW
1Salvacion Aleta, the applicant, was involved in an automobile accident on February 11, 2017, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”). The applicant was denied benefits by the respondent, BelairDirect Insurance Company, and applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal - Automobile Accident Benefits Service (the “Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE
2The preliminary issue as set out in the Case Conference Report and Order (“CCRO”) dated January 17, 2023 is:
i. Is the applicant barred from proceeding to a hearing for catastrophic impairment (“CAT”) determination because the applicant’s application is invalid due to the assessor, Dr. Gilman, failing to correctly assess for catastrophic impairment?
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
3The issues to be decided in the hearing as set out in the CCRO are:
i. Has the applicant sustained a catastrophic impairment as defined by the Schedule?
ii. Is the applicant entitled to $6,980.00 for medical services, proposed by 101 Assessment Centre in a treatment plan/OCF-18 (“plan”) submitted on September 15, 2020 and denied on February 4, 2021?
iii. Is the applicant entitled to $5,636.00 for psychological services proposed by Complete Rehab Centre in a plan submitted on February 12, 2021 and denied on March 1, 2021?
iv. Is the respondent liable to pay an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to the applicant?
v. Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?
4At the start of the hearing, the parties corrected issue iii. above as follows:
iii. Is the applicant entitled to $4,577.52 for psychological services proposed by Complete Rehab Centre in a plan dated February 8, 2022?
5The applicant originally applied for a CAT determination pursuant to Criteria 4, 7 and 8. During the course of the hearing, the applicant withdrew the issue of CAT pursuant to Criterion 7. As such, issue i. above was amended as follows:
i. Has the applicant sustained a catastrophic impairment as defined by Criteria 4 and 8 of the Schedule?
6During the course of the hearing, the applicant withdrew issue ii. above.
7At the end of the hearing, the respondent advised that they were seeking costs from the applicant.
8The issues to be decided in the hearing are now as follows:
i. Has the applicant sustained a catastrophic impairment as defined by Criteria 4 and 8 of the Schedule?
ii. Is the applicant entitled to $4,577.52 for psychological services proposed by Complete Rehab Centre in a plan dated February 8, 2022?
iii. Is the respondent liable to pay an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to the applicant?
iv. Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?
v. Is the respondent entitled to costs for the hearing pursuant to Rule 19 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal’s Common Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Rules”)?
RESULT
9The applicant has not sustained a catastrophic impairment as defined by Criterion 4 or 8 of the Schedule.
10The applicant is not entitled to $4,577.52 for psychological services.
11The respondent is not liable to pay an award.
12The applicant is not entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits.
13The respondent is not entitled to costs.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
14At the start of the hearing, I made a finding that the preliminary issue as set out in the CCRO, i.e. whether the applicant is barred from proceeding to a hearing for a CAT determination because the application is invalid due to the assessor failing to correctly assess for CAT, is not a preliminary issue. I held that this issue could be a factor with respect to the weight that should be given to the report based on the respondent’s argument that the assessment was done incorrectly and the applicant’s position that it is relevant to the CAT determination.
15A second procedural issue arose during the hearing. The applicant asked that Dr. John Gilman be qualified as an expert in neuropsychology specializing in brain injury and Catastrophic impairment and the respondent challenged this. The applicant submitted that Dr. Gilman has been a neuropsychologist for 28 years, specializing in brain injury cases and CAT impairment and has been qualified as an expert for the Tribunal on several occasions. The applicant argued that if Dr. Gilman is not qualified as an expert, it would be prejudicial to the applicant, but if he is qualified, there would be no prejudice to the respondent. The respondent submitted that Dr. Gilman was not trained in American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 6th edition, 2008 (the “Guides”) because he objects to them. Further, his CV is 15 years out of date.
16It is settled law that the threshold requirement for the admission of expert evidence has four elements: the evidence must be relevant; it must be necessary in assisting the trier of fact; no other evidentiary rule should apply to exclude it; and the expert must be properly qualified, assuming there is no novel scientific issue. I find the evidence being proffered goes directly to the issue of CAT impairment and whether or not there is a brain injury, and as such it is relevant. I find that Dr. Gilman’s evidence is necessary in assisting me make a determination on the CAT issue, since I am not medically trained in this area. I have not heard any submissions that there is an evidentiary rule that would exclude Dr. Gilman’s testimony. Finally, Dr. Gilman is a neuropsychologist with 28 years of experience who has significant experience with brain injuries and CAT impairment. He provided evidence of his criticism of the Guides, which demonstrates his familiarity with them. Considering all of these factors, I found that Dr. Gilman is qualified as an expert in neuropsychology specializing in brain injury and Catastrophic impairment.
ANALYSIS
The applicant has not sustained a catastrophic impairment as defined by Criterion 4 of the Schedule
17The applicant seeks a CAT determination under section 3.1(1) 4 of the Schedule (Criterion 4), which sets out the following two-prong test, where both of the following need to be satisfied in order to qualify:
i. The applicant sustained an impairment which resulted in a traumatic brain injury which shows positive findings on a computerized axial tomography scan, a magnetic resonance imaging or any other medically recognized brain diagnostic technology indicating intracranial pathology that is a result of the accident, including, but not limited to, intracranial contusions or haemorrhages, diffuse axonal injury, cerebral edema, midline shift or pneumocephaly; and
ii. When assessed in accordance with Wilson, J., Pettigrew, L. and Teasdale, G., Structured Interviews for the Glasgow Outcome Scale and the Extended Glasgow Outcome Scale: Guidelines for Their Use, Journal of Neurotrauma, Volume 15, Number 8, 1998, the injury results in a rating of Upper Severe Disability (Upper SD or Upper SD*) or Lower Severe Disability (Lower SD or Lower SD*), six months or more after the accident.
18Dr. Gilman testified on the issue of Criterion 4. In the applicant’s case, there was no diagnostic evidence of a brain injury. Dr. Gilman, acknowledged this, and testified that he did not do a GOS-E assessment. He did, however, find that the applicant had a CAT impairment based on Criterion 4 as he found that she had microscopic brain injuries as a result of his evaluation with Disparity Analyses.
19The applicant pointed out that the Schedule is silent with respect to when an MRI has to take place in order to demonstrate the brain injury. In this case, the accident occurred on February 11, 2017 and the MRI was done on February 19, 2019. The applicant submitted that Dr. Gilman was able to determine that there was a brain injury with neuropsychological testing and that the changes are so microscopic that they are not visible on an MRI or CT scan.
20The applicant submitted that there was also indirect evidence of mild brain injury in some of the reports which mention post-concussion symptoms, i.e. blacking out, headaches, dizziness, confusion and memory problems. The applicant submitted concussion is indirect evidence of a brain injury.
21In cross-examination, the applicant asked two of the physicians called as witnesses by the respondent whether mild brain injury could be caught on a positive imaging after two years. Dr. Robert Weinstein, a psychiatrist, said it would probably show on a PetScan, and Dr. Ricki Ladowsky-Brooks, a neuropsychologist, indicated that a CT scan might catch it. The applicant submitted that she sustained a mild brain injury that would probably have been caught by better technology.
22As noted, Dr. Ricki Ladowsky-Brooks, Neuropsychologist, testified at the hearing. She has been practising since 1997 in large part dealing with traumatic brain injuries and was certified in the C-CAT program (Accreditation and Certification in Catastrophic Impairment Evaluation) in September 2020. Dr. Ladowsky-Brooks assessed the applicant for the purposes of Criterion 4 and prepared a Neuropsychological Assessment for the Determination of Catastrophic Impairment dated May 4, 2022. Dr. Ladowsky-Brooks indicated that there does not appear to be any evidence of accident-related intracranial injury on imaging, so the first stipulation of Criterion 4 is not met. An MRI scan of the head from February 17, 2019 showed Chiari 1 malformation, however Dr. Ladowsky-Brooks was of the opinion that this was not in direct relation to the accident. A subsequent opinion provided by Dr. Kelvin Mak, Neuroradiologist, confirmed that the MRI brain scan findings were not accident-related. Dr. Ladowsky-Brooks testified that Dr. Mak is a top specialist.
23In light of these findings, Dr. Ladowsky-Brooks was of the opinion that the applicant did not sustain a mild, moderate or severe brain injury.
24I prefer the evidence of Dr. Ladowsky-Brooks as she uses the test set out in section 3.1(1) 4 of the Schedule in coming to her conclusions. Dr. Gilman did not. As the Court of Appeal held in Liu v. 1226071 Ontario Inc., 2009 ONCA 571 at para. 27, CAT impairment is a legal definition to met by the claimant, not a medical test. Criterion 4 requires traumatic brain injury to be detected via prescribed methods. If the applicant believed that neither CAT nor MRI were adequate, then it was open to her to present evidence from “other recognized medically recognized brain diagnostic technology.” However, there was no evidence from such source nor, further, any evidence which supports the applicant's speculation that better technology might have detected a brain injury in this case. In fact, Dr. Gilman testified that the changes were so microscopic that they would not appear on a CT Scan. There is no dispute that the diagnostic testing that was done, did not detect evidence of a traumatic brain injury. The evidence I have before me demonstrates that a brain injury was not detected.
25Since there was no positive findings via a prescribed method showing intracranial pathology in this case, I find that the applicant has not satisfied the test under section 3.1(1) 4 of the Schedule for a determination of CAT injury based on Criterion 4.
The applicant has not sustained a catastrophic impairment as defined by Criterion 8 of the Schedule
26The applicant submitted that she is catastrophically impaired because she has a Class 5 impairment (extreme impairment) in adaptation to work or work-like settings. I find that the applicant has not met the test under Criterion 8 of the Schedule.
27The applicant bears the onus to prove on a balance of probabilities that she is catastrophically impaired. As stated above, the Court of Appeal in Liu confirms that the applicant must meet the legal test for CAT impairment is a legal test. In reference to Criterion 8, she must prove that as a result of the accident, she has Class 4 impairments in at least three of the four domains or a Class 5 impairment (extreme impairment) in one or more areas of functioning as outlined in the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th edition, 1993 (the “Guides, 4th edition”) due to a mental or behavioral disorder. In Chapter 14 of the Guides, 4th edition, impairments are classified according to how much they impair a person’s useful functioning in the following four areas of function: activities of daily living, social functioning, concentration, persistence and pace and adaptation to work or work-like settings.
28Relevant to this hearing, the Guides describes adaptation issues as follows:
…repeated failure to adapt to stressful circumstances. In the face of such circumstances the individual may withdraw from the situation or experience exacerbation of signs and symptoms of a mental disorder; that is, decompensate and have difficulty maintaining activities of daily living, continuing social relationships, and completing tasks. Stressors common to work environment include attendance, making decisions, scheduling, completing tasks, and interacting with supervisors and peers…
29I find that based on the testimony of the applicant, and the medical evidence presented, the applicant does not meet the Criterion 8 test as set out in the Schedule.
30The applicant testified that as a result of the accident she has pain in the shoulders, back, neck, legs and arms, headaches, inability to concentrate, she felt useless and depressed, anxious, has a fear of noise, difficulty sleeping, weakness, and loss of appetite.
31The applicant testified that she is certified as a Personal Support Worker (“PSW”). At some point after the accident, she returned to work because of a shortage of PSWs. She testified that she works at RNS Healthcare for 20 hours per week mostly giving medication, but she cannot always do everything because of headaches and pain in the back. She mostly sits. If someone needs help, she will push a button and a family member helps the client. When asked in cross-examination when this work started, the applicant could not remember.
32Dr. Gilman testified that the applicant was catastrophically impaired in reference to Criterion 8. He prepared a report “Attachment to Application for Determination of Catastrophic Impairment (OCF-19)” dated February 12, 2021.
33Based on tests he conducted, Dr. Gilman classified the applicant as follows:
i. Moderate impairment (Class 3) in activities of daily living;
ii. Marked impairment (Class 4) in social functioning;
iii. Moderate impairment (Class 3) in concentration, persistence and pace; and
iv. Moderate impairment (Class 3) in work functioning.
34Despite these findings, Dr. Gilman found that these test results were inconsistent with the fact that the applicant only worked as a PSW providing attendant care supervision to the elderly and light meals. Further, he found that she had to take anti-psychotic medication to maintain her mental and emotional control to manage each day. As a result, he “immediately rejected” the numbers and concluded that the applicant had a Class 5 impairment with respect to her work functioning. He testified that he did not believe she was working meaningfully and felt that hers was a very minor job. She would have had a lot of down time where the client was sleeping or preoccupied with a program and the applicant could sit for hours. He testified that he believed that is what the applicant was doing, but he did not know for sure.
35Dr. Gilman also concluded that the applicant’s decomposition appeared imminent. However, he testified that he had no information with respect to the applicant’s work after he saw her in December 2020.
36Dr. Gilman testified that in his assessment of the applicant, notes from treating psychiatrists and psychologists were not helpful. He said that he is examining the patient, not the psychiatrist. He takes measurements, he uses the reports to see what medications the applicant uses, and he uses his own test results to see if they compare with other professionals’. Dr. Gilman said that clinical notes and records are very difficult to interpret because they are incomplete and may not be accurate. It is hard to appreciate clinical notes and records unless the doctor puts them in a medical report. He testified that he cannot rely on notes and records unless they are in a report. He relies on his own testing.
37Dr. Gilman did not review the family doctor records or the clinical notes of the psychiatrist prior to coming to his conclusions.
38Dr. Ken Fern, orthopaedic surgeon, provided an opinion that the applicant was catastrophically impaired based on Criterion 8. He testified that the medical records show that there were a number of psychological issues, the applicant was taken out of the MIG and she was receiving psychotherapy. Dr. Fern is not a psychologist and has no expertise in mental and behavioural disorders.
39In the clinical notes and records, there are several references to the applicant working. In a report dated November 18, 2019, there is an indication that the applicant was working as a companion to her friend Rosina full time. A report dated October 11, 2020 indicates that the applicant worked as a live-in PSW for an 89 year old patient and she was their primary caregiver. In another medical note dated August 4, 2021, there is an indication that the applicant had been off work as a PSW for three months.
40Dr. Velan Sivasubramanian, Psychiatrist, testified. He has been doing CAT assessments since 2018 and has received certification in CAT through the Canadian Academy of Psychology and Disability Management. He conducted an assessment on the applicant on July 21, 2021. He concluded that the applicant suffered a moderate impairment in her work functioning and that her impairments in this domain were a combination of physical pain and mental health issues including somatic symptom disorder. He testified that the applicant was still functional in certain areas: i.e. driving, managing finances with help, and that she returned to work on a number of occasions. Dr. Sivasubramanian opined that the applicant does not meet the criteria for a Class 5 (extreme impairment). He indicated that if she had a Class 5 impairment, she would not be able to work at all in any capacity for any length of time. The applicant was able to work for months at a time after the accident.
41I prefer the opinion of Dr. Sivasubramanian over that of Dr. Gliman. Dr. Sivasubramanian’s opinion is supported by other evidence at the hearing including evidence from various sources that the applicant been working for 20 hours per week after the accident, a fact which is inconsistent with a Class 5 impairment. Dr. Gilman’s evidence was not consistent with his own testing, which found a Class 3 impairment in work functioning, and he unreasonably disregards notes and records prepared by the applicant’s treating doctors. The applicant did not provide medical evidence that she had an extreme impairment in work function. The evidence presented indicated that the applicant had been working off and on as a PSW since the accident. In all of the circumstances, I find that the applicant has not demonstrated that she has a Class 5 impairment in the area of adaptation to work or work-like settings.
The applicant is not entitled to $4,577.52 for psychological services
42The applicant bears the onus of proving entitlement to the proposed treatment by demonstrating the benefits are reasonable and necessary on a balance of probabilities. To do so, the applicant should identify the goals of treatment, how the goals would be met to a reasonable degree and that the overall costs to achieve them are reasonable.
43I find that the applicant is not entitled to $4,577.52 for psychological services proposed by Complete Rehab Centre as they are not reasonable and necessary.
44Dr. Valda Lopo, Psychologist, prepared an OCF-18 dated February 8, 2022 proposing $4,577.52 for psychological services. The applicant did not provide any objective medical evidence to support why these services are reasonable and necessary.
45The applicant testified that she received psychological treatment and she learned to take deep breaths, inhale and exhale when she is anxious. She could not remember any other psychological techniques she learned; however, she is taking medication. She indicated that the medication was helpful in reducing her anxiety, fear and irritability.
46The respondent relies on the opinion expressed in the context of a section 44 assessment. Dr. Robert Weinstein, psychiatrist, has been practising for 32 years. He assessed the applicant on April 19, 2022. He reviewed her medical documentation, made an objective evaluation based on questions and answers in an interview and an assistant completed self reporting questionnaires with the applicant which Dr. Weinstein reviewed. The applicant reported having physiotherapy, psychotherapy, as well as desensitization training. The applicant reported to Dr. Weinstein that none of the treatments was helpful. He noted that the progress notes were vague, indicating that there was some improvement, but this improvement was not qualified or quantified, so that raised red flags for him.
47When questioned in cross-examination, the applicant replied that she could not remember telling Dr. Weinstein that she had minimal improvement from the psychological treatment she received.
48The applicant reported the following health complaints to Dr. Weinstein:
a. irritability;
b. trouble initiating and maintaining sleep;
c. daily fatigue;
d. low energy levels;
e. cries easily;
f. no desire in previously enjoyed social activities;
g. difficulties in concentration, attention, memory, multi-tasking and decision-making;
h. depression;
i. fear of being alone;
j. daily passive suicidal ideation;
k. increased levels of fear, anxiety and hypervigilance as a driver and passenger; and
l. flashbacks and nightmares every day.
49Dr. Weinstein indicated that the complaints from the applicant seemed to be much more severe than what he objectively observed. He observed that she had a normal emotional tone, although mildly sad at times, she was engaged, well dressed and groomed; however, she exhibited no anxiety, irritability or agitation during the interview. Dr. Weinstein was looking for signs of trembling, difficulty breathing, crying or being slow to answer. On one of the test results, the applicant’s score was the equivalent of someone with advanced dementia. The applicant scored at the maximum for all of the tests related to anxiety and depression, except one. Dr. Weinstein expected someone with those scores would be crying all of the time, not looking after their hygiene, not engaging, with slow speech and apathy, which he did not observe. He noted that when someone scores the maximum on these tests, he suspects they are either not trying or they are exaggerating. The applicant’s self reports were quite excessive compared to his objective findings.
50Dr. Weinstein diagnosed the applicant with Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood, Somatic Symptom Disorder with Predominant Pain, and Specific Phobia, Vehicular, Driver and Passenger Type. He indicated that in his opinion, the treatment plan in the amount of $4,577.52 for psychological services is not reasonable and necessary, pointing out that the applicant had two full trials of similar psychotherapy, including driver desensitization training, and described them to be completely ineffective. He stated that it is unlikely that any further psychotherapy would be of assistance now, given the time that has elapsed since the accident. He also felt that psychotherapy would not be beneficial in the applicant’s case because she did not appear to be psychologically minded, based in part on her amplification of results, and apparent inability to self reflect and self examine. Dr. Weinstein recommended Occupational Therapy as a more appropriate alternative.
51In all of the circumstances, I find that the applicant has not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that the treatment proposed is reasonable and necessary.
Award
52The applicant sought an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664. Section 10 provides that the Tribunal may grant an award of up to 50 per cent of the total benefits payable if it finds that an insurer unreasonably withheld or delayed the payment of benefits. As I have found that there are no benefits unreasonably withheld or delayed, there is no basis upon which to consider an award in this matter.
Interest
53Interest applies on the payment of any overdue benefits pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule. No treatment plans are payable and owing, therefore the applicant is not entitled to interest.
The respondent is not entitled to costs
54The Tribunal’s authority to award costs comes from two sources: s. 17.1 of the Statutory Powers and Procedure Act (“SPPA”) and Rule 19.1 of the Tribunal’s Common Rules of Practice and Procedure (“Rules”). Section 17.1(1) of the SPPA empowers the Tribunal to order a party to pay another party’s costs in a proceeding according to rules made under s. 17.1(4). Section 17.1(2) states the Tribunal shall not order a party to pay costs unless the conduct or course of conduct of that party has been unreasonable, frivolous or vexatious, or the party has acted in bad faith. Rule 19.1 of the Rules mirrors the language of s. 17.1(2) of the SPPA and provides that a party may make a request to the Tribunal for its costs where a party believes that another party in a proceeding has acted unreasonably, frivolously, vexatiously or in bad faith.
55Prior to April 1, 2016, under s. 282(11) of the Insurance Act, an arbitrator’s jurisdiction and discretion to award expenses was broad. Unlike Rule 19.1, arbitrators at the Financial Services Commission Ontario could consider criteria other than vexatious, unreasonable, frivolous and bad faith behaviour of a party, such as a party’s degree of success in the outcome of the proceeding, the conduct of a party, or a party’s representative, the failure of a party to comply with undertakings or orders, any written offers to settle, and/or any aspect that was improper, vexatious or unnecessary.
56Section 282(11) of the Insurance Act was repealed on April 1, 2016. The Tribunal’s opinion is that the repeal of s. 281(11) is a clear statement of legislature’s intent to limit the circumstances where the Tribunal can award costs in a proceeding.
57The respondent argued that the applicant required one of its witnesses for cross-examination on the issue of Criterion 4 even though the claim did not have a chance of success and the respondent was required to expend additional costs to prepare for the issue of Criterion 7, which was withdrawn on the 4th day of the hearing. The respondent also argued that another one of the applicant’s witnesses was not required to be called, and further preparation expenses were wasted as the applicant withdrew issue ii. Further, the respondent submitted that technological issues that arose because one of the applicant’s witnesses was hearing impaired could have been sorted out ahead of the hearing, which would have saved time. Finally, the respondent argued that the applicant expended extra time requiring breaks to obtain the document brief, which was sent by the respondent several times. The respondent submitted that the cumulative effect of all of these things resulted in a significantly longer hearing and costs, which could have been avoided. The respondent submitted that the applicant’s behaviour interfered with an efficient and effective process which resulted in prejudice to the respondent based on wasted costs.
58The respondent sought $2,000.00 in costs, representing 2 hearing days, which it submitted was a conservative estimate of the time that could have been saved.
59The applicant submitted that nothing pointed out by the respondent amounts to vexatious and frivolous conduct and that the applicant can withdraw issues at any point. The applicant further pointed out that the hearing was actually completed in one less day than was scheduled.
60In order to award costs a party must adduce evidence of unreasonable, frivolous, vexatious or bad faith behaviour in a proceeding and I am not persuaded that the applicant’s conduct has reached anywhere near that threshold.
61Cost awards under Rule 19 are to maintain civility and order during proceedings, to deter conduct that threatens the orderly and civil resolution of an application, and to ensure that the Tribunal’s process and the other participants are respected. They are not to compensate parties for suffering an inconvenience or for the cost of their involvement in a proceeding.
62For the reasons outlined above, I find that the respondent has not provided sufficient evidence to satisfy Rule 19.1 and the claim for costs is dismissed
ORDER
63The applicant has not sustained a catastrophic impairment as defined by Criterion 4 or 8 of the Schedule.
64The applicant is not entitled to $4,577.52 for psychological services proposed by Complete Rehab Centre.
65The respondent is not liable to pay an award.
66The applicant is not entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits.
67The respondent is not entitled to costs.
Released: September 19, 2023
Laura Goulet
Adjudicator