Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 21-004486/AABS
In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.
Between:
Javanshir Zeynalov
Applicant
and
Intact Insurance Company
Respondent
DECISION
VICE-CHAIR:
Brett Todd
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant:
Maria Papadopoulos, Paralegal
For the Respondent:
Peter Trueman, Counsel
HEARD:
By Way of Written Submissions
OVERVIEW
1Javanshir Zeynalov (the “applicant”) was involved in a motor vehicle accident on October 29, 2018 and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”). Intact Insurance Company (the “respondent”) denied a number of treatment plans. The applicant submitted an application to the Licence Appeal Tribunal – Automobile Accident Benefits Service (the “Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE
2The following preliminary issue is in dispute:
- Is the applicant barred from proceeding with a treatment plan/OCF-18 for physiotherapy services dated February 19, 2019 (issue #1 listed below) because it was submitted more than two years after the insurer’s denial?
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
3The following substantive issues are in dispute:
Is the applicant entitled to $2,680.38 for physiotherapy services, recommended by Humber Civic Care Centre Inc. in a treatment plan/OCF-18 dated February 19, 2019?
Is the applicant entitled to $2,326.04 for physiotherapy services, recommended by Humber Civic Care Centre Inc. in a treatment plan/OCF-18 dated April 3, 2019?
Is the applicant entitled to $1,971.70 for physiotherapy services, recommended by Humber Civic Care Centre Inc. in a treatment plan/OCF-18 dated May 21, 2019?
Is the applicant entitled to $1,043.75 for psychological services, recommended by Humber Civic Care Centre Inc. in a treatment plan/OCF-18 dated June 24, 2019?
Is the applicant entitled to $653.90 ($2,598.83 less $1.944.93 approved) for psychological services, recommended by Humber Civic Care Centre Inc. in a treatment plan/OCF-18 dated January 22, 2020?
Is the applicant entitled to $1,546.59 for psychological services, recommended by Humber Civic Care Centre Inc. in a treatment plan/OCF-18 dated July 13, 2020?
Is the applicant entitled to $1,197.51 for a cognitive assessment, recommended by Ontario Independent Assessment Centre Inc. in a treatment plan/OCF-18 dated September 16, 2020?
Is the applicant entitled to $2,200.00 for a chronic pain assessment, recommended by Ontario Independent Assessment Centre Inc. in a treatment plan/OCF-18 dated September 16, 2020?
Is the applicant entitled to $1,175.00 for a Biopsychosocial Assessment, recommended by of Ontario Independent Assessment Centre Inc. in a treatment plan/OCF-18 dated October 1, 2019?
Is the applicant entitled to $3,591.55 for driving therapy, recommended by of Ontario Independent Assessment Centre Inc. in a treatment plan/OCF-18 dated November 13, 2019?
Is the respondent liable to pay an award under s. 10 of O. Reg. 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to the applicant?
Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule?
Is the applicant entitled to costs pursuant to Rules 19.1 and 19.2 in the Tribunal’s Common Rules of Practice & Procedure (the “Rules”)?
4NOTE: I have adjusted the amount of issue #2 listed above, due to an error in the case conference report and order (“CCRO”) dated February 22, 2022 that set this matter down for a hearing. I have also clarified issue #5 to reflect the partial approval as noted by both parties in submissions.
RESULT
5I find that:
i. The applicant is not barred from proceeding with the treatment plan dated February 19, 2019.
ii. The applicant is not entitled to the treatment plans dated February 19, 2019; April 3, 2019; May 21, 2019; and September 16, 2020 (chronic pain assessment), nor interest.
iii. The applicant is entitled to the treatment plans dated June 24, 2019; October 1, 2019; November 13, 2019; January 22, 2020; July 13, 2020; and September 16, 2020 (cognitive assessment), plus interest pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule.
iv. The respondent is not liable to pay an award.
v. The applicant is not entitled to costs.
ANALYSIS
Preliminary Issue
Is the applicant barred from proceeding with the treatment plan dated February 19, 2019?
6I find that the applicant is permitted to proceed with the issue regarding the treatment plan dated February 19, 2019, even though she submitted her application after the two-year period established in the Schedule.
7Section 56 of the Schedule provides that a proceeding under s. 280 of the Insurance Act in respect of a benefit be commenced within two years after an insurer’s refusal to pay the amount claimed.
8Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999 (“LAT Act”) provides discretion to the Tribunal to extend this and other limitation periods, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension.
9The respondent submits that the applicant filed his application with the Tribunal on April 13, 2021, more than two years after this treatment plan was denied by Intact in correspondence dated April 8, 2019. In addition, the respondent notes that the applicant did not reference this issue in his written submissions, and that anything added on this matter in reply submissions should not be considered as it should be regarded as new evidence. As a result, the respondent requests that this treatment plan be barred and removed from the list of issues in dispute.
10The applicant did not reference this treatment plan specifically, but did comment on it in reply submissions. He claims that he should be granted an extension pursuant to s. 7 of the LAT Act. He refers to Tamayo v. Travelers Insurance, 2022 ONLAT 20-014625/AABS-M, a Tribunal motion order that references prior Tribunal decisions indicating that there are four factors to consider when deciding to engage s. 7 of the LAT Act. These are:
i. Bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit.
ii. Length of delay.
iii. Prejudice to the other party.
iv. Merits of the appeal.
11Further, the applicant submits that he meets all four criteria as listed above. He claims that there was a bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit, that a delay of five days is not excessive, that no prejudice was done to the respondent, and that there is merit to this treatment plan, as demonstrated by the fact that $2,562.84 of the total amount of $2,680.59 has been incurred.
12To start, I do not agree with the respondent’s argument that anything provided by the applicant on this issue in reply submissions should be regarded as new evidence and not considered in the context of rendering a decision. As this preliminary issue is not noted in the CCRO dated February 22, 2022, it seems as if the respondent raised it for the first time in its submissions. Accordingly, the applicant should be able to comment on it in his reply.
13I agree with the applicant and find that he has met the criteria in the four-factor test for the following reasons:
a. The applicant displayed a bona fide intention to appeal within the limitation period, given the amount incurred on this plan and the number of other plans included in this application.
b. The five-day delay is not an excessive amount of time.
c. The respondent has not been prejudiced by this minimal delay. No argument or evidence was submitted by the respondent claiming prejudice. This plan contains similar treatment recommendations to those in other physiotherapy plans in dispute, as well, so no additional burden would be placed on the respondent with the inclusion of this issue.
d. There is merit to the applicant’s overall case in general and in this issue specifically. This has been demonstrated by the totality of the evidence and the fact that the respondent removed the applicant from the Minor Injury Guideline (“MIG”) and approved other, similar treatment plans.
14In addition, I find that the respondent’s position does not take into account O. Reg 73/20, which was enacted on March 20, 2020. This legislation, which was implemented as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, suspended limitation periods retroactively from March 16, 2020. O. Reg. 73/20 was in force for 183 days, the time between March 16, 2020 and the date that it was repealed on September 14, 2020. As a result, a limitation such as the two-year period specified in s. 56 of the Schedule can be extended by 183 days.
15This was affirmed in McAuley v. Canada Post Corporation, 2012 ONSC 4528, where the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that O. Reg. 73/20 extended all running limitation periods by 183 days.
16Here, the limitation period for this issue started running on the denial date of April 8, 2019 and would have ended on April 8, 2021, under normal circumstances. However, the limitation period is extended by 183 days in accordance with O. Reg. 73/20. This means that the expiration of the limitation period for the appeal of this treatment plan was extended from April 8, 2021 to October 8, 2021, a time period that covers the April 13, 2021 date that the denial of this plan was appealed.
17In accordance with the above reasoning, I find that the applicant is not in contravention of s. 56 of the Schedule. As a result, he is not barred from disputing this treatment plan.
Substantive Issues
The Treatment Plans
18To be entitled to a treatment plan under s. 15 and 16 of the Schedule, the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that the benefit is reasonable and necessary as a result of the accident. The applicant should identify treatment goals, how these goals would be met to a reasonable degree, and that the overall costs of achieving them are reasonable.
19I find that the applicant is not entitled to the three treatment plans for physiotherapy, nor the chronic pain assessment, as he has not demonstrated them to be reasonable and necessary. It follows that he is also not entitled to interest for these plans.
20These three physiotherapy treatment plans each recommend a similar regimen of physical therapy rehabilitation, functional exercise, mobilization, and TENS unit treatment. Each plan also includes a reassessment fee. The chronic pain assessment is for precisely that, along with a fee for completion of the OCF-18.
21The applicant submits that all three physiotherapy plans are reasonable and necessary, largely on the basis that they have been shown to have relieved his ongoing symptoms of lower back and neck pain. He also submits that the chronic pain assessment is reasonable and necessary to address pain that recurred for over a year post-accident.
22The respondent counters that the applicant sustained soft-tissue injuries in the accident that were resolved through physical treatment approved by the insurer before these three plans were submitted and subsequently denied, and there was no evidence of chronic pain sufficient to warrant a chronic pain assessment.
23I am not persuaded that the applicant has sufficiently demonstrated that these plans are reasonable and necessary, mainly because medical evidence indicates that he sustained solely soft-tissue physical injuries as a result of the accident that were appropriately treated. The Disability Certificate/OCF-3 completed by Dr. Dario Mirian, chiropractor, dated November 15, 2018, lists injuries such as whiplash and various strains and sprains. Clinical notes and records (“CNRs”) of the applicant’s two family physicians, Dr. Raafat Gindi and Dr. Vishal Thakur, further indicate that he sustained soft-tissue injuries, mainly involving his lower back. Each physician recommended standard treatment for such injuries, including physiotherapy, core-strengthening exercises, and medication including NSAIDs and baclofen (a muscle relaxant). Nothing here indicates that the applicant’s injuries were more than minor and warranted extended treatment.
24In his argument regarding these physiotherapy plans and the chronic pain assessment, the applicant largely relies on claims that he continued to experience lower back pain for more than a year following the accident. While pain relief is a legitimate reason to find treatment plans reasonable and necessary, I do not find that he has substantiated chronic pain as he has provided minimal objective evidence demonstrating that he suffers from this condition.
25All that the applicant adduced was the self-reporting of this pain to Dr. Thakur in appointments on May 24, 2019 and July 17, 2019. While Dr. Thakur diagnosed the applicant with acute onset chronic pain as a result of the latter visit, I assign this diagnosis minimal weight as there is no evidence that the physician came to this conclusion based on anything but this self-reporting.
26Further, I prefer the respondent’s insurer examination (“IE”) report completed by Dr. Nikolaos Harmantas, family physician, dated March 25, 2019. Although this assessment was completed with regard to the applicant’s status within the Minor Injury Guideline (the “MIG”),1 it addressed the February 19, 2019 treatment plan and was also the basis for the insurer’s denial of the April 4, 2019 and May 30, 2019 treatment plans. Dr. Harmantas concluded that the applicant sustained predominantly soft-tissue injuries in the accident and that the February 19, 2019 plan was not reasonable and necessary. He opined that no additional facility-based treatment was recommended and that the applicant move to a self-directed exercise program moving forward.
27Dr. Harmantas made nearly identical conclusions about the applicant’s physical condition in a second IE report dated October 23, 2019, this one regarding the chronic pain assessment plan in dispute. He again confirmed that the applicant had sustained soft-tissue injuries that had been largely resolved by the time of this examination and that there was no objective evidence of any ongoing physical impairment.
28In all, the reports of Dr. Harmantas provide the most comprehensive physical assessments of the applicant entered into evidence. As a result, I assign them significant weight with regard to the physiotherapy treatment plans and the chronic pain assessment.
29For the above reasons, I find that the applicant is not entitled to the three physiotherapy treatment plans, nor the chronic pain assessment. As no benefits are owing, he is also not entitled to interest.
30I find that the applicant is entitled to the three treatment plans for psychological services, the cognitive assessment treatment plan, the biopsychosocial treatment plans, and the driving therapy treatment plan, as he has demonstrated them to be reasonable and necessary. He is also entitled to interest on any incurred amounts of these plans, in accordance with s. 51 of the Schedule.
31Details of the treatment plans in dispute are as follows:
i. Three treatment plans for similar psychological services. The first, dated June 24, 2019, recommends 12 1.5-hour sessions of “mental therapy” and includes fees for the completion of the OCF-18 and a progress report. The second, dated January 22, 2022, recommends 10 1.5-hour sessions of “mental health” and also includes fees for completing the OCF-18 and a progress report. And the third, dated July 13, 2020, recommends eight one-hour “mental health” sessions and the same fees for form completion and a progress report.
ii. A cognitive assessment plan dated September 16, 2020. This plan includes line items for a functional cognitive assessment and a fee for the completion of the OCF-18.
iii. A biopsychosocial assessment, also dated September 16, 2020. This plan is for a social work assessment intended to help the applicant through the creation of a treatment plan to assist his reintegration into social and work settings. This plan also includes a fee for completion of the OCF-18
iv. A driving therapy treatment plan dated November 13, 2019. This plan includes 12 1.5-hour sessions of psychotherapy, eight driving sessions, one session focusing on communication with others, a progress report, treatment planning, and a fee for OCF-18 completion.
32The applicant takes the position that there is a consensus among all of his treating practitioners that he developed notable psychological impairments following the subject accident. As a result, he submits that each of these plans are reasonable and necessary. The applicant also argues that the respondent behaved in an unreasonable manner by scheduling four in-person psychological IE assessments in a fairly short span of time, which resulted in the production of seven reports. He submits that this contravened s. 44(1) of the Schedule, which holds that such assessments should not be required “more often than is reasonably necessary.”
33To counter, the respondent submits that numerous IE reports resulting from in-person assessments of the applicant along with paper update addendums indicate that the applicant sustained mild psychological impairment as a result of the accident that have since resolved. Accordingly, the respondent argues that the psychological treatment plans are not reasonable and necessary.
34I agree with the applicant. I am persuaded by four s. 25 psychological reports adduced by the applicant, each of which concluded that the applicant suffered from psychological impairments as a result of the accident, and recommended psychological treatment sessions, driver reintegration therapy and driving instruction, and endorsed the objectives of the psychosocial plan and the cognitive assessment. The conclusions of these reports are as follows:
a. Anna Kozina, psychological associate, wrote in her report dated July 4, 2019 that the applicant demonstrated signs of severe depression and anxiety in both a clinical interview and as a result of psychometric testing. She found that the applicant met the criteria for an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, along with somatic symptom disorder with predominant pain. Ms. Kozina rated the applicant at a class 3/moderate level of impairment and recommended a total of 12 cognitive-behavioural therapy (“CBT”) sessions of up to two hours in length. She also noted the applicant’s self-reported difficulty with concentration, memory and decision-making, along with driving/riding anxiety, and having become so irritable that he refrained from socializing with friends. These issues were supported by psychometric testing results.
b. A progress report completed by Dr. Sadet Yilmaz, psychologist, and dated January 28, 2020, noted that the applicant was continuing to suffer from the same general symptoms. He conducted a clinical interview and psychometric testing, similar to that conducted by Ms. Kozina. This yielded similar results, indicating a severe level of depression and anxiety. In addition, Dr. Yilmaz noted the same issues with cognition, social isolation, and driving anxiety to the point where the applicant avoided driving entirely. As a result, Dr. Yilmaz recommended 10 additional sessions of psychotherapy (but did not specify a length of time for each session).
c. In another progress report dated June 18, 2020, Erin D. Langis, psychologist, arrived at similar conclusions. Following psychometric testing and a clinical interview, Ms. Langis diagnosed the applicant with severe depression and anxiety and recommended eight sessions of CBT of indeterminate length.
d. Ms. Langis further completed a driving reintegration assessment report dated April 6, 2020 that included the results of an in-vehicle driving performance evaluation conducted by Svetlana Kisilevich, driving instructor. Ms. Langis again diagnosed the applicant with a severe level of depression and anxiety. She recommended 12 sessions of CBT of up to two hours in length to address these issues and further endorsed Ms. Kisilevich’s opinion that the applicant would benefit from eight weekly sessions of driving instruction.
35All of the above demonstrate that these treatment plans are reasonable and necessary. Each psychological practitioner above arrived at the same general conclusion and recommended psychological therapy, supporting the three plans for psychological services. Each also noted the applicant’s difficulties with concentration and decision-making, along with social isolation, supporting both the cognitive and the psychosocial assessments. Lastly, Ms. Langis and Ms. Kisilevich recommended psychological therapy and driving instruction to address the applicant’s consistent complaints of driving anxiety, supporting the driving therapy plan.
36I find the respondent’s psychological s. 44 IE reports—all of which focused on the treatment plans and assessments in dispute here—to be contradictory, and as a result assign them less weight than those of the aforementioned s. 25 reports.
37To begin, the applicant is correct in noting that the respondent did request him to attend a significant number of psychological assessments. However, with that said, the applicant did not request a remedy for what it called the respondent’s “unreasonable conduct.” Also, given the evidence provided, the applicant seems to have attended these assessments without protest at the time, which would have been the most appropriate moment to raise these objections.
38Further, while the respondent did require the applicant to attend four in-person psychological assessments with three different psychological practitioners, and also ordered paper addendum reviews on four occasions from these same assessors, they took place from February 2019 to February 2021. This length of time puts the number of assessments into perspective and could well allow them to be regarded as reasonable by the provisions of s. 44(1) of the Schedule, even if the use of multiple assessors and the number of reports is somewhat noteworthy.
39But more importantly, the IE reports largely concluded that the applicant suffered from psychological impairments as a result of the accident, in whole or in part.
40Dr. Sharleen McDowall, psychologist, in her IE report dated March 8, 2019 (and confirmed in her paper review addendum dated April 9, 2019), found that the applicant met the criteria of major depressive disorder, but that this was unrelated to the subject accident due to the applicant reporting to her that he was depressed due to no longer working as a filmmaker as he did in his native Azerbaijan. However, I find that Dr. McDowall unduly minimized the impact of the accident, as the applicant also told her he was depressed due to losing his job as an Uber driver as a result of the accident. In addition, the applicant mentioned his filmmaking career to other assessors, but Dr. McDowall was the only one to have assigned this as the primary cause of the applicant’s psychological impairments. Accordingly, I assign Dr. McDowall’s conclusion limited weight as an outlier.
41In his report dated November 26, 2019, Dr. Rod Day, psychologist, diagnosed the applicant with an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood with symptoms causing a significant impairment in his daily activities. He also noted—in contrast to what was reported by Dr. McDowall—that the applicant was attempting to continue his career as a film director in Canada, but that the accident had contributed to issues with him working on set and that this was the main factor in him not working at the time of the assessment.
42Dr. Day further concluded that the applicant’s psychological impairment stemmed directly from the accident, writing that he did not agree with Dr. McDowall here. Lastly, in both his initial report and in addendums dated January 27, 2020 and February 13, 2020, Dr. Day recommended that the applicant continue with his current course of psychological treatment (although in the latter he did find that one-hour sessions were more appropriate than the 1.5-hour sessions in the treatment plan), including CBT therapy, and also noted that fear and avoidance of driving would pose a barrier to the applicant returning to work as an Uber driver.
43In all, I assign significant weight to Dr. Day’s initial three reports. They align with the s. 25 reports previously described, and as a result serve to strengthen the overall opinion that the applicant sustained psychological impairments as a direct result of the accident. I do not entirely agree with Dr. Day’s conclusions, however. His denial of the biopsychosocial assessment was founded on the applicant being single, which did not take into account that this assessment was also aimed at reintegrating the applicant into the workplace and society overall. I also prefer the recommendation of Dr. Yilmaz to the opinion of Dr. Day regarding length of time of the psychotherapy sessions. I find that Dr. Yilmaz supported a need for the 1.5-hour sessions via the comprehensive testing and clinical interview that went into his s. 25 report noted above.
44Conversely, I assign limited weight to the IE report and two paper review addendums of Dr. Bruce Ballon, psychiatrist, dated October 8, 2020, December 11, 2020, and February 8, 2021, respectively. Dr. Ballon’s opinion that the applicant did not suffer from a diagnosable psychological impairment as a direct result of the accident is contradicted by both Dr. Day and the s. 25 assessors, if not Dr. McDowall. Dr. Ballon’s findings that ongoing psychological therapy and the driver therapy treatment plan were not reasonable and necessary were also opposed by virtually all of the other assessments, which consistently noted that the applicant suffered from depression and anxiety, as well as significant anxiety when driving and riding in vehicles to the point where he avoided driving entirely.
45I further assign limited weight to the last IE in-person assessment of Dr. Day, which took place on December 9, 2020 and resulted in a report dated February 8, 2021. In this report, Dr. Day concluded that the applicant’s symptoms had significantly improved to be “sub-syndromal” since his last assessment, and that he no longer met diagnostic criteria for a psychological diagnosis. As a result, Dr. Day found that the treatment plan for psychological services dated January 22, 2020 was not reasonable and necessary.
46However, I find that this assessment is not relevant to this specific treatment plan, as it took place nearly a year after the plan was completed. By my reasoning, the conclusions of Dr. Day expressed in this report would be more appropriate in the consideration of contemporaneous treatment plans, or to review the applicant’s overall condition at the time of this assessment—not as something that can be utilized to deny treatment recommended many months or even a year or more earlier.
47For the above reasons, I find that the applicant is entitled to these six treatment plans, as well as interest on any incurred amounts of these plans in accordance with s. 51 of the Schedule.
AWARD
48I find that the respondent is not liable to pay an award.
49Section 10 of O. Reg. 664 allows the Tribunal to award a lump sum of up to 50 per cent of the amount to which an insured person is entitled plus interest as applicable if it is found that the insurer behaved in a manner that was excessive, imprudent, stubborn, inflexible, unyielding, or immoderate, and as a result unreasonably withheld benefits.
50Although an award claim was noted on the CCRO dated February 22, 2022, the applicant provided no specific submissions regarding this issue. Allusions were made in the applicant’s initial written submissions to the insurer’s unreasonable conduct regarding such allegations as Intact requesting an “excessive” number of IE assessments. But these notations were submitted in the context of supporting arguments that the treatment plans in dispute should be deemed reasonable and necessary, not in support of an award claim.
51The respondent similarly does not refer specifically to the award claim in its submissions. It submitted that the insurer’s positions taken throughout the adjustment of this file were reasonable and justified, but this is in a short paragraph otherwise devoted to refuting the applicant’s claims for costs.
52Regardless of the respondent’s silence on this matter, it is the applicant’s burden to demonstrate that the insurer behaved in such a manner as to warrant an award. As he has not provided any submissions supporting such a claim, he has not met this onus. Correspondingly, the respondent is not liable to pay an award.
COSTS
53I find that the applicant is not entitled to costs.
54Rule 19 of the Common Rules of Practice & Procedure (the “Rules”) authorizes the Tribunal to order costs against a party if it is found to have engaged in conduct that is unreasonable, frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith.
55Here, the applicant seeks an unspecified amount of “costs pursuant to the Regulations,” but provided no detailed submissions. The argument was made in a single sentence that was more of an across-the-board conclusion to the entirety of his written submissions than anything specific to a claim for costs.
56As noted above, the respondent did not comment in any detail on the costs issue in its submissions. It noted only that the conduct of the insurer and its legal representative had been cooperative and respectful throughout the proceedings, and as a result should not be liable to pay costs to the applicant.
57I agree with the respondent. The applicant has not supported this claim with an argument or evidence, so he has not met his burden here. Therefore, he is not entitled to costs.
ORDER
58I find that:
i. The applicant is not entitled to the treatment plans dated February 19, 2019; April 3, 2019; May 21, 2019; and September 16, 2020 (chronic pain assessment), nor interest.
ii. The applicant is entitled to the treatment plans dated June 24, 2019; October 1, 2019; November 13, 2019; January 22, 2020; July 13, 2020; and September 16, 2020 (cognitive assessment), plus interest pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule.
iii. The respondent is not liable to pay an award.
iv. The applicant is not entitled to costs.
Released: September 26, 2023
__________________________
Brett Todd
Vice-Chair